# Problems of Communism

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1976

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Adam Bromke

USSR

Khrushchev Revisited
George W. Breslauer

"Militarization" of Society
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Defense Industrialists
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Book Reviews
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

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# Problems of Communism

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Cover: Edward Gierek, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party. Photo by J. Tiziou/Sygma.

ANNOUNCEMENT:
This September marks the retirement of Clarke H. Kawakami from government service and from the position of Senior Text Editor of *Problems of Communism.* His 21 years of distinguished service to the magazine were highly valued, and his many friends and professional associates here and abroad will be pleased to know that he retains a relationship to the journal. He will continue to use its mailing address for professional correspondence.

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# A New Juncture in Poland

## By Adam Bromke

On October 13, 1975, shortly before the Seventh Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), Communist chief Edward Gierek visited the shipyards in Gdansk. It was a nostalgic visit, for it was there, in January of 1971, that he had faced rebellious workers as the newly-appointed First Secretary of the PUWP and pleaded for their support of his program. This meeting was different: it was carefully staged, and its mood was joyful. One speaker after another hailed the successful completion of the 1971-75 Five-Year Plan and emphasized the substantial improvement in the Polish standard of living. They all heaped praise upon the First Secretary as a leader "closely bound up with the working class." In turn, Gierek promised further improvement in living conditions and urged the workers to intensify their efforts to meet the targets assigned to them by the party under the new Plan for 1976-80.[1]

There is no doubt that since 1971 there has been considerable economic progress in Poland, and the Gdansk shipyard workers have been looked after particularly well by the Communist authorities. Yet on June 24, 1976, when new food price increases were announced, the workers in that city once again promptly went on strike. This time they were joined by laborers in various other parts of the country. The workers from the Ursus tractor factory south of Warsaw blocked the railroad tracks, stopping trains to the capital, and in Radom there was widespread rioting. To avoid a bloody confrontation, perhaps more serious than that of December 1970, the Communist government backed down. In a terse television statement, Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz announced that the bill in question had been withdrawn for further consideration.[2]

The disturbances were barely over when the Communist Party staged a counteroffensive. In the next several days, massive rallies in support of the government policy were organized throughout the country. On June 28, more than 100,000 people demonstrated in Warsaw,[3] and on July 2 more than 200,000 people gathered to listen to speeches by Gierek and Jaroszewicz in Katowice. The latter assemblage was characterized by public media as a "powerful patriotic demonstration of trust in the party and state leadership." [4]

At the rallies, the demonstrators criticized the strikers and denounced the rioters as "firebrands and hooligans." The press claimed that there was "universal condemnation of those who had disturbed public order in Radom and Ursus" [5] and demanded that they be severely punished. Indeed, trials were soon staged for seven of the workers from Ursus and six from Radom. All were found guilty and were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from three to ten years.[6]

At the same time, the government stuck to its argument that food prices must be increased. In his speech in Katowice, Premier Jaroszewicz claimed that "the present structure of prices has become a barrier to further development." However, he did soften his statement by promising that the increases

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[1] Radio Warsaw, Oct. 17, 1975.
[2] *The New York Times*, June 27 and 28, 1976.
[3] *Trybuna ludu* (Warsaw), June 29, 1976.
[4] Radio Warsaw, July 2, 1976.
[5] *Slowo powszechne* (Warsaw), June 20, 1976.
[6] *The New York Times*, July 18, 1976; *Zwiazkowiec* (Toronto), July 28, 1976.



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will be smaller than originally planned and will be introduced only after extensive consultation with the workers.[7]

In recent years, and especially since 1974, economic progress has slackened, and inflation has made inroads in Poland. The government thus had valid reasons for seeking to raise food prices, which had remained frozen since 1970. Yet it aggravated the impact of this highly unpopular decision by serious errors—both political and psychological—in its approach to the public. In a period when it needed the people's trust, the Gierek regime has managed to undermine its own credibility and has helped to create a climate of apprehension and stress in Poland.[8]

Gierek's blunder has been to develop a program that contains an inherent discrepancy between its economic and its political goals. He has not matched his economic pragmatism with political liberalization; if anything, in recent years there has been a return to doctrinal orthodoxy in Poland. Gierek has rightly acknowledged that an improvement in the standard of living represents an important stimulus to economic growth; however, he has failed to perceive that freedom also can contribute to creative economic activity. In this respect, he has very badly misjudged the Polish national character.

The present article will look at trends in the economic and political spheres that have led to the current tensions in Poland. Then it will weigh the country's prospects for the future.

## Economic Pragmatism

Overall, Gierek's policies in the economic realm have been both innovative and practical. However, they have also helped to create new economic problems which have intensified sharply in the last two years.

Ever since he came to power, the main thrust of Gierek's policies has been to promote Poland's economic growth and to improve the living conditions of the population.[9] Unlike his predecessor, Wladyslaw Gomulka, who concentrated on the former and ignored the latter, Gierek believes that advancement toward these two objectives should be simultaneous. In his eyes, a higher standard of living not only keeps the people contented but also induces them to work harder. In short, Gierek has rehabilitated the profit motive—although strictly within the limits of a socialist system—as a valuable stimulus to economic growth. He made his view clear at a party conference held toward the end of 1973:

*The objective of our system is equality. Socialist equality means, above all, the equality of opportunity in life. Beyond that, the share of each citizen in the goods produced by the society must correspond to the quantity and quality of his work. Those who work better, who have higher qualifications and contribute more to the society, deserve greater moral and material satisfaction.*[10]

To promote these goals the Gierek government introduced two major innovations in the economic system (in addition to a substantial revision of agricultural policy, which need not be discussed here.[11]) First, a so-called "small economic reform" was adopted.[12] Unlike some of the economic experiments in other Communist countries, this reform did not aim at a modification of centralized planning and management; if anything, Warsaw's control over major industrial enterprises was strengthened. Central guidance, however, was combined with a greater scope for initiative in the key industries, in which the principle of the interrelationship of efficency and remuneration was established. In January 1973, this new system was introduced on an experimental basis in 28 industrial units responsible for 20 percent of national production. By mid-1974, units accounting for nearly half of Poland's industrial production had already adopted the new scheme, and it was still continuing to spread into many other branches of the national economy.[13]

[7] Radio Warsaw, July 2, 1976.

[8] For an analysis of the situation in Poland in the fall of 1975, see Thomas E. Heneghan, "Poland on the Eve of the Seventh Party Congress," *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), Dec. 3, 1976.

[9] For evaluations of early Gierek policies, see Adam Bromke, "Poland Under Gierek: A New Political Style," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1972; and M. K. Dziewanowski, *The Communist Party of Poland*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1976, Chap. 17.

[10] *Trybuna ludu*, Dec. 10, 1973.

[11] Gierek's new agricultural policy, which was introduced in 1971, is discussed in Bromke, *loc. cit.*

[12] For an analysis of Gierek's economic policy, see Stanislaw Gomulka, "The Present Economic Situation in Poland," *Kultura* (Paris), November 1975. For earlier evaluations, see Michael Gamarnikow, "Poland under Gierek: A New Economic Approach," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1972; also Zbigniew Fallenbuchl, "The Strategy of Development and Gierek's Economic Maneuvre," in Adam Bromke and John W. Strong, Eds., *Gierek's Poland*, New York, Praeger, 1973.

[13] *Zycie gospodarcze* (Warsaw), July 28, 1974.



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Second, and once again in striking contrast to the Gomulka era, foreign trade was recognized as an important instrument of economic advance. A strategy of stimulating growth through imports was adopted to modernize Polish industry. To obtain modern technology, Poland turned primarily to the West. The Gierek government strove to expand trading relations with various Western countries and to obtain extensive credits from them. A temporary disequilibrium in Polish foreign trade in favor of imports was accepted, but it was hoped that with industrial progress Polish exports to the West would increase and that ultimately a balance would be restored.

## Détente with the West

In developing economic relations with the West, Poland has used the overall climate of East-West détente as a protective umbrella. At every turn, the Poles have emphasized that they are following in the footsteps of their powerful eastern neighbor, and Gierek has never tired of proclaiming his unswerving loyalty both to the USSR and to Brezhnev personally. Indeed, Poland has stayed safely within the limits of solidarity with the rest of the Communist bloc. But at the same time, Warsaw's relations with the various Western capitals have expanded beyond purely commercial contacts into cultural, diplomatic, and even political spheres.

Poland's interest in reducing East-West tensions in Europe was already evident under Gomulka; the Gierek regime's commitment to détente, if only because of the regime's economic program, has been beyond doubt.[14] The Poles were in the forefront of the move to promote the Conference on European Security and Cooperation—which culminated in the summit meeting in Helsinki in July 1975—and they played a constructive role (although more as a matter of style than of substance) during the preceding intricate negotiations in Geneva.

Since 1970, Poland's relations with most of the West European countries have undergone substantial improvement. Warsaw's contacts with Paris have turned into what the Poles like to label a model of relations between countries with different sociopolitical systems. In October 1972, Gierek paid a visit to Paris, and in June 1975 President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing visited Warsaw. Close relations have also developed between Poland and the Scandinavian countries, especially Sweden, highlighted by Premier Olof Palme's trip to Warsaw in April 1974 and Gierek's return visit to Stockholm in June 1975. There has been noticeable improvement, too, in Poland's relations with Britain, Belgium, Austria, and several other countries in Western Europe. Last but not least, since the visit to Poland of Archbishop Agostino Casaroli early in 1974, working diplomatic contacts have been maintained between Warsaw and the Vatican through the regular exchange of diplomatic visits.

It has taken longer to improve Poland's relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), owing to the burden of some legacies of World War II. The Poles initially assumed a hard negotiating stance but subsequently showed considerable flexibility. Particularly thorny problems, having to do with the repatriation from Poland of ethnic Germans and indemnification by pensions of Poles who had worked during the war for German companies, were resolved in a personal meeting (stretching into the small hours of the morning) between Gierek and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt early in August 1975 during the summit in Helsinki. After the agreement was finally signed and ratified, Gierek paid a visit to West Germany in June 1976. To enhance the sym-

*Polish First Secretary Edward Gierek, left, and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt at a June 11, 1976, press conference in Bonn.*

**—Wide World.**

[14] For fuller discussion of this subject, see Adam Bromke, "Polish Foreign Policy in the 1970's," in Bromke and Strong, *op. cit.*



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bolic importance of the visit, Gierek stayed overnight at Schmidt's personal residence in Hamburg before proceeding to Bonn.

Polish-American relations took a dramatic turn for the better soon after Gierek came to power. In the spring of 1972, on his way back from a summit session in Moscow, US President Richard Nixon stopped over in Warsaw. In October 1974 Gierek paid a visit to the United States, and in July 1975 Nixon's successor, President Gerald Ford, visited Poland. On all of these occasions, manifold agreements providing for broad cooperation between the two countries were concluded. Relations between Warsaw and Washington clearly went beyond purely businesslike contacts; the historic tradition of friendship between the two nations was emphasized by both sides.[15]

In its efforts to improve relations with the West, the Gierek regime did not ignore the Polish ethnic communities in the Western countries. Travel restrictions for people of Polish origin visiting Poland and for Poles visiting their relatives in the West were eased. The activities of the "Polonia Society," whose task is to maintain cultural contacts with Poles abroad, were considerably expanded. During his visits to France and the United States, Gierek paid tribute to the achievements of people of Polish background in those countries.

In general, détente with the West has paid off handsomely for Poland. Not only has foreign trade been dramatically expanded, but Warsaw has also obtained substantial Western credits. West Germany has become Poland's fourth trading partner, with France and Britain occupying the next two places. Polish commerce with the United States, which in the early 1970's was negligible, climbed to over $700 million in 1974. While economic cooperation with the Communist countries has been simultaneously advanced (in 1970-74, Polish-Soviet trade rose by approximately 50 percent), economic relations with the West have expanded even more rapidly. As a result, in 1970-74 the Comecon countries' share of Poland's trade was reduced from 63.2 to 47 percent, while that of the capitalist countries rose from 27 to 44.3 percent.[16]

One price which Poland has had to pay for its expansion of trade with the West is a serious imbalance between imports and exports. While in 1971-75 the former increased four times, the latter rose only two and a half times.[17] This gap, however, has been covered by Western credits, which in the period of recession were readily available and relatively inexpensive. In 1972, US Export-Import Bank credits were granted to Poland. Since then the Poles have obtained many other government and private loans, by now totaling some $7 billion, from the United States and Western Europe.[18]

## Economic Progress and Problems

In the first years after Gierek's assumption of power, his new economic policies brought about highly positive results. As early as 1971, there was a noticeable improvement in economic conditions, and in the next few years Poland underwent a veritable boom, unprecedented in the entire postwar period. Summing up the economic progress on the eve of the Seventh Congress, an editorial in the party daily *Trybuna ludu* boasted:

*Never in the past have we achieved so much within such a short period of time. This is true of our efforts both to develop the material base of socialism and to improve living conditions in the society.*[19]

In point of fact, Poland's rate of economic growth in the early 1970's was one of the highest in the world. During the 1971-75 Five-Year Plan, national income increased by about 60 percent (amounting to over $65 billion in 1975), and industrial production by over 70 percent.[20] The level of investments stayed very high, at about 20 percent a year. Some branches of Polish industry were completely modernized. About one-third of the industrial machinery is less than five years old. Equipment for entire factories was often acquired in the West.

During the plan period, there was also a marked improvement in living conditions. In the later years

[15] See, e.g., the pamphlet *Edward Gierek's Visit to the United States*, Warsaw, Interpress Publishers, 1974.

[16] Thomas E. Heneghan, "Polish Trade and Polish Trends: Economic and Political Considerations," *Radio Free Europe Research*, Nov. 13, 1975.

[17] *Contemporary Poland* (Warsaw), November 1975.

[18] Toward the end of 1975, Poland's foreign debt was estimated at over $6 billion (*The New York Times*, Dec. 14, 1975). Since that time, Poland has obtained substantial additional credits from West Germany, the United States, and some other Western countries.

[19] *Trybuna ludu*, Dec. 8, 1975.

[20] Most of the figures quoted in this and the next several paragraphs are from *Wytyczne Komitetu Centralnego na VII Zjazd PZPR* (Guidelines of the Central Committee for the Seventh PUWP Congress), Warsaw, Edition *Trybuna ludu*, 1975. Wherever possible, they have been checked against various other Polish as well as Western sources.



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



*Signs of growth: left, test borings drilled in 1972 in Silesia at the site of the giant Katowice Iron Foundry; right, installation of storage tanks of the new Gdansk Petroleum Refinery in February 1974.*

**—CAF via Eastfoto.**

of the Gomulka regime, real wages had increased by only 1.8 percent annually; by contrast, in 1971-75 they rose at an average of 8 percent a year. Throughout this entire period, the prices of basic foodstuffs remained frozen. The regime also made an effort to provide more and better consumer goods. Production in the consumer sector increased by 79 percent over five years, and additional goods, including Western items, were imported from abroad. Gierek's belief that an improved standard of living should accelerate economic growth was apparently confirmed: 70 percent of the increase in wages in the plan period was attributed to higher labor productivity under the new economic system—although there is little doubt that improved technology, imported from the West, also played a key role in the upswing.

Not only was full employment maintained during the entire period, but close to three million young people were absorbed into the economy. Various social services were expanded. Old-age pensions were increased, maternity leaves were extended, and free medical services were offered to 6.5 million people in the countryside. All in all, these were impressive results—in many respects, they even exceeded the original targets of the 1971-75 Plan.

Yet, at the same time—and especially since 1974—there has been evidence of mounting economic problems and consequent growing dissatisfaction among the Polish people. These economic difficulties have not been unexpected. To a large extent, they stem from the very success of Gierek's policies. The greater interaction with the West has made Poland more vulnerable to changing trends in the world economy, and the dynamic growth of earnings has brought about inflation and severe market dislocations.

Since 1974, several developments in the world economy have adversely affected Poland. Inflation in the West has increased the price of imports, while the simultaneous recession has reduced the demand there for Polish exports, making it more difficult for Poland to close the gap between the two. Moreover, Poland's indebtedness has already reached a relatively high level, a factor that could render further credits from the West less easily accessible. To make matters worse, the oil crisis in 1973 led the Soviet Union drastically to increase the price of crude oil, which hitherto had been available to the Comecon countries at preferential rates.

The spillover of Western inflation into Poland has aggravated the already severe inflationary tendencies created by the discrepancy between rapidly rising incomes and an insufficient quantity of consumer goods. In 1974 and again in 1975, agriculture—already lagging badly behind industry (in 1971-75 agricultural production increased by only 27 percent)—was hit by severe droughts. Serious shortages of food, and especially of meat, ensued.

To compound the Poles' frustrations, a housing shortage has continued unabated. There are at present some one and a half million families without their own separate dwelling space, and with the postwar generation reaching marriageable age, the situation is becoming even more acute.[21] The wait-

[21] *Tygodnik powszechny* (Cracow), July 21, 1974.



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ing period before obtaining one's own apartment is frequently ten years. The fortunate people who finally get their own place to live still have to wait for furniture. With the drastic gasoline price increases of 1974, the dream of early motorization—which in 1971 Gierek had enticingly dangled before the Poles—also largely faded away.

The short-lived economic boom in the early 1970's produced a climate of rising expectations in the country. The Poles believed that they would not only maintain their newly-won prosperity but improve it. When this did not happen, the credibility of the Gierek government increasingly came into question. The situation has been made worse by the postures struck in domestic propaganda. On the one hand, economic difficulties have been minimized. Inflation has been blamed on fluctuations in world prices, and its rate of increase under-reported at 2-3 percent a year, while shortages of food have been explained away as a consequence of temporary bad weather conditions.[22] On the other hand, economic achievements have been exaggerated beyond all reality. In the mass media, the PUWP has been touted as a force capable of building "the second Poland" (in the sense of doubling the country's national capital), and Gierek has emerged as a veritable superman who could cope with any adversity.

In the new economic plan for the remainder of the 1970's, which was announced at the Seventh Party Congress in December 1975, the policies and priorities of the past five years continue basically unchanged. Yet, significantly, among the targets which are to be scaled down, the most substantially reduced are wage increases, which in 1976-80 are to be only half as great as in 1971-75.[23]

Under these circumstances the population's frustration has increasingly manifested itself in open demonstrations of discontent. In the summer of 1974, there were labor disturbances among the dockers in Gdynia, and in the fall of the same year, there were reports of unrest among the miners in Katowice. In the spring of 1975, exasperated housewives demolished a grocery store in Warsaw.[24] And in the autumn, when a series of fires broke out in the capital, rumors of arson by a mysterious anti-Gierek group were widely circulated. The outbreaks in June 1976 suggest the volatile nature of the tensions that continue to mark the atmosphere in Poland today.

[22] *Contemporary Poland,* November 1975.

[23] See *Wytyczne. . . .* For a pessimistic evaluation of Poland's future economic prospects, see the statement by Z. M. Fallenbuchl in "Poland in the Last Quarter of the 20th Century," *Slavic Review* (Urbana, Ill.), December 1975.

[24] *Glos wybrzeza* (Gdansk), Aug. 28, 1974; *Polityka* (Warsaw), March 14, 1975.

## Gierek's Consolidation of Power

In the political domain, Gierek has sought to consolidate his power and has pursued a vigorous program to promote ideological conformity and firm allegiance to the Soviet line, both within party ranks and in Polish society at large. While he has succeeded in establishing his supreme authority in the top echelons of the PUWP and in streamlining the middle levels of the party organization to assure adherence to his leadership, his efforts to impose ideological orthodoxy and his pro-Soviet policies have provoked controversy and strong opposition. The latter in particular have worked to the regime's disadvantage in relations with key elements in Polish society, most notably the intellectuals and the Catholic Church.

To turn first to party developments, the recent Seventh Congress, held December 8-12, 1975, con-

*Franciszek Szlachcic, whose removal as PUWP Politburo member in December 1975 and as Minister of Internal Affairs early in 1976 marked the culmination of a rapid drop from political power.*

—CAF via Eastfoto.



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*Members of the inner core of the PUWP leadership around Edward Gierek: from left, Edward Babiuch, Jan Szydlak, and Stanislaw Kania—all party secretaries and Politburo members; and Polish Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz, also a member of the Politburo.*

**—The first two photos from Camera Press, the last two by Eastfoto.**

firmed Gierek's dominant position in the PUWP. From the beginning to the end of its proceedings, the First Secretary occupied a central role, and his leadership was hailed by many speakers. Gierek also received warm praise for his achievements from Leonid Brezhnev, who came to Warsaw for the occasion.[25] In contrast to the Sixth Congress in 1971, when many former supporters of Wladyslaw Gomulka and of ex-security chief Mieczyslaw Moczar had to be eliminated, there were few changes in the top echelons of the PUWP.

The only significant exception was the removal from the Politburo of Franciszek Szlachcic, a final step in the eclipse of a man who earlier seemed to pose a potential challenge to the party chief. Szlachcic, as Minister of Interior, had helped Gierek to consolidate his position during the political crisis in 1970-71 and had been rewarded with seats on both the Politburo and the Secretariat at the Sixth Congress. An intelligent and dynamic person, Szlachcic soon emerged as one of the key figures in the Communist leadership. Perhaps to compensate for his security background, he assumed a relatively liberal stance, cultivating connections with intellectual circles and letting it be known that he might advocate Poland's greater autonomy from the USSR. At the same time, through political patronage, he nourished his own base in the party and the administration.

In 1974 the leadership moved against Szlachcic, and his fall from power was swift. From February onward, he largely disappeared from public view, and in June he was shifted from the Party Secretariat to a relatively insignificant position as one of several deputy premiers. After his removal from the Politburo he was also dropped from the government and has since been relegated to complete obscurity. Meanwhile, an extensive purge of Szlachcic's supporters (the "Franciscans," as they were called in Poland) has been conducted in the administration, especially in the security apparatus.

In the present leadership, Gierek's supreme position is clearly unchallenged. There is no one who stands out as his deputy; instead, the responsibility for political decisions is divided among several individuals. The "inner" leadership is composed of five persons: Gierek; the three other Politburo members who, like him, combine this position with a seat on the Secretariat—Edward Babiuch, Jan Szydlak, and Stanislaw Kania; and Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz. Their authority is in many respects interlocking. Babiuch, who is in charge of party affairs, is responsible directly to Gierek. Szydlak is entrusted with the overall supervision of the government on behalf of the PUWP. Kania has responsibility for security affairs, although the present Minister of the Interior, Stanislaw Kowalczyk, is likewise a full member of the Politburo.

The diffusion of authority immediately under Gierek was reflected in decisions at the Seventh Congress expanding the size of the Politburo from 14 members (11 full members and 3 candidates) to 17 (14 full members and 3 candidates). The Central Committee was also expanded to increase the num-

[25] *Trybuna ludu*, Dec. 10, 1975.



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ber of full members from 115 to 140 and of deputy members from 93 to 111.[26] The Committee is now predominantly filled with men who can be presumed to be Gierek loyalists. Close to three-fourths of the full members and almost all of the deputy members have been elected since his rise (*i.e.*, in 1971 or 1975). The province of Katowice, where Gierek served for many years as provincial secretary, is particularly well represented on the Central Committee—topped only by Warsaw, where many CC members are from the party's central apparatus.

In advance of the Seventh Congress, the Gierek leadership also acted to bring the middle ranks of the PUWP under more effective control. A reform of the territorial administration in the spring of 1975 provided the opportunity for a drastic shake-up of party personnel at the district and provincial levels. The districts were altogether eliminated, while the provinces—which have often been the power bases of ambitious local secretaries—were increased in number from 17 to 46.[27] The obvious aim of the new two-tier organization is to make the party apparatus more responsive to the center.

Thus, in contrast to the 1960's and even the early 1970's, when the PUWP was repeatedly torn apart by factional struggles, Gierek has largely restored party unity. At present, there are no visible groups in the PUWP which could pose a challenge to his authority, and as long as the country stays calm, there is little chance that any will arise. However, the situation could change overnight in the event of a major crisis, since the consolidation of the party has been imposed artificially from the top and since many of the First Secretary's former opponents are still around.

## The Ideological Offensive

Gierek's ventures in the ideological realm have been something of a surprise. When he came to power, his image in the eyes of the Poles—an image he had gained as the successful Secretary of the industrial province of Katowice—was that of an able administrator. At the same time, he was known for his paternalistic—if not autocratic—political style, and he was generally not expected to undertake any major liberalization. However, the Poles did hope that his economic pragmatism might spill over into the cultural sphere, in that while carrying out his economic program he would probably deem it expedient to avoid confrontations over ideology. Indeed, in the first few years of Gierek's rule it appeared that a compromise along those lines was feasible. A fragile, but nevertheless real, *modus vivendi* was worked out by the party with Poland's intellectuals as well as with the Catholic Church, and at least for a time some degree of pluralism of opinions was tolerated.[28]

As soon as Gierek established his dominant position in the Communist Party, however, he began moving toward greater ideological conformity. The political indoctrination of PUWP members was gradually accelerated. In 1971, the Higher School of Social Sciences, attached to the Central Committee and responsible for the training of party cadres, was reorganized to expand its program.[29] At the lower levels of the party, political education was also stepped up. By the end of 1972, out of 125,000 members of the Warsaw party organization, 80,000 were undergoing some part-time political training.[30]

In this revived ideological activity, special attention was paid to the role of the USSR. The Soviet Union was presented in PUWP propaganda as a leader of the socialist commonwealth whose experience should be emulated by all the Communist countries. As East-West détente progressed, Poland's close attachment to its powerful neighbor was repeatedly and ostentatiously emphasized. Gierek himself set the tone. In an address at the Kremlin on the 50th anniversary of the USSR, he declared:

> *Our most important task is to strengthen ideological and political unity with the CPSU and with the Soviet state. . . . The international position and future prospects of People's Poland are inseparably linked to our alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union, which . . . is the keystone of our ideological education and the chief element in the thinking of the majority of our citizens.*
>
> *Solving the present era's most significant problem—the question of war or peace—is closely linked with the historical experiences and the leading role of the Soviet Union and with the great personal contribution made by the CPSU's leader, Comrade Leonid Brezhnev.*[31]

[26] *Ibid.*, Dec. 16, 1975.
[27] *Polish Perspectives* (Warsaw), September 1975.
[28] See Bromke, "Poland Under Gierek . . . ," *loc. cit.*
[29] *Trybuna ludu*, May 22, 1971.
[30] *Ibid.*, July 1 and Aug. 14, 1973.
[31] As quoted by J. Lukaszewicz in *Nowe drogi* (Warsaw), February 1974.



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There was little surprise, then, when—soon after a conference in Moscow of the East European party secretaries for ideological affairs in December 1973—a so-called "ideological offensive" was launched in Poland. In February 1974 a new Institute for Basic Problems of Marxism-Leninism, attached to the PUWP Central Committee, was established under the direction of the ideologist Andrzej Werblan, who was simultaneously promoted to the rank of Party Secretary. The Institute's task was to develop the theory of Marxism-Leninism with particular reference to "socialist construction" in Poland.[32]

In March 1974, a national conference of ideological activists was convened in Warsaw. In his keynote address, Politburo member Jan Szydlak hammered out the theme that East-West détente does not reduce but, on the contrary, intensifies ideological conflict:

*Peaceful coexistence cannot be identified with the termination of class struggle, either now or in the future. It does not remove the antagonistic contradictions between socialism and capitalism. It is a form of class struggle, a form of historical strife between socialism and capitalism in many different spheres. . . . Under conditions of peaceful coexistence the significance of ideological struggle increases considerably, and its outcome will more than ever affect the nature and the rate of social transformation.*[33]

The "ideological offensive" of the PUWP, according to Szydlak, should have two major objectives. On the one hand, it should "present Poland as an

[32] *Trybuna ludu*, Feb. 27, 1974.
[33] *Nowe drogi*, July 1974.

*Soviet party leader L. I. Brezhnev addressing the Seventh Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party in Warsaw on December 9, 1975. Standing immediately to his rear are (from left): Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz, PUWP First Secretary Edward Gierek, PUWP Secretary and Politburo member Edward Babiuch, Politburo members H. Jablonski and W. Kruczek, and PUWP Secretary and Politburo member J. Szydlak.*

**—Eastfoto.**



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

*Antoni Slonimski, distinguished Polish poet and champion of free cultural expression. Pictured here in 1958, Slonimski perished in an automobile accident in mid-1976.*

**—Wide World.**

integral part of the socialist commonwealth, inseparably linked by ideology, alliance, and many-sided cooperation with the USSR"; on the other hand, it should "unmask the false image of capitalism by revealing its internal contradictions and the many manifestations of its advancing crisis." Szydlak criticized academe as well as the mass media for not following these precepts. He castigated the historians for trying to rehabilitate bourgeois political movements while not paying enough attention to the achievements of the Communist Party; and he chided the social scientists for not resisting—and for even espousing—Western ideas.

Szydlak reserved a particularly vicious denunciation for what he called the "reactionary" core of the Catholic Church:

*The main organized anti-socialist power in our country, a veritable center uniting all the anti-state currents while at the same time representing their last hope, is the reactionary wing of the Episcopate deriving its support from the institutional structure of the Roman Catholic Church. It is the only center of social rightist forces which has at its disposal a coherent philosophic outlook, a strong organizational base and numerous cadres. . . . Its political strategy is aimed, above all, at exploiting our difficulties and failures.*[34]

## A Countertide of Protest

As the party's "ideological offensive" gathered momentum, its relations with intellectual circles deteriorated. The intellectuals not only refused to be intimidated but more and more often resorted to open defiance of the Communist authorities. Despite valiant efforts made by Minister of Culture Jozef Tejchma, one of the moderate Politburo members, to mitigate the conflict, the situation soon went from bad to worse.

The ferment in the intellectual milieu first came into the the open toward the end of 1974. In a petition addressed to Tejchma, written by the noted poet Antoni Slonimski and signed by 15 well-known writers, scholars, and artists, the sensitive issue of the fate of Poles in the Soviet Union was raised. The signatories argued that parallel with the expansion of relations with the Polish communities in the West, contacts should be established with Poles in the USSR. The petition also demanded freedom of culture, education, and religion for the Soviet Poles.[35] The Communist authorities responded with petty administrative measures against some of the signatories but otherwise refrained from confrontation over this highly sensitive issue. Indeed, in November 1975, on the occasion of Slonimski's 80th birthday, Tejchma ostentatiously sent him a congratulatory message.[36]

In September 1975, a letter by the popular Catholic writer, Stefan Kisielewski, bitterly denouncing the restrictions imposed on the study of history in Poland appeared in the émigré historical quarterly *Zeszyty Historyczne*, published in Paris. Kisielewski gave many specific examples of books on Polish

[34] *Ibid.*

[35] For the text of the petition in English, see *Radio Free Europe Research*, Dec. 20, 1974.

[36] *Krajowa Agencja Informacjina* (Warsaw), Nov. 19, 1975. Slonimski, it should be noted, died in a car accident in the summer of 1976.



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modern history which had been either banned for publication or substantially revised by the censors. He ironically observed that the ban extended to many episodes in the history of the Polish Communist Party—nothing could even be said, for instance, about Wladyslaw Gomulka! Kisielewski concluded that for all practical intents and purposes,

*. . . the study of recent Polish history is nonexistent. In its place there is a superficial and one-sided compilation, artificially put together, . . . geared to political propaganda, and exclusively serving to mold the minds of the students in a way desired by the party. The speciality of our system, as Orwell envisaged it, is history in the service of politics, adjusted and transmuted backward.*[37]

*Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, Catholic Primate of Poland, addressing a large open-air mass.*

—Caio Carrubba/Camera Press.

The Catholic Church was not silent either. In a series of sermons delivered in 1974, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski castigated various aspects of the Gierek regime's policies.[38] The Primate of Poland complained about obstacles impeding the creation of new churches and decried incidents in which the Communist authorities had closed down provisional chapels. He voiced concern that a planned reform of education did not provide sufficient room for religious instruction. He also criticized the amalgamation of all youth organizations into a single Union of Polish Socialist Youth directly subordinate to the PUWP.

The Polish Primate did not restrict himself to religious matters but touched upon political issues as well. He asserted that in view of the role which the Church had played for over 1,000 years in Poland's history, it was entitled to voice concern over crucial problems affecting the nation's future. He demanded respect from the Communist government for several basic democratic freedoms:

*A wise organization of society precludes application everywhere of the same narrow schemata; on the contrary, it provides the opportunity for free and unrestrained activity by various social groups and strata. . . . This requires a courageous defense of the right to free association as well as the rights to freedom of the press, expression of opinion, and unrestrained scientific research. . . .*[39]

Cardinal Wyszynski also challenged Communist claims of the identity of Poland's interests with those of the Soviet Union. In a passionately patriotic sermon, he declared:

*For us, next to God, our first love is Poland. After God one must above all remain faithful to our Homeland, to the Polish national culture. We will love all the people in the world, but only in such an order of priorities.*

*And if we see everywhere slogans advocating love for all the peoples and all the nations, we do not*

[37] *Zeszyty historyczne* (Paris), No. 34, 1975.
[38] *Mysl Polska* (London), April 1, 1974.
[39] *Ibid.*



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*oppose them; yet above all we demand the right to live in accordance with the spirit, history, culture, and language of our own Polish land—the same which have been used by our ancestors for centuries.*[40]

By 1975 the Gierek regime was clearly on a collision course with both the intellectuals and the Catholic hierarchy. The former climate of moderation had largely evaporated, and the stakes were increasing on both sides. It was not surprising, therefore, that when the PUWP came out with a proposal to amend the country's Constitution—ostensibly to bring it more into line with advanced "socialist construction"—the opposition took on the government directly.

## The Constitutional Conflict

The regime's intention to change the Constitution was first publicly announced in the "Guidelines" for the Seventh PUWP Congress, published in October 1975. The document referred to the need to affirm the socialist character of the Polish state, which it defined as "derived from the same class-revolutionary principles which originally triumphed in the Great October Socialist Revolution." [41] On December 19, 1975, Edward Babiuch revealed in the *Sejm* (the Polish parliament) that the amendments would also enumerate the basic principles of Poland's foreign policy and, above all, its "unshakable fraternal bond with the Soviet Union." [42]

The first reaction came even before the text of the proposed amendments was made public. On December 5, a group of 59 intellectuals, led by the respected senior economist Professor Edward Lipinski, sent a petition to the *Sejm* elaborating the principles which they felt should be included in the new Constitution. The memorandum, which invoked the Helsinki Declaration in support, amounted to a plea for the restoration of democratic liberties. It stopped short of endorsing a multiparty system and free elections, but it called for freedom of conscience and religion, freedom to work, freedom of expression and information, and freedom of scholarly pursuit and learning. Among specific proposals, it advocated admission of people with religious beliefs into all state positions, independence for the trade unions, the abolition of censorship, and autonomy for the universities.[43]

The petition of the 59 was followed by a veritable flood of protests. Several hundred people of all ages and from all walks of life—writers, scholars, artists, soldiers, priests, and lawyers—publicly expressed their support, in the form of open letters addressed to the *Sejm*. When the text of the proposed constitutional revisions was made available, new protests against its formulation on Polish-Soviet relations took place. A proposal to have the leading role of the Communist Party enshrined in the Constitution and a clause making citizens' rights contingent upon fulfillment of their duties came under especially heavy fire. In January 1976, Cardinal Wyszynski threw his enormous authority behind the dissenters and in three Warsaw sermons voiced strong concern over the proposed constitutional changes.[44]

The Communist leaders were clearly taken aback by the strength of the opposition. The government's official spokesman, Wlodzimierz Janiurek, tried to minimize the amount of protest by claiming that 90 percent of the people supported the constitutional changes (by Communist standards, this less-than-unanimous figure was an unusual admission in itself).[45] Nevertheless, in response to popular pressure the party backed down. The Constitutional Committee of the *Sejm* modified the amendments by removing several particularly objectionable phrases. In the new text, Poland was still defined as a socialist state; however, no reference was made to its similarity with the USSR, and the name of "Polish People's Republic" was retained.[46] The controversial phrase about the "unshakable fraternal bond" with the Soviet Union was eliminated in favor of a watered-down statement that "Poland strengthens its friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist states." The PUWP was acknowledged as a

[40] *Polonia* (Chicago), June 6, 1974.
[41] *Wytyczne*. . . .
[42] *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), Dec. 20-21, 1975.
[43] For the text of the memorandum in English, see *Radio Free Europe Research*, Dec. 31, 1975.
[44] *Libre Belgique* (Brussels), Jan. 27, 1976.
[45] *Zycie Warszawy*, Feb. 5, 1976.
[46] The modifications discussed in this paragraph were published in *Trybuna ludu*, Jan. 27, 1976. While the original amendments had continued no explicit reference to changing the name of "Polish People's Republic," their allusion to Poland's advance to the higher stage of "building socialism" implied that Poland might be declared a "socialist republic," as all the other East European countries have been. Moreover, in Polish there is a distinction between *republika* and *rzeczpospolita*—the latter being a traditional historical term used even when the country was a kingdom. Since *socjialistyczna rzeczpospolita* would not fit well together, many people feared that the state would become a *socjalistyczna republika*, which would follow closely the Soviet terminology.



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"leading political force in society in the construction of socialism," but it was not given any formal role in the state. The linking of citizens' rights and duties was dropped altogether; indeed, a clause explicitly providing for the possibility of participation by people with religious beliefs in the Front of National Unity was added. Still, when the constitutional amendments were submitted for approval by the *Sejm* on February 10, the leader of the Catholic Znak group, Professor Stanislaw Stomma, abstained from voting.[47]

The Communist leaders had met the opposition halfway, but it was a grudging compromise. Once again, administrative measures were applied against some signatories of the petitions, and Professor Stomma was ostentatiously omitted from the list of candidates for the new parliament. Gierek himself did not conceal his irritation over the protests. At a conference with Polish journalists, he characterized the petition of the 59 as ". . . a miserable attempt to revive obsolete Polish bourgeois concepts . . . and to try to apply long-dead ideas to a new era." [48]

## Continuing Ferment

The Communists' lack of grace in conceding their defeat only widened the chasm between the PUWP and the opposition and led to still further polemics. In April 1976, the Episcopate issued a tersely-worded communiqué elaborating its position on the recently enacted constitutional changes. The communiqué, pointing to the Helsinki Declaration, strongly endorsed both the principle of respect for human rights and the principle of the right to national self-determination. It also explicitly cautioned the Communist authorities not to use sanctions against signers of the various protests.[49]

In an open letter addressed to Gierek, Professor Lipinski answered the First Secretary's charges against the signatories of the appeal of the 59. As a veteran socialist, Lipinski asserted that he had a right to be concerned about the nature of socialism in Poland. Declaring himself in favor of the pluralistic model of socialism espoused by the Italian and the French Communists, he repudiated the Soviet totalitarian model as incompatible with Polish democratic traditions. The old professor did not mince words in describing the negative aspects of Soviet influence on Poland:

*The imposition of the Soviet system has devastated our social and moral life. It represents a great misfortune in the history of the nation. We are being compelled to support Soviet foreign policy unconditionally, and we have ceased to be an independent element in world politics. This is often contrary to Polish national interests. We took part in the military invasion of Czechoslovakia, helping to suppress the process of renewal in that country at the very time when it was emancipating itself from Soviet influence. . . .*

*Today there is no more important goal for Poland than the reassertion of its sovereignty. Only after regaining political independence will it be possible to undertake systematic economic reform and to restructure the political and social system, which will release the creative potential of the nation.*[50]

Another open letter to the Communist leadership, highly critical of the constitutional changes, came from Wladyslaw Bienkowski. Bienkowski is a veteran Communist and was a close collaborator of Gomulka until the late 1950's, when he resigned from the PUWP and subsequently wrote several books critical of various aspects of the political system in Poland. Never in the past, however, had he been so outspoken in his denunciation of Soviet interference in Polish domestic affairs. In a direct attack on the Soviet Ambassador in Warsaw, Stanislaw Pilotowicz, Bienkowski compared the present situation with that which existed in Polish-Russian relations toward the end of the 18th century, just before Poland's final partitioning:

*We have our own censors, but . . . the position of main censor is now occupied by the representative of the Soviet Union in Poland, whose main function, it seems, is to oversee the ideological purity of the allied country. He does not even conceal his mission and often intervenes personally. Under his pressure, books are refused publication, and books which have already been published . . . are withdrawn from circulation. In historical works entire sections are deleted, even when they deal with long-ago Polish-Russian relations—as if the Soviet authorities identified themselves with policies of the Russian Tsars.*

[47] *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), Feb. 11, 1976.
[48] *Trybuna* (London), No. 23/79, 1976.
[49] *Polonia*, May 30, 1976.
[50] *Trybuna*, No. 23/79, 1976. This letter circulated in Poland in *samizdat* form.



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*It closely resembles the situation of two centuries ago, when, in a still independent Poland, the representative of the Russian Empress acted as a* de facto *governor and with the assistance of corrupted elements and the support of the Russian army . . . suppressed any attempt at renewal in the country.*[51]

Dissident opinion of a more radical nature is reflected in an interesting document which has recently been circulated in Poland in *samizdat* form—the Program of the Polish Coalition for Independence. It goes beyond anything that has emanated from opposition circles in the past in that it is issued in the name of an organized political group (though its members are not identified) and proposes a totally different alternative to Poland's present political and economic system.

*A photo of Wladyslaw Bienkowski in 1956 when he was Polish Minister of Culture.*

—Eastfoto.

The program asserts that the Communist leaders are not interested in cooperation with Polish society but simply manipulate the people to stay in power. It calls for resolute opposition to communism and advocates the restoration of parliamentary democracy and at least a partial return to capitalism. The anonymous authors have no illusions that their objectives can be accomplished immediately, but they claim that the Communist countries, including the USSR, are already in the throes of a grave crisis. They write:

*It is impossible to anticipate when the crisis will come into the open. . . . [But it] may begin in Poland. We must be ready for this, and consequently we should be conscious not only of what we reject, but also of what we want to accomplish. . . .*

*The opposition must not be reduced to mere grumbling and gossiping. We must at all times be prepared with alternative plans and goals. This is above all the duty of the Polish intelligentsia, which historically has been burdened with responsibility for the spiritual fortunes of our nation. It is also the task of the most numerous social group, namely, the industrial workers, who command the greatest power.*[52]

## Parallels and Portents

The confrontation between the government and the workers in June 1976 gravely deepened the political crisis in Poland. Ironically, its scenario was somewhat similar to the upheaval in 1970. Gomulka had raised prices shortly after his great success in foreign policy—the visit to Warsaw by the then West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt; Gierek took the same step soon after his triumphant visit to Bonn. In one important respect, however, Gierek's position is worse than that of Gomulka. The intellectuals came out openly against Gomulka in March 1968, but at that time the workers remained passive. Conversely, when the workers struck in December 1970, the intellectuals were taken by surprise and played no role in the crisis whatsoever. By contrast, in the present situation both intellectual circles and the working class are opposing Gierek's policies.

In comparison with Gomulka, Gierek has been

[51] *Kultura*, April 1976. This letter circulated in Poland in *samizdat* form.

[52] *Glos Polski* (Toronto), May 27-June 24, 1976.



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handicapped from the very start. When Gomulka came to power in 1956, he enjoyed considerable prestige among the Poles for his opposition to Stalinism, while Gierek in 1970 has no such record to his credit. Also, the Poles' eventual disillusionment with Gomulka made them more reserved toward his successor. In January 1971, the rebellious Szczecin workers told Gierek this to his face:

*We must give Comrade Gierek a chance. . . . We must have confidence in him, as we had confidence in Gomulka. Except that the latter failed us. . . .*

*We have to give the government a chance for a year or two . . . we must do it! If in a year or two there is no improvement, then we will say: Comrades, we were deceived.*[53]

In 1956, the mood of the Poles was one of political realism.[54] The memories of their immense but futile losses during World War II were fresh in their minds, and they were wary of staging another costly revolt. Thus, they eagerly embraced the compromise offered by Gomulka—which gave them at least a modicum of freedom after years of Stalinist oppression. The present mood of the Poles is different; they have shifted markedly toward political idealism. The losses wreaked by the war have been made up, and today the members of the young generation are no longer under the defeatist spell of the 1940's. They are more assertive and impatient. The spontaneous reaction of a major segment of the workers to the recent price increases clearly illustrated this. By taking to the streets in 1956, the workers brought Gomulka to power, and in 1970 they overthrew him. At present, the workers seem to be confident that they can depose Gierek in the same fashion. The government's prompt retreat from food price increases probably only confirmed them in this conviction.

When he came to power in 1970, Gierek tried to play his own game. He cultivated his image as an able administrator. He gave his first attention to economic progress. His objective, it seems, was to buy the workers' political acquiescence with an improvement in their standard of living. Yet, economic progress produced other results. It helped increase

*Fire rages at the headquarters of the Polish United Workers' Party in Szczecin on December 17, 1970, during the unrest that led to Edward Gierek's emergence as PUWP First Secretary in the place of Wladyslaw Gomulka.*

**—A private photo by a Polish citizen now in the West.**

the Poles' confidence, and it intensified their economic as well as their political demands.

With the first sign of economic difficulties in 1974, Gierek abandoned his earlier stance and tried to overcome the crisis by political means. He sought to arouse the workers to greater efforts by a renewed stress on Communist propaganda. Yet, by resorting to practices which had been thoroughly compromised under Gomulka, Gierek damaged his credibility even more. Soon the country was caught up in a vicious descending spiral. The more popular dissatisfaction the Communists encountered, the more they intensified their propaganda drive; and the wider the gap between the slogans and the existing facts became, the less authority the PUWP commanded.

Since the confrontation in June, there has been an impasse between the Communist government and the workers. Sooner or later, for economic reasons,

[53] Ewa Wacowska, *Rewolta szczecinska i jej znaczenie* (The Szczecin Revolt and Its Significance), Paris, Instytut Literacki, 1971. For excerpts in English, see *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1972, p. 4.

[54] For a comprehensive discussion of this subject, see Adam Bromke, *Poland's Politics, Idealism vs. Realism*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967.



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*Polish First Secretary Edward Gierek and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev converse during the July 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe held in Helsinki, Finland. In the right foreground is British Prime Minister Harold Wilson.*

**—A. Nogues and P. Ledru/Sygma.**

food prices will have to be increased. This, however, is likely to lead to new strikes and conceivably even to a large-scale workers' rebellion. Resolving the conflict by replacing one Communist leader with another might be difficult, for at present there are no figures in the top echelon of the PUWP who enjoy a stature comparable to that of Gomulka in 1956 or even to that of Gierek in 1970. Yet crushing a rebellion by force—if it could be done at all—would compromise the PUWP even more. At the same time, it would disrupt economic progress and worsen the workers' plight. It would also adversely affect Poland's cooperation with the West, which is crucial to the country's progress.

The intellectuals and the Catholic leaders are well aware of the dangers inherent in the present situation. They watch the government's impasse with the workers with a certain *Schadenfreude* (a mixture of sorrow and satisfaction), but they would not like to see the situation deteriorate to the point of no return. Most of them have not forgotten the lesson of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Program of the Polish Coalition for Independence does not seem to represent the views of the general intellectual milieu, for most intellectuals appear to believe that in Poland's present position democracy and capitalism are unrealistic goals. Yet, there is no question that more and more of the intellectuals have been pushed to embrace extreme positions. Their mood of frustration seems to have deepened into one of desperation.

In the last few years Polish society has thus become largely polarized, with emotions on both sides running high. The parallel escalation of demands has made compromise increasingly difficult, and it seems very possible that a major explosion threatens. By 1976, the situation in the country has come dangerously close to the pessimistic prediction offered two years ago by Professor Jan Szczepanski:

*Polish politics is governed by emotions. We still believe that development of the country is a function of patriotic involvement, devotion, readiness to sacrifice, etc., and in education and propaganda we emphasize emotions. . . . This is playing with fire, for aroused emotions often can produce quite unexpected results.*

*The basic question is whether our society will have enough determination to continue the efforts under-*



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*taken in 1971 . . . or whether it is going to be carried away by the emotional traditions which worked with such regularity in our history. . . .*[55]

## The Test of Helsinki

The Poles' more assertive mood has been reflected not only in domestic developments but also in their attitude toward foreign relations. They have been pleased by the expansion of Poland's contacts with the West; Gierek's exchange of visits with various Western statesmen has undoubtedly enhanced his prestige at home. However, many Poles also hoped that in the climate of international détente they would be able to improve their position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. They would have liked the Helsinki Declaration's provisions for noninterference in domestic affairs to apply to Polish-Soviet relations. Yet, since 1971 the trend has been in the opposite direction. As if to compensate for his expanded contacts with the West, Gierek has gone out of his way to demonstrate his unconditional loyalty to the Kremlin.

Warsaw undoubtedly was put under pressure by Moscow to conform with the general ideological tightening in the Soviet bloc in the wake of East-West détente. But Gierek apparently needed no urging. His repeated discourses about Poland's unshakable bonds with the USSR and his profuse praise of the CPSU and of Brezhnev personally have gone far beyond what is expected of a loyal ally. His statements have annoyed the Poles no end and have become the object of widespread scorn in the country. Soviet Ambassador Pilotowicz's overbearing behavior has only added insult to injury. In such a climate, the proposal to enshrine Poland's subordinate position with respect to the Soviet Union in the Polish Constitution was viewed by many Poles with genuine alarm. They regarded it as a first step toward incorporation of the Polish People's Republic into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Poles are well aware of the necessity of maintaining good relations with the USSR; however, they want Poland to be Russia's ally, not its satellite—even less a Soviet republic.[56] A popular saying in Warsaw, attributed to disgraced Communist leader Franciszek Szlachcic, has it that Polish-Soviet friendship should be like "good Russian tea—strong, warm, but not too sweet." It is important to remember that several leading figures now in the ranks of the opposition—notably, Stomma, Slonimski, Bienkowski, and Kisielewski—have been known in the past as strong supporters of the Polish-Soviet alliance. They were driven to their present positions by sheer dismay. Instead of a gradual improvement in Poland's position vis-à-vis Russia, they have seen a steady deterioration—even as compared to the Gomulka era.

The Polish people have no illusions about the prospects of any assistance from the West should a crisis develop. Among all the various documents emanating from opposition circles, not a single one anticipates direct Western support for Poland. The Poles, do expect, however, that the climate of East-West détente will have a restraining influence on Moscow, reducing the chances of Soviet intervention. They also hope that the prospect of criticism from the influential Italian and French Communist parties—who were openly indignant over the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968—will be a similiar deterrent to rash action on Moscow's part. While these attitudes seem realistic enough, many Poles have a distorted picture of the internal situation in the USSR. Under the influence of the Western media and émigré publications, they tend to exaggerate the impact of the Soviet dissidents, and many even seem to believe that a major upheaval is imminent in that country.

The growing divergence between internal and external trends in Poland is potentially threatening to détente in Europe. Should the internal political situation culminate in an open rebellion, the Polish Communist regime might be unable to cope on its own and might turn to Moscow for assistance. Yet Soviet military intervention, which would almost certainly encounter armed resistance in Poland, would doubtless be viewed by the West as a flagrant violation of the Helsinki Declaration. The last several years of painstaking progress in East-West relations would thus be gravely imperiled.

The tug-of-war between the Communist regime and the Polish people has by now gone on for a generation. The latest workers' strikes occurred almost 20 years to the date after the "Black Thursday" in Poznan on June 28, 1956. There were popular upheavals in Poland in 1968 and again in 1970. Today the Polish people are in a more assertive mood than ever before, and the present confrontation—unless handled with great caution—could evolve into a more acute crisis than those in the past.

[55] *Polityka*, Oct. 19, 1974.

[56] For fuller treatment of this subject, see Adam Bromke, "Beyond the Gomulka Era," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), April 1971; also Andrzej Micewski, "Polish Foreign Policy: Historical Perspectives," in Bromke and Strong, *op. cit.*



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# Khrushchev Reconsidered

By George W. Breslauer

Since the dismissal of Nikita Khrushchev in October 1964, scholars have debated at length the nature of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime and the features that make it similar to, or different from, the regime under Khrushchev. There are, of course, some very obvious differences about which few disagree. First, Leonid Brezhnev is clearly not the arbitrary interventionist that Khrushchev was—despite the increasingly effusive praise of his personality. He seems to respect the process of group decision-making and the development of tacit procedures for interaction among members of the top leadership. Second, neither Brezhnev nor his colleagues have made major assaults on the main institutional bases of power in the system through widespread purging, frequent reorganizations, or radical alterations of budgetary priorities. Third, Khrushchev's ebullient optimism about, and impatience for, rapid transformation and economic progress have been toned down, as has his tendency to pressure cadres into pursuing wildly unrealistic and unattainable goals—and then to blame those cadres for malfeasance when the targets were not met. Of course, it remains the case that optimism, pressure, and political intervention in operational decision-making are important principles of rule in the USSR; but in comparison to the situation under Khrushchev, there have been considerable changes in the precise nature of each principle and the degree to which each is actually applied.

Major disagreements arise, however, when we attempt to interpret the meaning and significance of these changes. To some scholars, alterations in political style since Khrushchev have also been accompanied by a fundamental shift in the values of the dominant coalition in the Soviet leadership—away from transformist goals in the direction of a "conservative restoration." Other scholars emphasize continuity.

To some extent these differences can be reconciled, for they are often determined by the types of issues on which the analyst focuses his attention. Those who deal with problems of *economic growth* are led to emphasize the many features of continuity between Khrushchev and his successors: the commitment to raising the standard of living and overcoming Stalinist austerity; the turn away from dogma in the natural, and some of the social, sciences; the steady increase in material incentives and investments in previously neglected sectors of the economy; the end of mass terror as an instrument of rule; the expanded recruitment of technically skilled cadres into public administration; and the much greater emphasis on economic performance in judging the results of administrative work. When one focuses on this realm of policy, one can legitimately characterize Khrushchev as a "transitional leader" [1] who steered the Soviet Union away from the rigidity and austerity of late Stalinism toward a new era of material and physical security for the masses—and who differed from his successors with respect to means, but not ends.

Those who focus on issues of *social transformation,* on the other hand, often reach the conclusion that Khrushchev's overthrow was accompanied by a conservative restoration — away from "utopian"

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[1] See Carl A. Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966, p. 208 ("The Khrushchev era was a transition in Soviet politics, and Khrushchev may be seen as a transitional leader"). Also see Mark Frankland, *Khrushchev*, New York, Stein and Day, 1967, p. 208; and Edward Crankshaw, *Khrushchev: A Career*, New York, The Viking Press, 1966, pp. 286-87.



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goals and toward "developmental" goals.[2] Thus, the abandonment of "revolutions from above" directed against the private sector in agriculture; the renewed emphasis on individual rewards at the expense of collective rewards in the allocation of material incentives; and the reduced urgency about radical changes in social structure and university access—all are viewed as fundamental reductions in the regime's commitment to radical social transformation, despite continuing efforts to reduce income inequality in Soviet society.

The image of Khrushchev's successors as the architects of a conservative restoration has, until recently, been further reinforced by a focus upon issues of *political participation.* Khrushchev has been regarded as a Soviet-style "populist" who tried to draw the masses into the implementation of public policy, and who allied with the masses against the bureaucrats in order to foster administrative control and responsibility. His successors, in turn, have been viewed as "restorationists" for having reduced the opportunities for mass involvement in public affairs, having restricted the scope of public discussion on most issues of social and economic policy, and having increased political control and intervention.[3]

In a series of important articles, Professor Jerry Hough has recently challenged this image of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime.[4] He points out that the present Soviet leadership has continued to draw the population into mass organizations at rates that far exceed the rate of growth of the population as a whole. Moreover, he takes issue with the notion that debate has been constricted, noting that "with the exception of a few of those in the past, nearly all debates are richer and freer than they were under Khrushchev." [5] Finally, Hough observes that there has been a steady expansion in the opportunities for specialists and masses alike to make inputs into the political system on issues of interest to them. Accordingly, he concludes that the current regime has been no less "populist" than Khrushchev's was.

Hough's critique is a telling one and ought to give pause to those who apply the label of "immobilism" to the Brezhnev administration and to those who have underplayed the expanded opportunities for input since the years of Khrushchev's high-pressured, unpredictable, and impatient leadership. Yet, before we apply such labels as "populist" to this phenomenon, we should bear in mind that, in the Soviet context, a populist ruler is not one who is concerned simply with expanded societal input or with drawing the masses into social organizations in ever-larger numbers. "Drawing in" *(privlecheniye)* is a traditional goal in Leninist regimes, though one that was stifled during the Stalinist period of "cadres decide everything." Expanded input, moreover, is a common goal of Leninist and non-Leninist bureaucratic regimes that are trying to increase the responsiveness of their institutions to societal inputs and that wish to increase their capacity for more rational manipulation of societal affairs. A populist leader, on the other hand, is concerned not just with numbers and inputs, but with the *nature of the authority relationship between leaders and led.* In the Soviet context, thus, populism would take the form of an attack on elitism among officials: it would challenge the higher political and ideological status of state and party officials vis-à-vis the masses; and it would attempt to reduce the immunity of officials to criticism of their political prerogatives and leadership orientation.

Whether or not one wishes to accept this definition is a matter of taste, but whether or not Khrushchev and his successors differ in their approaches to questions of political participation is a matter for investigation. Most Westerners who have stressed Khrushchev's populism have tended either to overemphasize the uniqueness of *privlecheniye* (and therefore to misinterpret trends since Khrushchev) or to view Khrushchev's turning of the masses against the bureaucrats in purely instrumental terms —as Khrushchev's way of increasing administrative control. Those who now argue that the current regime is no less populist than Khrushchev's tend to ignore dimensions of political participation other than *privlecheniye* and expanded input.

The present article will highlight some very important differences between the two administrations

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[2] See Richard Lowenthal, "Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy," in Chalmers A. Johnson, Ed., *Change in Communist Systems,* Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1970, pp. 33-116.

[3] Paul Cocks, "The Rationalization of Party Control," in Johnson, *op. cit.,* pp. 153-90; Wolfgang Leonhard, "Politics and Ideology in the Post-Khrushchev Era," in Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson, Eds., *Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev,* Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968, pp. 41-72; Sidney Ploss, "New Politics in Russia?," *Survey* (London), August 1973, pp. 23-35.

[4] "Political Participation in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), January 1976, pp. 3-20; "The Brezhnev Era: The Man and the System," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1976, pp. 1-17. (According to the latter article, p. 10, "The 'populism' of Khrushchev did not disappear with him.")

[5] "Political Participation in the Soviet Union," p. 13.



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relating to the nature of political authority. As this writer sees things, Khrushchev deserves the label of "populist" (of the Soviet variety), for despite the fact that he propagated a personality cult of his own, he led an attack on elitism among Soviet officials. He did not measure the quality of participation by simply asking whether there existed "the opportunity for a very small percentage of the population to inform themselves about some specialized realm of decision-making and to have some impact on those decisions," [6] important as this may be in the eyes of most Soviet citizens. Khrushchev was concerned with the much broader question of expanding the rights of the masses vis-à-vis Soviet officials, and with establishing mechanisms whereby the population might be protected from arbitrary official behavior. For a number of reasons (to be discussed below), Khrushchev's efforts were unsuccessful, but they deserve to be recorded.

Khrushchev's successors, in turn, may be more popular with the masses than Khrushchev was, because they have improved economic performance, abandoned "revolutions from above," and expanded the opportunities for input on questions related to economic efficiency and social relations. However, they certainly are not as "populist" as Khrushchev was, since they do not address the questions of political authority tackled by Khrushchev. *On this dimension,* debate under Brezhnev and Kosygin is *not* "richer and freer" than it was earlier, and the policies of the regime are *not* as populist.

## Khrushchev and Stalin's Legacy

While under Stalin ultimate political authority, of course, resided in the hands of the dictator himself, Soviet officials exercised almost unlimited discretionary power over the masses within their domains in the execution of his will. It was taken for granted among Soviet officials that any decompression of police controls would lead to "anarchy" and that most groups in the nonofficial sector of society could not be trusted to advance regime goals in the absence of coercion. Distrust and fear of the masses were accompanied by a profound distrust of the critical instincts of the intelligentsia, expressed in the imposition of dogmatic controls on most areas of inquiry and an almost exclusive emphasis on political reliability in recruitment. The

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

*Premier Khrushchev chatting with the Moscow populace outside the Historical Museum in 1963.*

—K. Mustafin/TASS via Sovfoto.

institutional expression of these orientations was a secret-police hierarchy that sought to atomize the populace, and a highly prescriptive bureaucratic system that aspired to reduce an individual's discretion to a minimum. Though the regime professed to want Soviet citizens to exercise "initiative" and to criticize official malfeasance, the paranoid atmosphere of the time, coupled with the emphasis on political control, militated against such initiative.

Khrushchev, however, was more interested in stimulating the growth of the Soviet economy than in reinforcing the political controls of late Stalinism. He operated on the basis of a core belief that problems of economic growth could not be solved without eliciting authentic mass initiative—and he searched constantly for new methods of mobilization and leadership that might elicit such initiative. In the process, he was forced to confront the exclusivist, dogmatic, and heavy-handed orientations of Stalinist officialdom. This eventually led him to the opinion that only a radical redefinition of authority relationships could create the conditions for genuine mass initiative. Let us, then, look in greater detail at the evolution of his outlook.



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Khrushchev's much-noted economic "pragmatism" forced him to address some very controversial questions of political life in the USSR: What should be the status of the peasantry in a socialist society? Could technical specialists be freed from the shackles of dogma and included in decision-making processes without threatening the integrity of the ideology and the political prerogatives of officials? How much discretion and local initiative could be delegated to the citizenry without stimulating "spontaneity?" The issue, then, was one of *trust:* Could the new socialist society be trusted? Had it been decisively reconstructed?

Khrushchev's repudiation, at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, of the Stalinist dictum that the "class struggle intensifies as the building of socialism advances" [7] was perhaps his most dramatic attack, during the initial years of his tenure, on the notion that society still could not be trusted. Yet, if one examines his speeches during 1953-59, one notices that, in varied forms, the calls for "trust in society" were a constant refrain in his articulations.

In the case of the peasantry, Khrushchev argued that the regime could no longer afford to base its relationship with the peasant on forced exploitation and neglect. Those who wished to perpetuate such an exploitative relationship, he proclaimed, "do not understand the simple truth that, without an advance in agriculture, the problems of building communism cannot be successfully solved." [8] After 1953, therefore, agricultural advance was billed, at most Central Committee plenary sessions devoted to agriculture, as a "task of all the people" *(vsenarodnaya zadacha).* Yet, establishing a national commitment to rural development required more than just a recognition of the socioeconomic interdependence of urban and rural sectors; it also called for a dilution of the Stalinist distrust of the peasant and peasant initiative.[9] This crucial *sociopolitical* issue found its way into Khrushchev's speeches. In 1953, he criticized the "lordly and bureacratic attitude toward the village which has arisen among some Communists." In the same speech, he chastised those who believed that private peasant livestock "can constitute any sort of danger to the socialist system." [10] In 1958, in defense of his plan to transfer the technology of the machine-tractor station to the kolkhoz itself, Khrushchev criticized those who regard "collective farm property . . . from the positions of the initial period of collectivization," as well as those who "consider the collective farm a foreign body in the socialist organism." [11] That this opposition came not from utopians wanting to abolish collective farm property but from those who distrusted peasant loyalties was confirmed by Khrushchev in the same speech, when he declared that "one wonders how it can be assumed that the development of collective farm ownership can be used against the state, against the working class," and then went on to list the entire battery of remaining controls that the state could wield over the peasantry.[12]

Thus, in attempting to modernize Soviet agriculture, Khrushchev was forced to confront the question of political community. The peasant, Khrushchev contended, could be trusted; he no longer embodied the threat of restoration. Hence, he ought no longer to treated like a subject; he had to be accepted as a citizen.

If Khrushchev must be credited with convincing the Soviet elite that the status of the peasant had to be reevaluated, he must also be credited with integrating the scientific and technical intelligentsia into the political community. Throughout his tenure in office, Khrushchev could be found arguing *not only* for an end to dogma in many fields, but for a new approach to the political status of specialists as well. His secret speech denouncing Stalin had many motives, but surely one of these was to expand the boundaries of decision-making arenas ("collective leadership") so as to incorporate multiple competences. Moreover, his speeches are replete with calls for party officials to treat specialists with "consideration," to create good working conditions for them, and to respect their knowledge.[13]

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[7] Leo Gruliow, Ed., *Current Soviet Policies II: The Documentary Record of the 20th Party Congress and Its Aftermath,* New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957, p. 177.

[8] Nikita Khrushchev, *Stroitel'stvo kommunizma v SSSR i razvitiye sel'skogo khozyaystva* (The Construction of Communism in the USSR and the Development of Agriculture), 8 vols., Moscow, Politizdat, 1962-64 (hereafter, Khrushchev, *Stroitel'stvo kommunizma I-VIII*), Vol. I, p. 77.

[9] Both Khrushchev, in his memoirs, and Zhores and Roy Medvedev, in a recent typescript on Khrushchev, make special note of this feature of Stalin. See *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament,* Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1974, p. 112 ("For Stalin, peasants were scum"); Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev, "N. S. Khrushchev, gody u vlasti (N.S. Khrushchev, Years in Power)," Ann Arbor, Xerox University Microfilms and Columbia University Press, 1975, p. 16.

[10] Khrushchev, *Stroitel'stvo kommunizma I,* pp. 73, 31.

[11] Khrushchev, *Stroitel'stvo kommunizma III,* pp. 119, 69.

[12] *Ibid.,* pp. 127-28.

[13] For examples from the early years, see Khrushchev, *Stroitel'stvo kommunizma I,* pp. 178, 402; and *Stroitel'stvo kommunizma II,* pp. 94-95, 376-77, 416, 425.



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

*Design engineer Gudkin holds forth at a weekly "brain trust" meeting at the Krasnyy Kotel'shchik Machine-building Plant.*

—Sovfoto.

Khrushchev's campaigns to draw people who were not functionaries into the decision-making process, regardless of their political status, naturally brought him into conflict with the exclusionary propensities of Stalinist officialdom. Already in 1954, we can find examples of the Khrushchevian approach to the problem:

*Both party and nonparty comrades are present at this meeting. Both are involved in the same general business. Therefore we critize both party workers and nonparty. . . .*[14]

And, in April 1955, when addressing a gathering of obkom secretaries, Khrushchev noted:

*Obkom secretaries are seated here, and they are probably thinking, why does Khrushchev speak that way; after all, there are nonparty people present. Comrades, all of us, party and nonparty alike, want the same thing—the prosperity of our homeland.*[15]

Even at the central levels, Khrushchev would invite nonparty specialists to Central Committee meetings to offer their expertise. And when frustrated in his efforts to move talented and energetic young people into positions of authority within the apparat, Khrushchev defined the problem in familiar terms: "The young must be trusted."[16] In sum, Khrushchev's ideal conception of decision-making processes envisaged cooperative problem-solving among talented actors. The First Secretary had little patience with institutional boundaries or conceptions of political exclusiveness that inhibited such interaction.

The issue of official exclusiveness arose in other contexts as well. In 1956, Khrushchev argued that all Soviet citizens should be subject to the performance principle in evaluations of their work. A party official should be no more exempt from meeting economic performance goals than any other citizen, and his pay should reflect this philosophy. Apparently, there were objections to these proposals by those who felt that party leaders did not need material bonuses as incentives, in light of their higher level of political consciousness. Khrushchev did not accept this argument, declaring:

*Party workers are not the only principled [ideynyye] people among us. Each Soviet person—worker, collective farmer, and members of the intelligentsia—is principled.*[17]

All of these citations from Khrushchev's speeches have been from articulations during the 1950's—before the radical changes introduced at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961 (see below). In short, already in the early years of his rule, Khrushchev was confronting the problem of equal accountability in a reconstructed socialist society. A persistent theme in his articulations during the 1950's, therefore, was that the boundaries of the political community had to be expanded to include the previously repressed, neglected, or distrusted collectivities of Soviet society.[18] Beyond this, however, Khrushchev believed that party cadres and nonparty people alike required material incentives to induce them to contribute to national performance goals. Thus, judging performance by the performance principle, rather

[14] Khrushchev, *Stroitel'stvo kommunizma I*, p. 192.

[15] Khrushchev, *Stroitel'stvo kommunizma II*, p. 96; see also *ibid.*, p. 114.

[16] *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 17, 1959.

[17] Khrushchev, *Stroitel'stvo kommunizma II*, p. 384.

[18] At a higher level of generalization, one scholar interprets post-Stalinism in Soviet-type regimes as a process of "inclusion" of previously *excluded* groups. See Kenneth Jowitt, "Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), October 1975, pp. 69-96.



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than simply by criteria of political reliability, was a leveling process in that it no longer accepted the contention that party cadres were privileged and beyond accountability.

## Toward the Active Society

Khrushchev also perceived a redefinition of authority relationships to be necessary to the advancement of still another goal: eliciting mass initiative through new patterns of leadership. He envisaged a society in which the masses would contribute actively, enthusiastically, and voluntarily to the pursuit of *centrally-prescribed* goals. The key (in his mind) to synthesizing this centralist mode of integrating society and the vision of an enthusiastic, involved citizenry was the *debureaucratization of leadership*. He wanted to make Soviet centralism more effective by purging it of its bureaucratic-statist component. In this way, the citizenry would develop a greater sense of identification with the policies and personnel of the regime and would have greater incentive to become personally involved in the administration of public affairs.

Thus, throughout the destalinization campaign, Khrushchev called upon Soviet officials to abandon "leadership from the desk," "rule by fiat," and "commandism," and demanded that they acquire the inspirational skills necessary to mobilize the masses without terror:

*Go to the workers, talk frankly with them, and say that it is necessary to raise labor productivity, . . . and they will understand you properly. But to do this it is necessary to go to the worker not as some administrator-bureaucrats do, but as a comrade of that worker; then the worker will open his heart and show the possibilities he has for raising labor productivity and lowering costs.*[19]

If party leaders alienated the masses with their behavior, Khrushchev felt, it would not be possible to develop local initiative. All forms of noncoercive incentives, after all, require a measure of trust on the part of those being led, for there is some degree of deferred gratification in any endeavor that does not promise a guaranteed payoff. It was critical, therefore, that local leaders impart to the masses a sense of confidence that a job well done would be

[19] *Pravda*, Nov. 20, 1962.

*Party First Secretary N.S. Khrushchev visiting the I. Pavlov State Farm in the Kustanay Region of Kazakhstan in 1956.*

—Sovfoto.



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rewarded as promised. Or, as Khrushchev put it with characteristic bluntness:

*It is necessary to speak the truth to collective farmers, to persuade them, so that they will continue to believe you, so that they will believe your every word, because their pay will arrive in the spring, whereas the harvest must be collected in the winter.*[20]

Thus, "trust in the masses" was a prerequisite for establishing greater "trust in government." Khrushchev was trying to change the basis for the maintenance of compliance from power to authority—and the nature of political authority from command to inspiration. This, he believed, required the establishment of direct ties between leaders and led and the eradication of the indirect, bureaucratized style of leadership that had been dominant under Stalin. Indeed, as First Secretary of the Communist Party in the Ukraine and as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Khrushchev served as a model of the mobilizational leader with his forays out among the people and his concern for first-hand contact with local conditions.

In addition to these efforts to change the leadership style of Soviet officials, Khrushchev sponsored a three-pronged effort to expand the quantity and quality of mass participation and to elicit initiative from all those who had been driven into passivity by the orientations of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." First, there began in 1957 a vast expansion in the size of the party, in the size of the party and nonparty aktivs, and in the role of social organizations in the discussion and implementation of policy —the process of "drawing in" *(privlecheniye)* that Hough emphasizes in his article on political participation. Yet even this *privlecheniye* had, under Khrushchev, a distinctly anti-elitist tinge. I have in mind the expansion and transformation of the party's adult political education program (a mechanism for recruitment into the aktiv), which now began to emphasize training of nonparty, nonofficial members of society. Whereas during the 1957-58 academic year there were just 6.2 million participants in the program, of whom only some 15 percent were nonparty people, by September 1964 there were 36 million people enrolled in the system, of whom 78 percent were nonparty.[21]

The anti-official character of measures to expand mass participation also found expression in a movement for the expansion of the rights *(rasshireniye prav)* of such mass organizations as the soviets and the trade unions in line with Khrushchev's call for them to "wrangle really hard" [22] with state officials and to protect their constituents against arbitrary behavior by their own hierarchical superiors. In addition, there emerged at this time a movement for the transfer *(peredacha)* of some administrative functions of the state to public corporations or social organizations.

Khrushchev was clearly in favor of such a transfer since it was entirely consistent with his belief in the need for debureaucratization of leadership. Not surprisingly, this brought him into conflict with the political orientations of party and state officials, whose distrust of unregulated political initiative and whose broad definition of the "political" reinforced a bureaucratized style of leadership. It was in response to these orientations that Khrushchev publicly developed his ideas about popular *self*-regulation.

Speaking to the Congress of the Young Communist League in April 1958, Khrushchev complained that League organizations lacked the capacity genuinely to inspire youth and elicit initiative. Specifically, he declared:

*Life in League organizations should literally seethe, and initiative overflow. Then everyone will find something interesting to do, and young people will not complain that life is boring in League organizations, whereas today you hear such complaints frequently.*[23]

From our standpoint, however, the most significant passages of the speech relate to Khrushchev's conception of what was at issue. As far as he was concerned, the bureaucratization of all tasks and the pervasive state regulation of social behavior had been based upon a belief in the untrustworthiness of the population and a conviction that its behavior

[20] Khrushchev, *Stroitel'stvo kommunizma I*, p. 126. For other examples of this call for a new leadership style during the early post-Stalin years, see *ibid.*, pp. 279, 394-95, 489-92; and *Stroitel'stvo kommunizma II*, pp. 72-73, 150. Jeremy Azrael notes, moreover, that the post-Stalin period was marked by a "near infinity" of articles calling upon *managers* to adopt a less "harsh and disciplinarian" leadership orientation (*Managerial Power and Soviet Politics*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966, p. 232, fn. 23).

[21] Ellen Mickiewicz, *Soviet Political Schools*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1967, pp. 10, 13.

[22] Gruliow, *Current Soviet Policies II*, p. 59.

[23] Khrushchev, *Stroitel'stvo kommunizma III*, p. 170.



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needed to be circumscribed in all spheres. The First Secretary stated:

*Some comrades fear that the trade unions will be unable to organize physical culture work and that a state inspector is required. If there is such an inspector, people will jump, run, and swim, but if there is no inspector, everything will go to pieces. This is nonsense. . . . It is wrong to reduce matters to channeling everything through state agencies.*[24]

Perhaps for this reason, Khrushchev's speech at the 21st Party Congress less than a year later called for a diminished role for formal state agencies and the transfer of many social functions to public organizations which would work "alongside and parallel with . . . state agencies." [25] Popular initiative, then, would be stimulated by *depoliticization* of many social initiatives, thereby legitimizing their removal from formal subordination to state officials.

Such depoliticization implied greater trust in society, for it assumed that a decompression of political controls would not foster political deviance. Indeed, the interpretation of the concept of *obshchestvennost'* (public-spiritedness) under Khrushchev differed strikingly from that employed under Stalin. Under Stalin, the *obshchestvenniki* were, in practice, "the leadership of the obkoms, ispolkoms, raykoms, republican central committees, etc."—in other words, the officials themselves.[26] In the late 1950's, however, the term *obshchestvenniki* referred to a stratum of mobilizers drawn from all groups in society and not just from among the full-time paid officials of the party and state bureaucracies. Efforts were made to enlist these activists from among the more technically competent "opinion leaders" in society.[27] The hope was that the didactic relationship involved in mobilization would be based upon interaction between social peers and would thus be less susceptible to considerations of ego, status, or formal position in the hierarchy. As Khrushchev put it in the speech to the YCL cited above, "What kind of



*Aleksey Apalkov, Communist Party organizer of Shop 42 at the Voronezh Electrosignal Plant, reflects on the criticisms he has just undergone at a shop meeting of party members and nonmembers.*

**—Sovfoto.**

initiative is it when there are guides and nursemaids everywhere in the form of paid instructors, propagandists, physical culture inspectors, and other officials?" [28]

Naturally, there was considerable resistance to this trend, as Soviet officials tried, wherever possible, to regulate the behavior of the activists, to give them menial tasks rather than real influence, and to blunt their ability to penetrate the inner workings of the decision-making process.[29] For what was at stake was the *political autonomy* of Soviet officialdom—its prerogative to define the nature of problems, to establish criteria for evaluating success, and to judge whether a spontaneous initiative constituted political deviance. For those who feared that genuine self-

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 171-73.

[25] Leo Gruliow, Ed., *Current Soviet Policies III: The Documentary Record of the Extraordinary 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1960, p. 67.

[26] See Medvedev and Medvedev, *op. cit.*, p. 32. Moreover, Paul Cocks notes that these officials harbored a profound distrust of nonofficial members of the aktiv, whose numbers were, in any case, very small. See his "Controlling Communist Bureaucracy: Ethics, Rationality, and Terror," unpublished book manuscript.

[27] See William J. Conyngham, *Industrial Management in the Soviet Union,* Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1973, p. 84.

[28] Khrushchev, *Stroitel'stvo kommunizma III*, p. 173.

[29] This resistance is well documented in Cocks, "Controlling Communist Bureaucracy . . . ," and Conyngham, *op. cit.*



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regulation would lead ultimately to anarchy, the right to channel all political initiative was jealously guarded. To Khrushchev's way of thinking, on the other hand, social and political cohesion were not threatened by decompression precisely because he believed in the basic trustworthiness of the population and in the ability of rank-and-file activists to maintain control and exercise leadership without the regime's having to resort to "administrative methods" and police power. As the party program of 1961 indicated,

*Comradely censure of antisocial acts will gradually become the principal means of eradicating manifestations of bourgeois views, customs and habits. The power of example in public affairs and in private life, in the performance of one's public duty, acquires tremendous educational significance.*[30]

## Frustration and Reaction

As is well known, Khrushchev's ambitious plans for social transformation and economic growth were frustrated as early as the first years of the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65). During this period, serious questions were raised about the wisdom of his policy of using pressure to try to elicit extraordinary economic performance. His campaigns for greater social homogeneity were also strongly resisted by both officials and nonofficials. And behind the scenes, efforts were made to dilute the ideological innovations articulated at the 21st Party Congress of 1959. By 1961, then, serious doubt had been cast upon the efficacy of Khrushchev's social, economic, and political programs. The Party Program of 1961, in fact, is noteworthy for its repudiation of "revolutions from above," for its advocacy of a policy of channeling mass initiative through state agencies (thereby downgrading the status of self-regulation), and for its view of sociopolitical transformation as a measured outgrowth of long-term economic growth.[31]

Moreover, as many have observed, Khrushchev's counterattack against these trends—his efforts to purge the party and the state administration through the establishment of a "rotation system" among officials; his large-scale recruitment of specialists into generalist positions within the party apparatus, bypassing political training in party schools; his bifurcation of the party and state hierarchies into industrial and agricultural branches; and his broad mobilization of the masses to check up on the behavior of officials in discharging their administrative responsibilities—was highly unpopular with Soviet officials. The Western interpretation of these moves is usually cast in instrumental terms, viewing them solely from the perspective of Khrushchev's concern for the solution of economic and administrative problems; however, there was an additional dimension to Khrushchev's undertakings that is ignored by any single-factor explanation of his policies: namely, the sociopolitical dimension that we have been highlighting in this article. For what we find during the 1961-64 period are continuing attempts by Khrushchev to solve economic problems through the further expansion of the boundaries of decision-making arenas and further diminution of the political status of Soviet officials.

Indeed, a careful reading of Khrushchev's speeches at the 22nd Party Congress (October 1961) reveals an intensification of his efforts along these lines. Ideologically, the First Secretary sought to undermine still further the notion that officials have a higher level of political consciousness than the masses and therefore are entitled to regulate mass initiative and make decisons *in camera*. In announcing that the USSR had emerged as a "state of all the people," for example, Khrushchev indicated that this was a new form of state whose institutions were becoming a *nonpolitical* organization of the working people: "the domestic functions of the state will develop to the full, be transformed and gradually lose their political character." [32] Similarly, in depicting the CPSU as a "party of all the people," Khrushchev sought to upgrade the ideological status of the aktiv at the expense of the *apparatchiki*:

*The party must be a model in developing the very best forms of Communist public self-government. In practice this may mean, for instance, that the apparatus of the party agencies will steadily shrink, while the ranks of party* aktivists *grow.*[33]

Such calls for depoliticization and debureaucrati-

[30] Charlotte Saikowski and Leo Gruliow, Eds., *Current Soviet Policies IV: The Documentary Record of the 22nd Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1962, p. 28.

[31] See Lowenthal, *loc. cit.*, pp. 95-96; and George A. Brinkley, "Khrushchev Remembered: On the Theory of Soviet Statehood," *Soviet Studies*, January 1973, p. 396.

[32] Saikowski and Gruliow, *Current Soviet Policies IV . . .*, p. 102.

[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.



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zation could only be legitimized by a consensual image of society. Accordingly, Khrushchev proclaimed that "in our times nonparty people too are actively building communism arm in arm with the Communists, *and the overwhelming majority of them reason like Communists.*" [34] For similar reasons, Khrushchev needed to downgrade the notion that existing class differences warranted the continuation of an elitist pattern of decision-making at the local levels: "The distinctions between the working class and the peasantry have been eliminated in their major, decisive aspects; the final eradication of class differences will now proceed at an ever faster pace." [35]

Of course, Khrushchev remained thoroughly committed to the notion that the New Man was still to be created, but he felt that the locus of resocialization had to shift. Accordingly, he tried to downgrade still further the formal, educational function of party and state officials in a statement that would be repudiated by Brezhnev ten years later:

*The molding of the new man is influenced not only by the educational work of the party, the Soviet state, the trade unions and the Young Communist League, but by the entire pattern of society's life. . . . All economic, social, political, and legal levers must be used to develop people's Communist consciousness. . . .*" [36]

And the concept of official "ties with the masses" was far more noticeable in the First Secretary's speeches at the Congress than in the speeches of any other Soviet leader at a Party Congress before or since.

The anti-official emphasis in Khrushchev's remarks should not, however, be taken as a sign of liberalization within the system at large. After all, it was precisely during this period that Khrushchev, in response to signs of widespread corruption, sponsored the extension of the death penalty to economic crimes and a witchhunt against "parasites." Nevertheless, Khrushchev *was* trying to maintain a highly organized and centrally coordinated system without simultaneously reinforcing the administrative methods and exclusionary policies that had pertained under Stalin.

Thus, while the use of *pressure* was being increased during the early 1960's, there was a simultaneous introduction of a series of measures to reduce the scope of discretion of Soviet officials vis-à-vis their subordinates. Elected production committees were established in the factories as a means of broadening worker participation in decision-making. A campaign was launched by the trade union newspaper *Trud* during 1961-63 to encourage factory union committees to protect workers against illegal overtime, dismissals, and underpayment for work done.[37] Within the party, Khrushchev pushed, unsuccessfully, to reduce the size of the secretariats, so as

*First Secretary Khrushchev reports to the 22nd CPSU Congress on the Draft Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on October 18, 1961.*

**—V. Savostyanov and V. Egorov/TASS via Sovfoto.**

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 114 (emphasis added). Stalin, in his election speech of February 1946, also denigrated the party-nonparty distinction (*Pravda*, Feb. 10, 1946), but this must be interpreted in terms of Stalin's larger effort at the time to reassert the ideological primacy of his own authority. Obviously, it was not accompanied by the pervasive Khrushchevian concern for transforming the authority relationship between officials and masses.

[35] Saikowski and Gruliow, *Current Soviet Policies IV . . .*, p. 66.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 104.

[37] Mary McAuley, *Labor Disputes in Soviet Russia, 1957-1965*, Oxford, England, Clarendon Press, 1969, p. 123.



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to force party officials to rely more on the bureaus and the aktivs in decision-making.[38] Moreover, during 1961-62, there took place a vast expansion in the number of nonstaff party instructors, and one of the purposes of an independent Party-State Control Commission was to see to it that "those who spoke critically of party leaders in report meetings received equal time with other speakers." [39]

An additional clue to Khrushchev's dual motives during this period appeared in the semiannual slogans of the Central Committee. In October 1961, for the first time in the entire postwar period, all reference to "labor discipline," "technological and production discipline," and "state discipline" disappeared from the slogans, not to turn up again until October 1965.[40]

In light of the interpretation offered in this article, such a development should not be entirely surprising. The concept of "discipline" is a Soviet euphemism for "administrative methods," and the reinforcement of discipline is usually effected by increasing the discretionary powers of officials vis-à-vis their constituents. Since this was precisely what Khrushchev was trying to move away from, it is understandable that he sought to decouple the traditionally-paired concepts of "organization" and "discipline" in order to further his calls for cohesion based upon new patterns of social leadership.

This interpretation is further supported by ideological literature of the time which emphasized that the "state of all the people" needed to protect the citizen against the arbitrary power of state organs. The Party Program affirmed:

*The socialist state apparatus serves the people and is accountable to them. . . . It is the duty of Soviet people . . . not to tolerate any abuses but to fight them.*[41]

An authoritative commentary on the Program called for the development of legal norms to guarantee the individual against arbitrary behavior on the part of officials.[42] And in outlining the "basic tasks of the future Constitution," Khrushchev noted the need for that Constitution "to create still stronger guarantees of the democratic rights and freedoms of the working people and guarantees of the strict observance of socialist legality. . . ." [43]

In light of the anti-official character of all these innovations, it should not surprise us that Khrushchev would later be accused of: (1) having "counterposed" the "state of all the people" to the dictatorship of the proletariat; [44] (2) having turned the legislative organs of state administration against the executive organs; [45] and (3) having overemphasized the degree of homogeneity and consensus in society in order to denigrate political criteria in party recruitment.[46] Nor, for that matter, is it unusual that "certain authors" would later be accused of having claimed that the state had already lost its "class essence," [47] for the innovations sponsored by Khrushchev unleashed social forces throughout the system which, for reasons of their own, were hostile to the political prerogatives of Soviet officials.

## The Lessons of Khrushchev

Khrushchev's successors have not dealt kindly with his historical image, presenting him as little more than a harebrained schemer and arbitrary interventionist. A more balanced appreciation of Khrushchev's contribution to Soviet history, however, would at least give him credit for addressing the most crucial sociopolitical dilemma of destalinization: the relationship between initiative and criticism, on the one hand, and political authority and status, on the other. On this score, Khrushchev opened something of a Pandora's box. He sought to integrate previously repressed social groups into the political community by changing their political and ideological status, and he attempted to elicit their initiative by urging them to criticize obsolete policies and recalcitrant officials. However, his Stalinist legacy came through in his continued commitment to central definition of the direction and rate of change

[38] Conyngham, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

[39] Cocks, "Controlling Communist Bureaucracy . . . ," p. 491.

[40] These slogans appear regularly in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* in April and October of each year. The word "discipline" was *entirely* expunged from the slogans during the period from October 1962 through April 1965. In October 1961 and April 1962, it appeared only with reference to "military discipline."

[41] Saikowski and Gruliow, *Current Soviet Policies IV . . .*, p. 24.

[42] F. Burlatskiy, "Problems of the State in the Draft of the CPSU Program," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 13, 1961, pp. 46-47.

[43] *Pravda*, April 26, 1962.

[44] D. Chesnokov, in *ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1967.

[45] A. Luk'yanov and B. Lazarev, "The Soviets: The Development and Strengthening of [Their] Democratic Bases," *Kommunist*, No. 13, 1967, p. 57.

[46] Speech by I. V. Kapitonov, "The CPSU After the 23rd Party Congress," *The World Marxist Review* (Toronto), No. 9, 1966, p. 6.

[47] Ts. A. Stepanyan and V. S. Semenov, Eds., *Klassy, sotsial'nye sloi i gruppy v SSSR*, (Classes, Social Strata, and Groups in the USSR), Moscow, Nauka, 1968, p. 27.



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*Workers of the open-hearth shop of the Magnitogorsk Steel Mill discuss their output quota at a shop production meeting.*

—Sovfoto.

and his heavy emphasis on citizen obligation. He envisaged a society in which all would "participate in the construction of communism as a single monolithic labor collective." [48] Thus, he never idealized the distinctiveness of the peasantry, the intelligentsia, or other groups. He would fight for their recognition as citizens who could be trusted, but he himself always treated them as equally liable to mobilization by a political leadership that made no binding commitments to specific interests in society. Accordingly, he would encourage the critical intelligentsia to criticize but would then feel impelled to urge them not to "overgeneralize" their criticism, lest this challenge the centralist bases of the system.[49]

The commitment to centralism left Khrushchev with relatively few options in trying to stimulate initiative and criticism. He found common cause with certain liberal dissenters who urged the development of legal norms to protect the citizen against arbitrary behavior by state and party officials, but he could not countenance the constraints on his own actions that would have been imposed by an independent legal order. Similarly, he flirted with the notion that the primary contradiction in society lay between "the state" and "society." This flirtation strengthened the hand of those liberal academic philosophers who accepted the Yugoslav critique of bureaucratic centralism and argued against their more traditional colleagues that "bureacracy," not "anarchy," was the main danger in Soviet society.[50] However, the First Secretary could not explicitly endorse such a theoretical position because he was not interested in a genuine pluralism and dispersal of power. These would only have tied his hands and slowed his campaigns for social transformation. In the event, one of the few options that remained was for him to propagate a personality cult as a means of bolstering his own authority and to "ally" with the social activists against the full-time officials. Politically, this was a rather weak position, given the dominance of Soviet officials in the political system.

Yet the circumstances that pertained in the early 1960's make it hard to assess exactly how weak this position was, for Khrushchev combined his commitment to centralism with a commitment to urgency, pressure, and optimism. Thus, he called upon the aktiv to inspire people to deny their own self-interest at the same time that he applied pressure to induce workers and peasants to work very hard for a rather low reward. His use of pressure often frustrated efforts to upgrade the role of legislative branches of party and state and thereby to draw the broader aktiv into local decision-making; pressure simply heightened traditional Soviet "session fever" and reinforced the tendency of party secretaries to make decisions rapidly and *in camera*.[51] Resort to high pressure was also detrimental to attempts to elicit a new leadership orientation, since insisting on rapid conformity to extreme demands was hardly conducive to a posture based upon persuasion and trust. (The campaign to communalize private peasant livestock was a case in point, and it cast serious doubt on the Khrushchevian belief that high pressure was consistent with voluntary compliance.) Finally, Khrushchev's commitment to pressure alienated many of the specialists and technocrats whom he was championing, for they recognized the need for a more

[48] *Pravda*, March 8, 1963.

[49] For an excellent example of Khrushchev's effort to balance these conflicting requirements, see his speech to the Writers' Congress, in *ibid.*, May 24, 1959.

[50] See F. Burlatskiy, *Gosudarstvo i kommunizm* (The State and Communism), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoy literatury, 1963, pp. 172-73, 207 ff.

[51] Conyngham, *op. cit.*, p. 203.



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contemplative, "scientific" approach to the solution of economic and administrative problems, even as they were resentful of the dogmatic and exclusionary practices of Stalinist officials.[52]

It is possible, then, that some form of alliance with the aktiv against Soviet officials is a viable political strategy in a Soviet-type system (though the Maoist experience suggests that this would require police power). The Khrushchev experience is inconclusive on this score, clouded as it is by the disruptive impact of the First Secretary's simultaneous commitment to high pressure, rapid transformation, and personal rulership. Yet, within the context of a dictatorial system, Khrushchev's primary insight may have been that genuine initiative could not be elicited without offering the citizen opportunities for regular public criticism of his hierarchical superiors. Moreover, Khrushchev was also aware that such criticism could not be elicited without either upper-level or extra-bureaucratic protection from retribution, and his efforts toward redefining the political and ideological status of Soviet officials were directed toward creating these conditions.

From this standpoint, Khrushchev was far more than a transitional leader, for one of the central thrusts of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime has been to restore the political status and prerogatives of official organs.

## The Brezhnev-Kosygin Approach

Khrushchev's successors probably raised their stock with the Soviet masses by further extending certain trends that had begun after Stalin's death: more rational economic and administrative policies, reduced reliance on pressure (despite Khrushchev's commitment to the use of pressure, his employment of it did not in any way match Stalin's in intensity), and assurances to the masses (lived up to in practice) that political conformity ensures physical security and hard work means the opportunity for advancement and a higher standard of living. However, the price of these changes, and the accompanying end of "revolutions from above" as mechanisms for social transformation, has been the abandonment of Khrushchevian efforts to redefine the status of political authority. *On this score*, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime represents very much of a "conservative restoration." In contrast to the Khrushchevian emphasis on trust in society, one now finds continual reference in elite articulations to the need for "trust in cadres." Most of the "diploma specialists" recruited directly into the apparat during 1962-64 were purged shortly after Khrushchev's overthrow, and the importance of training in a party school before advancement into, and within, the party apparat has been restored.[53] The dismantling of the Party-State Control Commission eliminated an out-of-channels source of protection for those inclined to criticize party officials, and turnover among primary party organization secretaries has slowed dramatically. The practice of expanded plenary sessions of the Central Committee, attended by nonparty specialists, has been dropped, as has the publication of transcripts of CC proceedings. In addition, the role of the nonparty population in the adult political education program was rapidly reversed, as the accompanying table indicates.

None of these trends is necessarily incompatible with greater openness on the part of Soviet officials to the advice of experts. Nor do they preclude a more rational division of decision-making labor among the various institutional centers of power in the system. These trends do, however, point to the determination of Soviet officials after Khrushchev's fall to regulate both the quantity and quality of popular involvement in public affairs and to arrogate to themselves the right to decide which decisions are routine (and therefore can be safely delegated) and which are fundamental or "political."[54]

Thus, despite the fact that more and more citizens have been "drawn into" public affairs, the entire

[52] These included the academics (many of them liberals), whose hopes soared so high after Khrushchev's overthrow—paradoxical as that may seem. On the one hand, they supported Khrushchev's destalinization campaign and its implied attack on the political prerogatives of Soviet officials. On the other hand, they hoped that his overthrow would reduce the pressure for social transformation and thereby allow the extension of political changes he had begun. See, for example, A. I. Lepeshkin, in *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo* (Moscow), February 1965, pp. 5-15; F. Burlatskiy, in *Pravda*, Jan. 10, 1965; and A. Rumyantsev, in *ibid.*, Feb. 21, 1965, and Sept. 9, 1965.

[53] Conyngham, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

[54] It is also important to bear in mind that greater secrecy of deliberations is not *necessarily* associated with greater dogmatism in the resolution of social and economic issues, though this *may* be the case, depending upon the realm of policy in question. (For contrasting conclusions on this score, see Ploss, *loc. cit.*, pp. 28-31; Peter H. Solomon, Jr., "Specialists in Soviet Policy-Making: Criminal Policy, 1938-1970," in Karl Ryavec, Ed., *Adaptation and Change in Soviet Politics*, study to be published in the near future: and George Breslauer, "Transformation and Adaptation in the Soviet Union Since Stalin," in *ibid.*) Hence, evaluators of change in the USSR must look at four dimensions of political change: richness and freedom of debate; access to officials; responsiveness by officials to certain types of messages; and secrecy of deliberations (regardless of who takes part in them).



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**Adult Political Education Program**

| | 1957 | 1964 | 1966 | 1974-75 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size (millions) | 6.2 | 36.0 | 12.0 | 19.6 |
| Percentage nonparty members | 15.0 | 78.0 | 25.0 | 38.0 |

SOURCES: Data through 1966 are from Ellen Mickiewicz, *Soviet Political Schools*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1967, pp. 10, 13; data for 1974-75 are from "CPSU in Figures," *Partiynaya zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 10, May 1976, p. 23.

ethos of elite articulations about the terms of this participation has changed radically since Khrushchev's overthrow. Calls for "discipline" have filled the press, and the term returned to the Central Committee slogans in October 1965.[55] During the past six years, special efforts have been made to activate party members and to increase the number of "social assignments" performed by the aktiv; however, this campaign has been linked with continual calls for "iron discipline" among party members, rather than with efforts to upgrade the relative ideological status of the aktiv vis-à-vis the *apparatchiki*. In line with this reassertion of "trust in cadres," Brezhnev used the term "ties with the masses" only once in his speech to the 25th Party Congress, and then only in reference to the central party organs' on-going practice of receiving workers' letters, "examining" them, and "taking them into account" in decision-making.[56]

The current Soviet leadership has also redefined the problem of "self-regulation" in order to reassert both the higher political consciousness of Soviet officials and the right of these officials to channel political initiatives into a bureaucratic, rather than a public, arena.[57] Thus, M. Suslov has noted that the process of expanding mass participation in administration will proceed only as fast as the "political consciousness and spiritual maturity of the Soviet people" advance.[58] And the current regime rejects the Khrushchevian contention that societal activity is the *principal* arena within which popular consciousness is to be raised. Instead, it reasserts the educational function of formal organs, thereby also downgrading the relative political status of the aktiv. At the 24th Party Congress, Brezhnev seemed to sum up the perspective that underlay many of the policy changes of the late 1960's with a statement that contrasted pointedly with Khrushchev's innovation ten years previously. As mentioned earlier, Khrushchev had told the 22nd Party Congress: "The molding of the new man is influenced *not only* by the educational work of the party, the Soviet state, the trade unions and the Young Communist League, but by the entire pattern of society's life. . . ." [59] In 1971, Brezhnev observed: "The moral and political qualities of Soviet people are molded by the entire socialist tenor of our life, by the entire course of affairs in society, but *above all* by the purposeful, persistent ideological-upbringing work of the party and all its organizations." [60]

There has likewise been a marked constriction of the terms of discussion in the ideological literature concerning political organization, in contrast to the "richer and freer" debate on other issues. The "state of all the people" and "party of all the people" have been redefined (but not dropped, for reasons discussed below) in order to purge them of all components that contributed to "anarchy, disorder, and lack of discipline." [61] It is now routine for Soviet leaders to refer to the CPSU as the "political leader [*vozhd'*] of the working class, of all working people, of all the people," and to stress:

*Under conditions of developed socialism, when the Communist Party has become a party of all the people, it by no means loses its class character. By its nature, the CPSU has been and remains a party of the working class.*[62]

Similarly, there is no more flirtation in the ideological literature with defining the "state of all the people"

[55] This means that the period between October 1961 and April 1965 is the only one in the entire postwar period (1946-76) when the concept of discipline (other than "military discipline") does not appear in the slogans.

[56] *Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1976.

[57] The commitment to channeling politics into a bureaucratic arena and hostility to the creation of an autonomous public arena are features that markedly distinguish the Soviet regime from liberal-democratic ones. On this point, see T. H. Rigby, "Hough on Political Participation in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Studies*, April 1976, pp. 257-61; and Kenneth T. Jowitt, "National, State, and Civic Development in Marxist-Leninist Regimes," paper presented to the September 1975 meeting of the American Political Science Association in San Francisco. What I am suggesting in this article is that Khrushchev was moving away from this commitment to a bureaucratic channeling of demands, while his successors have strongly reaffirmed it.

[58] M. Suslov, "The CPSU—A Party of Creative Marxism," *Kommunist*, No. 14, 1971, p. 21.

[59] Saikowski and Gruliow, *Current Soviet Policies IV . . .*, p. 104. Emphasis added.

[60] *Pravda*, March 31, 1971. Emphasis added.

[61] *Ibid.*, Dec. 6, 1964.

[62] *Ibid.*, Feb. 25, 1976.



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as an entity which is in the process of evolution toward a *nonpolitical* form of self-regulation. Rather, the emphasis is on the *political* organization of society, achieved through the *strengthening* of the state.[63] Also, incessant calls for "discipline" and "order" are now the mode in the ideological literature, and those who see bureaucracy as the main evil do not receive much press. The Khrushchevian emphasis on "transferring functions" and "expanding rights" have been dropped as operative goals of political participation, while much attention is given to the notion of "drawing in." [64]

The terms of discussion have narrowed, too, regarding political innovations in the forthcoming Constitution. In outlining the tasks that must be addressed in formulating the new Constitution, the current regime no longer talks at all about establishing guarantees against arbitrary official behavior.[65]

One could argue that words are cheap and that citations from leaders' speeches and the ideological literature prove nothing. In some cases, this may be true—but not in this case. With the end of the anti-Stalin campaign (which had implications far beyond mere historiography), and with the practical and ideological changes cited above, Soviet citizens know quite well that criticism of the political prerogatives of Soviet officials is not likely to receive support at the top or in a Party-State Control Commission. The scope of individual criticism on social and economic issues—instrumental feedback—has probably expanded. But when leaders and newspapers suddenly speak continually of "trust in cadres," "strengthening the state," and the need for "iron discipline," one wonders how many citizens are likely to exercise their right to engage in criticism directed toward *political* innovation. And under these circumstances, one also wonders how many Soviet citizens will exercise their right to criticize their hierarchical superiors for anything but the most flagrant abuses of authority.

It is notewothy, however, that the regime has continued to affirm that the Soviet Union is directed by a party and state of "all the people," instead of reverting to Stalinist formulations. This is not merely a manipulation of symbols, for although the anti-official component of Khrushchev's innovations has been rejected, the other component—the post-Stalin recognition that socialism has been fully victorious and that the regime need not face the masses in a posture of ideological confrontation—has remained. In a sense, this is testimony to the success of Khrushchev's efforts to convince the Molotovs to expand the boundaries of the political community and to recognize the needs of "all the people." Soviet theorists now distinguish their own conception of the relationship between officials and masses from those of both the Yugoslavs and the Chinese.[66] The Yugoslavs are accused of counterposing the interests of the state to those of groups in society and thereby fostering "anarchy"; the Chinese are accused of going too far in the opposite direction in maintaining a militant-transformist approach to society. In contrast to each of these, the Soviet affirmation of the "class essence" of the state and party of "all the people" upholds the higher political status and autonomy of executive organs but treats the state as no longer relating to society in an arbitrary and revolutionary posture.

This perspective helps one better understand the evolution of the social sciences under Brezhnev's administration. Discussions that attempt to counterpose the interests of the state to those of society are now quite illegitimate, but there has been a vast expansion of discussion of the nature of group interests *within* Soviet society. Similarly, the study of sociology based on "concrete sociological investigations" has been encouraged; however, the discipline of *political science* has been suppressed, not because Marx already provided such a mode of analysis (*after all, he had a sociology too*), but precisely because it would concentrate upon the *process* of decision-making within official organs. The regime needs to learn more about the environment it desires peacefully to manipulate, but it does not want studies of the process by which goals and priorities are determined.

[63] The literature here is extensive but rather homogeneous. For a sampling of it, see A. Butenko, "About the Developed Socialist Society," *Kommunist*, No. 6, 1972, pp. 48-58; G. N. Manov, "The Soviet State—The Chief Instrument of the Building of Socialism and Communism," *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 5, 1971, pp. 10-19; and N. P. Farberov, "The Strengthening of the Soviet State and the Development of Socialist Democracy," *ibid.*, No. 8, 1971, pp. 3-11.

[64] For the contemporary perspective, which is neither Stalinist nor Khrushchevian, see A. P. Kositsyn, *Sotsialisticheskoye gosudarstvo* (The Socialist State), Moscow, "Yuridicheskaya literatura," 1970. For a dissent from the contemporary orthodoxy by one who strongly supported destalinization, see F. Burlatskiy, *Lenin, gosudarstvo, politika* (Lenin, the State, Politics), Moscow, Nauka, 1970, *passim.*, but especially pp. 388, 393, 404.

[65] See Brezhnev's remarks on the Constitution, *Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1976, and the authoritative article by V. Kotok and N. Farberov, "The Constitution of the USSR—The Developing Basic Law of Society and the State," *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 6, 1973, pp. 3-12; then compare these with Khrushchev's remarks in *Pravda*, April 26, 1962.

[66] For a typical example, see I. Kuzminov, in *Pravda*, April 16, 1969.



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The current Soviet regime, then, is hardly a return to Stalinism. Contemporary calls for "discipline" lack the paranoid insistence on compulsive displays of political conformity that characterized the Stalin era. Today, "discipline" usually means that the masses are expected to be politically conformist and to remain sober, arrive at work on time, labor hard and conscientiously, upgrade their skills, and participate in such occasional rituals as the *subbotniki* (donations of off-work time to state projects) and political lectures. Moreover, while the political prerogatives of official organs have been restored, there has been no systematic return to the commandist and heavy-handed leadership orientation of earlier years. Indeed, the leadership orientation of most Soviet officials, paradoxically enough, has probably become less harsh and disciplinarian (at least toward the politically conformist) since Khrushchev's overthrow because of the reduced pressure for attaining unrealistic goals. This reduction in pressure has also expanded the opportunities for official consultation with specialists before decisions are made.

The assumption of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, however, is that mass initiative can be stimulated without status equalization between the officials and the aktiv and that even-handed treatment in social and economic policy is more important to various groups in the population than equalization of political status. Soviet leaders assume—correctly, this writer would guess—that most Soviet citizens prefer a bureaucratic political system that is responsive to their basic socioeconomic needs, rather than a pattern of public politics in which officials are held more accountable to the masses than to their superiors.

## Conclusion

The current arrangement may well be more popular and more stable than that under Khrushchev because it accords material and physical security to the populace; however, it is certainly not as "populist" as Khrushchev's regime since it does not address the question of status equalization tackled by Khrushchev. More important, the Brezhnev-Kosygin approach promises expanded opportunities for certain types of input but does not permit formalization of these opportunites in legal guarantees that would tie the hands of Soviet officials or ensure that the input is heeded. Perhaps this state of affairs will pose a problem in the future—if, for example, various groups push for an upgrading of their ideological status vis-à-vis officialdom. Or maybe it will create problems for the Soviet leadership in that it will frustrate attempts to reorganize public administration or to make Soviet officials more responsive in practice to the advice of experts.

Speculation about contemporary events is, of course, hazardous, but I suspect that the latter process may be going on in the Soviet Union today. At the 25th Party Congress, Leonid Brezhnev sounded a strong note of impatience with the pace of administrative reform and implied that Soviet officials were dragging their feet in responding to the inputs provided by experts.[67] Perhaps this accounts for the recent ideological upgrading of the intelligentsia, with its inclusion—for the first time in Soviet history—in the "indestructible alliance of the workers and peasants." [68] It may also explain Brezhnev's comment that the new Soviet Constitution should "record *not only* the general principles of the socialist system, expressing the class essence of our state, *but also* the fundamental features of an advanced socialist society and of its political organization." [69] Apparently, authority relationships are difficult to formalize in a regime that is based upon the relative political autonomy of its officials. Perhaps this fundamental dilemma of destalinization—so courageously, though ineffectively, addressed by Khrushchev—is now creating difficulties for those charged with drawing up a new Constitution.

[67] I have analyzed this in "The Ethos of the Twenty-fifth Party Congress—Domestic Issues," in Alexander Dallin, Ed., *The Twenty-fifth Congress of the CPSU*, Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, forthcoming.

[68] See Bezhnev's formulation at the 25th Party Congress (*Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1976), and the Central Committee slogans for October 1975 and April 1976 (*Pravda*, Oct. 11, 1975, and April 15, 1976). This upgrading (if it is that) is tempered somewhat by continual references to the "people's intelligentsia"—which renders the meaning of the change ambiguous.

[69] *Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1976. Emphasis added.



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# The "Militarization" of Soviet Society

By William E. Odom

Almost unnoticed by Western observers, an enormous military-educational complex is emerging in the Soviet Union today. It holds a commanding position in graduate education as well as in undergraduate training; it permeates the civil secondary-school system and ties up more than one-fourth of the population in voluntary work in support of military skill training; and it touches every Soviet citizen by entangling him in a nation-wide civil defense structure. Before investigating this phenomenon, it may be useful to reflect on some of the reasons why a development of such significance has not drawn more of our attention.

In his monumental study of the nature of war, the well-known American scholar of international law, Quincy Wright, observed:

*States at war have tended to become socialistic, and socialistic states have tended to be at war. Modern socialism has in fact been the war organization of capitalism, in the same sense that feudalism has been the war organization of agrarianism. The modern socialistic state resembles the feudal state in its spirit and its organization.*[1]

To those who have not considered this viewpoint or who have been either too bored or too confused by the din of Soviet propaganda on the war-causing nature of capitalism to think seriously about the relationship between war and socialism, Wright's proposition may occasion surprise. The rhetoric of Marxism, intended to inspire moral indignation over the distribution of income in market economies, has not encouraged us to ponder the military implications of political organization. And while Stalin's formula for Soviet development, "socialism in one country," is familiar to students of Soviet politics, its military corollary, "the militarization of the entire population," is not. Yet this was the policy advanced by the early Bolshevik military leader, M. V. Frunze, when he displaced Leon Trotsky in 1925 as head of the Red Army.[2]

Just as the slogan "socialism in one country" has substantive connotations, so, too, did Frunze's "militarization of the entire population" envisage substantive programs. The next war, Frunze contended, could not be won simply by a regular army led by astute field commanders; a winning force structure would have to be much more. It would have to provide units not only for the front but also for civil defense formations in rear areas, because modern aviation had made every village vulnerable to enemy attack. By the same token, moreover, the labor force of a war economy would have to be treated as part of the force structure.

For Soviet Russia, however, Frunze recognized that cultural and economic backwardness complicated the attainment of a modern military posture. It was impossible to employ such a total approach to *organizing* the society for war without also launch-

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[1] *A Study of War*, 2nd ed., Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1965, p. 1172.

[2] See M. V. Frunze, *Izbrannyye proizvedeniya* (Selected Works), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1934, p. 180. Two essays in this collection, "A Unified Military Doctrine" and "Front and Rear in Future War," elaborate Frunze's assumptions and make clear that he was quite serious about militarizing the state apparatus and the society.



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ing an extensive program to *train* the society for war. In Soviet jargon, this meant achieving mass "military literacy"—which, as the Bolsheviks were quick to discern, was closely related to the mass technical-cultural level. There was, they believed, a commonality here that would allow education policies to serve more than one purpose. In other words, the large overlap in training requirements for socialist industrialization on the one hand and for the society's militarization on the other hand dictated as much civil-military integration as was practicable. It did *not* encourage the differentiation of military organization so characteristic of Western armies; *nor* did it encourage differentiation on the civil side, where such differentiation would provide no immediate advantage from the standpoint of military manpower needs.

In actual practice, the principle of integration proved impossible to apply as completely as the Bolsheviks desired[3]—the ideal being the military and society woven into a single, seamless political garment—but it did produce a Soviet military infrastructure different from the military infrastructures found in Western democracies. The civil war experience, to be sure, forced the Bolsheviks to differentiate the military side from the civilian—that is, to build a regular army of the "barracks type." On the other hand, integration on the civil side—that is, organizing the civil society to support the military—was carried very far indeed, with results that Westerners found it difficult to comprehend. The degree of difficulty could be seen in the prevailing Western assessments of the Red Army on the eve of World War II. It was the exceptional observer who did not allow Stalin's purge of the officer corps to lead him to wrong conclusions about what remained of Soviet military power.[4] This was due in no small part to a mix of ethnocentrism and ignorance of Soviet military institutions.[5]

Ethnocentrism may be an even more important source of misperception of Soviet military policy than confusion about the programmatic implications of Soviet socialism. We in the West hold a unique view of civil-military relations, a view which derives from our particular experience with kings' armies in the development of liberalism in Western Europe and America and which was complicated by our special experiences in World War II. We find it difficult to comprehend the military policies of a society where the imperial monarch's army was for at least two centuries the fundament of domestic political order and where the successor "multinational" state has found its stability even more dependent on its military and police forces.

The Russian Marxist philosopher Nikolay Berdyayev put it perhaps too succinctly for us when he said, "Bolshevism entered into Russian life as a power which was militarized in the highest degree, but the old Russian State also had always been militarized." [6] The clarity of his brevity embarrasses us for our blindness to two sources of the militarization of the Soviet polity: (1) the military implications of Bolshevism; and (2) the military tradition that was always so strong in the Russian autocracy's approach to political, economic, and social organization. Seen in this political perspective, the extraordinary compatibility between Marxism and Russian imperialism occasions much less surprise than it does when viewed in the usual economic perspective of "Marx against the peasant," to borrow David Mitrany's felicitous phrase.[7]

If we examine current Soviet military-education policy, it quickly becomes apparent that Frunze's prescriptions of the 1920's are highly descriptive of today's realities. Nonetheless, that policy is little studied, and when it is, its significance is usually missed or misconstrued.[8] If the task undertaken in this discussion is more modest than discovering the

[3] On the failure of A. V. Lunacharskiy, the first People's Commissar of Education, to orient the Soviet education system toward satisfying the Red Army's demands, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, The *Commissariat of Enlightenment*, Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 284, 289.

[4] See, *e.g.*, J. S. Herdon and J. O. Baylen, "Col. Philip R. Raymonville and the Red Army, 1934-43," *Slavic Review* (Champagne, Ill.), September 1975, pp. 483-505, for an interesting account of some of the Western reporting at the time.

[5] Since writing these lines, the author has seen John Erickson's *On Investigating Military Institutions*, The Waverly Papers (Occasional Papers: Series 3), University of Edinburgh, Scotland, November 1975. Erickson is unique in his early sensitivity to this problem, and his prodigious scholarship is leading the way in breaching the ethnocentric barrier.

[6] *The Origins of Russian Communism*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1960, p. 120.

[7] In his *Marx Against the Peasant: A Study in Social Dogmatism* (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1951), Mitrany calls attention to the stubborn emphasis that Marxists in Eastern Europe placed on the industrial worker despite the fact that the peasantry constituted the largest social stratum and the stratum of industrial workers was extremely small. Consequently, from the viewpoint of the socioeconomic structure, Marxian socialism seemed dogmatic and inappropriate.

[8] For example, Herbert Goldhamer, in his *The Soviet Soldier*, New York, Crane and Russack, 1975, manages to examine several features of the Soviet military-educational complex without grasping either their military or political implications (though admittedly

(*continued on page 36*)



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full significance of the present Soviet structure of military education, it does not preclude suggestive observations on that score. The author's primary purpose, however, is to offer an elementary exploration of the nature of the Soviet military-educational complex—a sense of its extent, design, and programs. At the same time, in looking for dynamic trends, we can perhaps infer something of the policy rationale behind them.

Let us therefore examine the following specific areas: (1) the growth of the system of officer-educational institutions; (2) the new disposition of the military basic training system in the secondary schools; (3) the altered role of the Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy (*Dobrovol'noye obshchestvo sodeystviya armii, aviatsii i flotu*—DOSAAF) in specialist training; and (4) the changing structure of the civil defense system. If the subject matter appears diffuse, that is simply because the "militarization" of a society is a diffuse (as well as herculean) undertaking.

## Growth of Officer Education

The Soviet Army has been plagued by a perennial shortage of officers adequately trained to cope with contemporary military technology. The educational effort to create a new class of "Red Commanders," begun in the ashes of the civil war, yielded spotty results at best, and even what it did accomplish in the way of producing better-trained officers was largely sacrificed in the Great Purges of the 1930's. Then World War II brought into the armed forces a new generation of young men who came largely from the peasantry, had no chance to acquire a sound education, and yet were thrust into top command posts. Bemedaled and over-ranked at war's end, they were hardly equipped to preside over military preparations for the nuclear age.

The twofold task in the postwar period, therefore, was to ease out the veterans and to develop a new corps of educated officers. A quick solution was impossible. Only a long-term program to develop a system of military education could provide a source of adequately trained officers. Siphoning them from the civil higher-education sector, which was not a great deal better off, simply was not an option. Nor was purging the veterans an easy matter. Mass retirements raised morale problems, because pensions and benefits were so meager that many Soviet generals faced retirement with horror.[9] Stalin's recall of Marshal Georgiy Zhukov from the obscurity of the Odessa Military District appears to have been related to a policy decision to get on with solving this general personnel problem, but developments of the period remain foggy for Western students.[10] Clear evidence of the direction that Soviet policy was taking in this area only began to appear in the early 1960's.

The number of officer-training schools, according to one Soviet source, commenced to grow not long after the addition of a military pedagogical faculty to the Lenin Military-Political Academy in 1959.[11] This was not, however, the first postwar expansion. New institutions had begun to appear immediately after the war with the creation of the Artillery Radio Technical Academy in 1946 and the Military Institute of Physical Education in 1947, supplemented in 1953 by the Command Signal Academy and the Military Artillery Command Academy.[12] In addition, several new officer schools with a course of three years or more and with authority to confer degrees in higher learning were opened, predominantly in

his chosen task of proving that the Soviet soldier is not ten feet tall did not require that he discover such implications). Also, Jeffrey Record's *Sizing Up the Soviet Army*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1975, pp. 10-11, is at fault in giving an inaccurate view of the institutional arrangements for basic military training. Record goes astray in relying too heavily on Goldhamer and on James A. Barry, Jr.'s "Military Training of Soviet Youth," in *Military Review* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas), February 1973, pp. 92-103. Although Barry accurately describes the changing preservice military training system, his reasoning about policy motives—notably his contention that the military vigorously opposed the changes—is unsupported by evidence and most likely wrong. On the other hand, Leon Gouré's *Civil Defense in the Soviet Union*, Berkeley, Calif, University of California Press, 1962, is a valuable contribution, though outdated in some respects—a defect he is reportedly remedying in a forthcoming new volume. Similarly, Robert G. Wesson's article, "War and Communism," published in *Survey* (London), Winter 1974, pp. 101-17, shows a real appreciation of the military character of communism, although it unfortunately deals with the subject in general terms rather than in terms of specific programs. John Erickson is perhaps the outstanding exception. His article, "Soviet Military Manpower Policies," in *Armed Forces and Society* (Chicago), November 1974, pp. 29-48, provides solid, up-to-date data relevant to Soviet military-education policy. Some of the same evidence will be treated here in an effort to bring additional perspectives to bear.

[9] For a description of senior officers' sentiments about retirement, see *The Penkovskiy Papers*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1965.

[10] See W. J. Spahr, "The Political Socialization of the Soviet High Command, 1957-1967," unpublished PhD dissertation, George Washington University, Washington, DC, 1972, for some interesting glimpses through the fog.

[11] *Voyennaya pedagogika* (Military Pedagogy), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1973, p. 72.

[12] *50 let vooruzhënnykh sil SSSR* (50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1968, p. 489.



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

*Soviet officers in training at the Order of Lenin Frunze Military Academy.*

**—From *50 let sovetskikh vooruzhënnykh sil—fotodokumenty* (50 Years of the Soviet Armed Forces—Documentary Photos), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1967.**

the 1949-52 period.[13] The curricula of these new schools showed a strong engineering-technical profile, foreshadowing a trend that was to emerge more strongly in the 1960's in response to what the Soviet authorities have called the "revolution in military affairs" since World War II.[14]

To gain a rough idea of the base from which the postwar growth started, it is necessary to look at the prewar size of the officer-education system. By 1939, it included 14 academies (for advanced and special training for company- and field-grade officers) and 109 officer-commissioning schools of all types.[15] In other words, the postwar growth has presumably added to these 123 institutions. For purposes of comparison, a tally of all the military schools, academies, and institutes listed in the military press during 1973-75 yields a count of 161 (see table on p. 38). Because this figure includes no officer-commissioning schools for the security police (KGB), not to mention any secret or unlisted institutions, it is a very conservative total. Even so, it shows that there has indeed been significant quantitative growth.

A sense of the hugeness of the military school system may also be gained by comparing the civil and military sectors. In 1972, there were 811 civil institutes of higher education—*VUZy.*[16] If the 125 military higher schools are added to this number, making a total of 936, the military schools amount to more than 13 percent; in other words, about one in every seven or eight college-level institutions in the USSR is an officer-commissioning school roughly analogous to the United States' service academies at West Point, Annapolis, and Colorado Springs. The 23 Soviet military academies and institutes, which require a higher-education degree for entrance, have no precise civil counterpart, but they may be roughly compared with the 52 Soviet universities, constituting more than 30 percent of the combined total of 75.

It would be misleading, however, to assume that these percentages also reflect the military share of students. Available information suggests that this share is significantly less than the military's share

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] On the Soviet conception of this revolution, see *Nauchno-tekhnickeskiy progress i revolyutsiya v voyennom dele* (Scientific-Technological Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1973. See also John Erickson, Ed., *The Military Technical Revolution*, New York, Praeger, 1966, for a Western analysis of the same phenomenon, and W. L. Kintner and H. F. Scott, Eds., *The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs*, Norman, Okla., University of Oklahoma Press, 1968, for translated materials setting forth Soviet views.

[15] A. A. Grechko, *Vooruzhënnyye sily Sovetskogo gosudarstva* (The Armed Forces of the Soviet State), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1974, p. 207.

[16] *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR, 1922-1972* (The USSR National Economy, 1922-1972), Moscow, "Statistika," 1972, pp. 430-32.



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**Officer-Educational Institutions in the USSR**

| Type | Middle Schools [a] | Higher Schools [a] | Academies, Institutes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Academies | | | 16 |
| Institutes | | | 7 |
| Combined-Arms Schools | 1 | 9 | |
| Tank Schools | — | 9 | |
| Artillery Schools | 1 | 15 | |
| Anti-aircraft Artillery Schools | — | 5 | |
| PVO (Air Defense) Schools | 5 | 9 | |
| Airborne Schools | — | 1 | |
| Aviation Schools | 2 | 23 | |
| Military Engineer Schools | — | 3 | |
| Signal Schools | — | 12 | |
| Motor Transport Schools | — | 3 | |
| Chemical Defense Schools | — | 3 | |
| Rear Services, Railroad, and Construction Schools | 2 | 6 | |
| Civil Defense Schools | 1 | — | |
| Naval Schools | 1 | 10 | |
| Military-Political Schools | — | 10 | |
| Ministry of Internal Affairs Schools | — | 5 | |
| Border Troops Schools | — | 2 | |
| KGB Schools [b] | ? | ? | |
| TOTALS | 13 | 125 | 23 |

[a] "School" as used here refers to *uchilishche*. The "higher" *uchilishche* confers a degree roughly comparable to a BS from an American college.
[b] KGB schools are publicly admitted to exist, but none has been openly identified in the last few years.

SOURCES: This tally is based solely on reports published in the Soviet press since 1973. It should be considered incomplete, accounting only for those institutions which have been mentioned in public print.

of educational institutions. The average size of the student body in civil schools is 2,850 for full-time (that is, day) students and 3,640 if night students are included.[17] It is extremely doubtful that military schools have such large student bodies. Although the present average size is not known, figures provided by the late Marshal Grechko for the year 1941 indicate that the average student body in military schools at that time was about 1,100.[18] The difference at the university level may be even greater. One can only guess at the student-body size for military academies, but it would have to be small indeed to offset the strikingly large military share of total university-level institutions. Nor should one forget that the military academies and schools have high priority in material support, student recruitment, and faculty selection. Compared to the provincial institutes of agriculture and pedagogy, which are the most numerous civil schools, the military schools are vastly superior. In any event, the military's quantitative share of the overall educational system remains impressive.

Quantity, however, may be less important than the change in the qualitative characteristics of Soviet military education. In order to appreciate this change we must first understand the general classifications of Soviet military-educational institutions.

The most numerous type of institution is the military *uchilishche*, or school. There are many subclassifications within this general category (*e.g.*, engineer, technical, command, etc.), but it is more important to underscore that the schools are of two different levels. First, the "middle" *uchilishche* is actually comparable to a Western secondary technical school. It was the predominant type in the prewar period and usually offers a two-year curriculum. Second, the "higher" *uchilishche* normally offers a four-year course, although five-year courses have become increasingly common. Graduation from the higher school carries a "higher-education" degree, roughly equivalent to a bachelor of science degree in the United States. It is approved and authorized by the Ministry of Education just like degrees conferred by any Soviet civil educational institution.[19]

The "academies" have even higher status as the crowning institutions of this vast educational complex. Their faculties supervise original research and grant the highest academic degrees: the "candidate of sciences" and the "doctor of sciences." The "institutes" may be considered to stand on the academy level, but they are highly specialized—for example, in finance, languages, and even music. Graduate degrees from the academies are usually in military sciences but may also be in the natural and social sciences. The academies, therefore, can be thought of as military universities with graduate faculties. Officers, if they already have a "higher-education" degree, may apply for admission to an academy for a graduate degree program, normally three years in length.[20]

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 432 ff.
[18] Grechko, *op. cit.*, p. 208.
[19] For details on this classification of schools, the curricula, degrees, and entrance requirements, see *Voyennyye akademii i uchilishcha* (Military Academies and Schools), 2nd ed., Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1974, pp. 100 ff.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 192.



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A few additional administrative details about officer graduate and postdoctoral training are essential to an appreciation of the vastness of the military-educational system. First, the graduate education program includes study by correspondence. If an officer is accepted for a graduate degree program in correspondence status, he is granted relief from some of his duties in his unit.[21] Normally such a program can be completed in four or five years. Second, military officers may study in civilian institutions for a particular specialty. Although it is not entirely clear how this program works, it does help to train teachers for the military academies and schools,[22] and it probably provides specialists in areas where the military institutions have either no graduate programs or only weak ones. In the case of the Moscow Finance Institute, a military department has been established in this otherwise civilian institution. Third, officers who hold advanced degrees may be employed in civilian institutions for research purposes or activities in which their training is needed. Throughout the prestigious USSR Academy of Sciences, for example, one may find generals, admirals, and officers with advanced degrees working in their particular fields of expertise. Administratively they are usually on "reserve" status, receiving only part of their pay from the military and the remainder from the institution in which they work. Clearly the civil sector is quite porous, permitting the military to move in and out of almost all educational and research activities.




*A chemistry class at the Suvorov military secondary school in Kazan in April 1975.*

**E. Logvinov/TASS via Sovfoto.**

*Indicative of the increasing sophistication of Soviet officer training is this computer at the Order of Lenin Naval Academy, photographed in 1962.*

***—From 50 let sovetskikh vooruzhënnykh sil—dokumenty.***

## Qualitative Change

Having surveyed the growth of the officer-education system and the different types and levels of educational institutions the system now embraces, let us turn our attention to the change that has taken place in the quality of Soviet military education. One clue to this change is provided by the data in the table presented earlier. Fifteen years ago, the number of schools in the middle column (higher schools) would have been very small, with the largest number falling in the first column (middle schools). As the table shows, this profile is now essentially reversed. One Soviet military commentator noted in 1972 that "only in the last few years the proportion of higher schools and academies in the total number of schools . . . has almost

[21] *Spravochnik ofitsera* (Officer's Reference Book), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1971, pp. 210-15.

[22] See V. Staritsyn, in *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), March 12, 1975.



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doubled." [23] Furthermore, many of the higher schools now have graduate programs, bringing them closer to the status of the academies. As a consequence, the latter no longer hold a monopoly at the highest educational level, particularly in the scientific disciplines and applied engineering.

The buildup of the system of higher military education has entailed some problems. Merely to staff all the new faculties, the Ministry of Defense has obviously had to push officer graduate education to the system's maximum capacity. The head of the Vilnius Higher Command School of Radio-Electronics—under the Air Defense Forces (*Protivo-Vozdushnaya Oborona*—PVO)—recently told of the harried experience his school went through in moving up from "middle" to "higher" status. In 1971, only one member of the teaching staff possessed a higher degree; as of early 1976, 14 members had such degrees, and numerous others were completing dissertations.[24]

At the same time, the buildup has made a considerable imprint on the officer corps. In the armed forces as a whole, 45 percent of the officers now are engineers or technicians with higher degrees, with the proportion 75 percent in the rocket forces.[25] All commanders at brigade level and above, and 80 percent of those at regimental and lower levels, have higher degrees, *i.e.*, a BS equivalent or better.[26] Though such figures would hardly be impressive for a Western country, for the Soviet Union they reflect a remarkable transformation of the officer corps.

Thus far we have mentioned only the education of officers within the domain of the Ministry of Defense. It no longer stops there, however, but has been extended into the civil sector through the introduction in 1970 of military departments into every civilian institution of higher education.[27] These departments were not always happily received, but their effect was to create a system not unlike the Reserve Officers' Training Corps in US civilian colleges. A crucial difference, however, is that every able-bodied Soviet male student at a civil "higher" educational institute is obligated to participate in the program and receives a reserve commission upon graduation. This reserve system, of course, provides a great mobilization pool, but it also brings another advantage. Almost anyone with higher education can be coopted for military employment by being called to active duty as a reserve officer. Thus, scientific and technical elites can easily be drawn from the civil sector to meet military research and development demands. Scientists and engineers simply put on uniforms.

If the reserve officer program in some respects militarizes the civilian technical intelligentsia, the military academies and schools proper are creating a distinctive "military intelligentsia." The regime is highly conscious of this social development and fosters a postive image of the educated and sophisticated officer. For example, a 1972 article in the military press stressed the need for developing the intellectual qualities of Soviet officer personnel. While admitting that the terms "intelligentsia" and "intellectuality" had pejorative connotations for many Soviet officers—especially because they had been applied to "reactionary" elements in the prerevolutionary intelligentsia—the article emphasized that such ideas must be abandoned in the contemporary epoch. "The cultured officer," wrote the author, "is a man of moral conviction and deep learning in Marxism, one who has a broad understanding of literature and art. It is possible to converse with him on many subjects, to discuss the latest literature, music, and painting." The article hastened to add that such intellectuality is not ensured by mere possession of a diploma of higher learning.[28]

Is the system of officer education described above —perhaps the most intensive as well as the most extensive the world has yet seen—an aberration in the Russian historical context? Not entirely. It was for military purposes that Peter the Great launched a special system of public schools for the sons of the service nobility. These soon faded, but by the end of the 18th century there were four cadet corps. The 19th century witnessed an exponential expansion of military schools which was not matched in the civil sector until the *zemstva* (organs of local government) much later became actively concerned with public education. Twenty percent of all elementary school children were in military schools by 1830, and 30 percent by 1850. On the secondary level, the number of cadet corps rose to 19 by mid-century. A number of specialized or "technical" mili-

[23] B. Sapunov, in *ibid.*, Feb. 3, 1972.

[24] K. Logvinovskiy in *ibid.*, Feb. 1, 1976.

[25] *XXIV s'yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, stenograficheskiy otchët* (24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Stenographic Report), Moscow, Politizdat, 1972, p. 349.

[26] Grechko, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

[27] See "In the Military Faculties," *Krasnaya zvezda*, Nov. 29, 1972.

[28] I. Ovcharenko, "Intellectuality," in *ibid.*, March 11, 1972.



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tary secondary schools also appeared. At the higher-education level, the Military Surgical Academy was founded in 1800, and the General Staff Academy in 1832. Then came the Military Engineering Academy, the Artillery Academy, and the Military Juridical Academy, followed by a proliferation of additional technical institutions in response to what could well have been called a forerunner of the "revolution in military affairs" that Soviet writers speak of today.[29]

Thus, the Russian imperial system of military education, although it has been practically ignored by Western historians, was large indeed. However, it was not until after the military reforms implemented in the 1870's by D. A. Milyutin, then Minister of War, that the Russian Army slowly developed the mass mobilization capacity that allowed it to enter World War I on a grand scale. Nevertheless, as we turn our attention from officer education to the training of troops, we shall see that Russia's late start in mass recruitment has not prevented the Soviet regime from developing an incredibly large troop-training capacity.

## The New Basic Training System

The Soviet Army has never had a basic training system analogous to the American system of massive training centers where recruits receive 16 weeks of individual training before being posted to military units. Until recently it had a large number of smaller induction centers where new conscripts spent a so-called "quarantine" period of up to six weeks duration before assignment to units. This allowed time for some basic training beyond the elementary military training which had been instituted in many areas of the civil society dating back to the Red Guard in 1917 and which had acquired a significant structural base in mass voluntary organizations, the trade unions, and occasionally on collective farms. Such elementary training was always supplemented by the training received at the induction centers during the "quarantine" period and later at regimental schools in regular units. In the recent past, however, the "quarantine" training has been dropped, and draftees now proceed directly from civil life to regular military units.

In 1967, the government promulgated a new military service law that instituted fundamental changes. Only its most obvious feature caught the eye of most Western observers—namely, a reduction of the term of obligatory active service by one year. For most of the troops that was a change from three years to two, but for the naval and air forces, it was a change from four years to three.

Actually, however, it is wrong to look upon the 1967 law as reducing the term of service by a full year. In practice, part of that time has simply been pushed back into the civil sector—specifically, into the 9th and 10th grades of secondary schools, where all male students are required to go through a standard military program that includes marching, rifle marksmanship, and individual and squad tactics, as well as military regulations, terminology, and his-

*Field Marshal Count D. A. Milyutin, the leading force in the modernization of the Tsarist military education system in the 1870's.*

**—Frontispiece in *Voyenno-istoricheskiy sbornik* (St. Petersburg), No. 1, 1914.**

[29] On the prerevolutionary development of military education, see L. G. Beskrovnyy, *Russkaya armiya i flot v XIX veke* (The Russian Army and Navy in the 19th Century), Moscow, Nauka, 1973, pp. 103 ff. and 164-250.



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*Tenth-grade pupils at the Smolensk No. 9 Secondary School study the mechanics of hand grenades.*

—From *Voyennyye znaniya* (Moscow), No. 4, 1972, p. 33.

tory.[30] The youth who has completed this program and is called to active duty does not enter a basic training program but proceeds directly to a regular unit. Drafted, say, in Kiev one day, he could be in a combat division in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, or on the Chinese border two or three days later. This is quite a different situation from that in Western armies, where recruits receive at least four, and sometimes six to eight, months of training before assignment to operational units.

Each secondary school has a "military supervisor," usually a retired officer, approved by the local military commissariat. As a member of the school faculty, he is hired and paid by the school and in principle is subordinate to the school director, but frequent clashes between military supervisors and school directors have tended to confuse this supposedly subordinate relationship.[31] In 1972, the Deputy Minister of Education, F. Shtykalo, was called upon to answer publicly a growing number of questions about the role of the secondary-school military program, the military supervisors, and their duties in an effort to quell what seems to have been a widespread mix of resentment and resistance against, and misuse of, the supervisors.

In other respects, too, this program has been far from trouble-free. For example, the State Committee for Construction Affairs (*Gosudarstvennyy Komitet po Delam Stroitel'stva*—GOSSTROY) cut corners on the building of rifle ranges at secondary schools, leaving many schools with no access to ranges, and in Belorussia the Ministry of Education's design for new schools omitted military offices, classrooms, and weapons-storage facilities.[32] Moreover, such problems are petty compared to the problem of putting all teenage youths into daytime secondary schools. Both in industrial areas and in rural areas, the

[30] For the basic training text currently used in these secondary-school programs, see *Uchebnoye posobiye po nachal'noy voyennoy podgotovke* (Textbook for Basic Military Training), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo DOSAAF, 1973.

[31] See "Does the School Need a Military Supervisor?" *Sovetskiy patriot* (Moscow), Aug. 16, 1972.

[32] *Krasnaya zvezda*, June 14, 1972.



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secondary-school system has large lacunae. To remedy this deficiency, the practice thus far has been to retain the network of military training points set up in factories and collective farms by the trade unions, DOSAAF, or some other public organization, letting them close down only as secondary-school military programs become available.

In summary, then, it is the USSR Ministry of Education, assisted locally by military commissariats, which bears the responsibility for providing basic military training through the civil secondary schools. The system is far from uniformly and completely installed, but in a fashion typical of Soviet military programs, it is being methodically and persistently developed, though possibly another decade may be required to get it into full swing.

Beyond the features of the system itself as just described, the rationale behind it also merits at least cursory examination if its implications are to be fully understood. This rationale is more complex than is generally realized, for as a key element in the policy of "militarization of the entire population," the 1967 military service law on which the system is now based is related to economic and general education policy as well as to state defense.

One of the major considerations behind the changes instituted by the 1967 law is undoubtedly the desire to call up more youth each year and thereby move a larger number of experienced veterans into the reserve mobilization base. It is an old concern. Already at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, Defense Minister Marshal Zhukov explained that reduction in the armed forces meant that an increased number of youths would fail to receive active duty training.[33] The present system, with a shorter active duty term, is at least a partial remedy.

Another consideration, a very complex one, is the technical imperative of modern weaponry. The number of specialties in the Soviet military has grown from 400 in the 1950's to about 2,000 in 1972.[34] One might be inclined to conclude from this that a reduced term of service would exacerbate the problem of skilled manpower. If the Soviet force structure were designed with little regard for mobilization, such reasoning would be cogent, but that is not the case. Moreover, there has been a significant change in recruitment patterns. Traditionally, the Soviet armed forces recruited from a low-literacy rural manpower pool, while urban youth with more exposure to things industrial—machines, autos, factory work patterns—were more often reserved for the industrial labor pool. However, as a greater and greater percentage of the population has become urban, and as the technical skills required by the military have grown, it has become compelling to shift the center of gravity of the recruiting base to the cities. Thus, by 1972, about 56 percent of all inductees were said to have worked in industry before call-up,[35] and in mid-1975, 84 percent of inductees were described as having already mastered "various civil specialties" and as possessing "a high level of technical preparation."[36] If these Soviet claims are generally accurate, it is evident that the quality of the military's recruiting base has changed radically from that of the 1950's and 1960's in response to the need for higher technical skills.

A third consideration underlying the present service law concerns the social structure of the armed forces and the multinational character of the USSR. In line with the regime's goal of national integration, the 1938 draft law declared national units in the armed forces no longer necessary or desirable, but in World War II language problems forced a retreat to the mobilization of homogeneous national formations. Naturally, in the postwar period, wholly integrated units have once again become the rule in the armed forces. No other institution in Soviet society offers such a unique means of Russification, and this fact has not been missed by the Soviet leadership. As of 1968, over 100 national language groups were reportedly represented in the Strategic Rocket Forces.[37] The regime has been surprisingly explicit about this integrative function of the armed forces in socializing youth from minority ethnic groups and providing a source of Russified cadres to feed back into the work force in minority regions. As a Soviet military journal put it, the "most important component part of the structuring of a multinational state" is the make-up of the armed forces (*voyennoye stroitel'stvo*).[38]

[33] *XX s'yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, stenograficheskiy otchët* (20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Stenographic Report), Moscow, Politizdat, 1956, p. 483.

[34] B. Sapunov, in *Krasnaya zvezda*, Feb. 3, 1972.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] A. Baranov, "Military-Technical Culture—An Aspect of the Spiritual Makeup of the Soviet Officer," *Kommunist vooruzhënnykh sil* (Moscow), July 1975, p. 20.

[37] *50 let Vooruzhënnykh sil SSSR*, *supra*, p. 468.

[38] P. Rtischev, "The Leninist National Policy and the Building of the Soviet Armed Forces," *Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 6, 1974, pp. 3 and 9.



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Finally, if the motives for the new service law are diverse and not immediately obvious, the same is true of some of the consequences of the basic-training system founded on it. One significant consequence is that, as the system comes to fruition, the training base becomes dispersed in a manner that makes it virtually invulnerable to a surgical nuclear strike—for the reason that, in a post-strike situation, any surviving secondary school can be used as a basic-training and mobilization center. Another consequence is a vast allocation of resources to defense through nonmilitary agencies. The individual student's time and other contributions are nowhere reflected in institutional budgets. Insofar as he receives no pay or material support, such as food and living quarters, the student is making a large contribution toward financing his own military training. Finally, a more intangible consequence is the social and psychological impact of the "military-patriotic" propaganda that forms a central part of the training program. The system ensures that youthful school experiences are saturated with military rhetoric in the most extreme "heroic" idiom.

## The New Role of DOSAAF

The modern technology of the Soviet armed forces, however, requires skills that cannot be imparted in the secondary-school military training program. Consequently, it has been necessary to supplement this pre-service basic training with additional specialized programs to teach as many as possible of the more than 2,000 military occupational specialties. This task has been given to the Soviet Union's largest mass voluntary organization, DOSAAF. Actually the use of mass voluntary societies for purposes of military education is not new, its origins dating back to 1923.[39] Between that time and World War II, an intricate network of programs in the mass-organizational context developed astride the civil-military boundary, siphoning resources from the civil to the military sector and *vice versa*, but with the balance heavily favoring the military sector. Lotteries, auto clubs, shooting galleries, radio operations, parachuting, pilot training, and dozens of other activities were included in the programs, a mix clearly chosen to bring in resources and funds as well as to contribute to many kinds of military education. DOSAAF, established in 1951, is the postwar successor to this prewar union of voluntary defense societies (under a 1927 statute, this organization was designated the Society of Friends of Defense and Aviation-Chemical Construction, or OSOVIAKHIM).

Until 1967, DOSAAF more or less followed the pattern developed in the 1930's. The 1967 military service law, however, explicitly shifted DOSAAF's focus and military emphasis to specialist training—that is, to imparting to the pre-inductee some specialized skill that he would employ after being drafted into active military service. The shift was made in response to a 1966 decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers calling for improvement in the work of DOSAAF—particularly with respect to the scope of its activities, the sharpening of its specialty training to complement the secondary school program, and the modernization of DOSAAF training facilities to make them capable of supporting specialty training of a quality acceptable to the Soviet army.[40]

By 1972, the results of the new policy were apparent, though hardly sufficient or complete. The report given at the 2nd Plenum of the All-Union DOSAAF Central Committee, held in Moscow in November 1972, was revealing in its account of the status of organizational and construction work.[41] According to the report, the list of concrete achievements since 1966 included 800 units of "capital construction." In the five years preceding the Plenum, moreover, over 60 percent of DOSAAF training organizations had moved to better buildings with better equipment. And finally, a threefold increase in the all-union DOSAAF budget had been realized over the preceding six years. This growth, however, had not been accomplished without difficulty. Some organizations had simply ignored the growth policy; others had misused new facilities after struggling to obtain them; and supervision over construction had frequently failed to prevent excessive cost, squandering, and misappropriation.

The report further noted that 570 new DOSAAF structures, including a new network of "Houses of Military-Technical Training," were scheduled to be built under the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-75). Of particular interest are the new Houses of Military-Technical Training, which are to be better-equipped

[39] See W. E. Odom, *The Soviet Volunteers*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1973, pp. 58-92.

[40] *Krasnoznamennoye oboronnoye*, ("Red Banner" Defense [Society]) Moscow, Izdatel'stvo DOSAAF, 1972, pp. 196-204.

[41] *Sovetskiy patriot*, Dec. 3, 1972.



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and better-staffed compared to most DOSAAF institutions and therefore capable of supporting programs of much higher quality than has been the general rule in past DOSAAF activities (with the exception of aviation training [42]). The aim is to build a House of Military-Technical Training in every oblast, kray, and republic center, or roughly 200 such units, during the period of the Ninth Five-Year Plan. The total number could be larger if the Ukrainian organization makes good its aim to build one in every rayon and city. Construction, however, has not kept up to schedule. The goal of 112 new houses for 1973 was reported to be only 25 percent complete by midyear.[43]

The new post-1967 DOSAAF policy has also included a drive to expand membership in DOSAAF's subsidiary organizations—a drive that has been surprisingly successful. According to a 1972 report,[44] the 1967-71 period witnessed a gain of 9 million new members and 20,000 new primary organizations. Confirming the youthful profile of DOSAAF's membership, the same report indicated that 70 percent of the total membership as of that time were also Komsomolites. Given a total of about 28 million Komsomolites in 1971,[45] this would suggest an estimated possible maximum DOSAAF membership as of 1972 of some 40 million if one assumes every Komsomolite belonged to DOSAAF. In 1973, however, public lecturers in Moscow and other cities were telling audiences that the organization was 65 million strong, a figure amounting to more than 25 percent of the entire population. Given the notorious unreliability of Soviet statistics, this figure may well be high, but even a manpower pool of 30 or 40 million is a staggeringly large voluntary labor allocation to military programs.

[42] The introduction of the "Houses of Military-Technical Training" has a historical parallel in the evolution of the pre-World War II Soviet program of voluntary aviation training. In order to achieve the qualitative level of training required for military purposes, the mass character of the prewar civilian program had to be sacrificed in favor of consolidating it in fewer but better-equipped facilities. (See *The Soviet Volunteers*, pp. 214 ff.) It must be noted, however, that the trade-offs involved in the establishment of the "Houses of Military-Technical Training" cannot be as severe in terms of cost because (1) more resources are available today, and (2) many specialist skills, such as motor mechanics, weapons repair, and radio maintenance, can be supported more cheaply than pilot training. A possible exception to (2) could be skills related to computer technology and radar systems, which could require expensive equipment in training bases if taught above an elementary level.

[43] *Sovetskiy patriot*, Aug. 9, 1973.

[44] *Ibid.*, Oct. 8, 1972.

[45] *Krasnoznamennoye oboronnoye, supra*, p. 248.

*Students of the Riga Maritime Club of the Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy (DOSAAF) study the workings of the AVM-3 diving apparatus. The youths come from a fishing collective and a lumber combine.*

**—From *Voyennyye znaniya* (Moscow), No. 7, 1972, p. 46.**

The DOSAAF cadre—that is, the paid organizational staff of instructors and supervisors—seems to come largely from among retired and reserve military personnel. Not only low-ranking officers and enlisted men but droves of retired generals as well are drawn into DOSAAF work.[46] To what degree military patronage enters into the staffing of the DOSAAF apparatus is impossible to say. While it probably plays some part, many press reports indicate that retired military personnel contribute their time to DOSAAF without remuneration.

The sources of DOSAAF income are of special interest because they are largely outside the state budget. They include dues from members, donations by institutions, revenues generated by DOSAAF enterprises, proceeds from an annual all-union lottery, and direct state grants.

Dues from members of local DOSAAF organizations reportedly amounted to about 25 million rubles in 1972,[47] not a very large sum in relation to the scale of DOSAAF programs. Donations are difficult to estimate but could be quite large. They include such things as buildings and grounds made available by factories and other institutions for DOSAAF activities. Occasionally, sums of money are given. For example, one factory gave DOSAAF 12,000 rubles

[46] See, *e.g.*, *Sovetskiy patriot*, Nov. 12, 1972; *Krasnaya zvezda*, Sept. 17 and 21 and Nov. 11, 1972.

[47] *Sovetskiy patriot*, Oct. 11, 1972.



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to be used for a boathouse facility on a nearby river.[48]

Profits from DOSAAF enterprises are a more important source of income. These derive from a variety of money-making activities—*e.g.*, from charges for the use of sports facilities and for transportation rendered by auto clubs; tuition fees for courses and schools; income from the manufacture of posters, training aids, and related items; and income from auto repair shops, shooting galleries, and boat rentals. The income from these sources is not petty. For example, the Rostov oblast organization reported a profit of 600,000 rubles in 1971, a figure which was also matched by the Mineral'nyye Vody city organization.[49] Such profits accounted for about 46 percent of the all-union DOSAAF budget—by no means a paltry portion.[50]

Another large source of income has been a nationwide lottery run by DOSAAF's network of organizations. In 1972, it reportedly took in tens of thousands of rubles in towns like Saratov and Kuybyshev[51]—indicating that total proceeds from such lotteries at the all-union level must surely reach into the hundreds of millions.

Finally, there are state donations to DOSAAF, although at present they probably account for only a small part of total annual income. The donations normally take the form of transfers of military equipment, but thus far the equipment has usually been so worn that it was considered no longer serviceable for active military training. Moreover, the changing weapons technology required for the kinds and quality of training now desired by the armed forces would seem to make it imperative to raise the quality—and hence the money value—of such transfers.

Has the shift in DOSAAF policy, along with the allocation of enormous resources to this far-flung organization, brought significant results? If the impressionistic figures publicized in the Soviet press correspond even roughly to reality, the results have been impressive. The most striking claim has been that made in 1974 by General of the Army A. A. Yepishev, Chief of the armed forces' Main Political Directorate, to the effect that one of every three inductees comes to active duty with a military specialty acquired in DOSAAF programs.[52] A slightly lower proportion of one out of four was reported for a district of Moscow in 1973,[53] and since DOSAAF programs generally receive greatest attention in urban areas, one would expect this figure to be above the all-union average. Yepishev's figure may therefore be puffed up, but even if it were deflated by half, it would still be a significant ratio.

As for the quality of the specialized training offered by DOSAAF, this is difficult to assess. Given the organization's cottage-industry-like structure, one would suspect that the quality of instruction leaves much to be desired, and complaints from military unit commanders appear to vindicate this suspicion. General-Lieutenant A. I. Odintsov, chief of the Ministry of Defense's Civilian Training Directorate, has also spoken candidly about the quality problem.[54] On the other hand, there have been contrary reports of praise from receiving units.[55] In any case there is no sign that the system is in danger of dissolution or great change; on the contrary, its expansion and improvement continue unabated.

This brief survey of DOSAAF's evolving role should suffice to demonstrate that the organization is not the innocuous and feckless agitational phenomenon that most Westerners and even many Soviet citizens have supposed it to be. In fact, it has become a vast conduit for nonbudgetary allocations to the military-educational complex. Almost uniformly, recent émigrés from the Soviet Union give DOSAAF low marks, and by their own standards and their idea of the active Soviet Army's standards, they are undoubtedly correct. However, they seldom consider the total allocation it makes to Soviet national defense, or the ability it gives the regime to impart at least marginally useful military skills to otherwise amorphous masses of young pre-draft-age Soviet youth.

Mass voluntary organizations have long been recognized as characteristic of mobilizational political systems. They have particular appeal for socialist leaders because they channel vast collective efforts toward public goals, and state defense, as a public goal, is among the easiest for any political leadership to justify at the expense of individual values. If Frunze could, in principle, justify the militarization of the entire population as a reasonable response to the appearance of aviation and chemical weapons in World War I, the advent of nuclear weapons in World War II has made his case all the more compelling in

[48] *Ibid.*, Nov. 5, 1972.
[49] *Ibid.*, Dec. 2, 1972.
[50] *Ibid.*, Aug. 9, 1972.
[51] *Ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1972.
[52] *Krasnaya zvezda*, June 1, 1974.
[53] *Ibid.*, May 11, 1973.
[54] *Krasnaya zvezda*, Aug. 23, 1972.
[55] *E.g.*, see *ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1973, and March 2, 1975.



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the present age. Yet DOSAAF, as we have seen, embraces only about one-fourth of the Soviet population. Consequently, we must turn to the fourth institutional arm of the Soviet military-educational complex in order to appreciate that its embrace is indeed total.

## The Civil Defense Structure

When General-Colonel A. T. Altunin made his public debut as Deputy Minister of Defense and head of "Civil Defense USSR" in October 1972, he did so with an article ostensibly occasioned by the 40th anniversary of civil defense in the Soviet Union.[56] The advent of nuclear weapons, he declared, meant that "defense must be conducted in every city, village, and production unit in the economy, on the entire territory of the state." In principle, Altunin was adding nothing to what Red Army leaders had said fifty years earlier about defense of rear areas.[57] Technically, however, nuclear weapons have complicated matters and made necessary a more complex system than the old tradition of localism in Soviet civil defense. Altunin explained it thus:

*The tasks of defense of the population and the economy from contemporary weapons demanded the creation of a completely new all-state defense system which could, with the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, under a unified military command, together with all the armed forces, with active participation of the entire people, secure the life activity of the state in conditions of severest war. That system emerged as Civil Defense USSR.*

What is new in this system? Put briefly, two features are novel, both of which have developed within the last decade or so.[58] First, the dominant administrative role of the Ministry of Defense has gained more substance than ever before. Second, local civil defense organizations have been linked for the first time into an all-union system of command, control, and maintenance. While the subject is too vast for detailed treatment here, let us briefly examine some of the major evidences of these two features.

Although the structure of General-Colonel Altunin's Civil Defense staff in the Ministry of Defense is not public information, this staff is clearly the nerve center of a system with extensive linkages to the civil bureaucracy. It appears to be tied to the State Planning Committee (GOSPLAN) and the production ministries in the civil economic sector and to the General Staff of the Armed Forces in the military sector. It is probably also represented in most other ministries, but especially in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This ministry controls all the nation's fire departments, most of which are staffed by the MVD troops under the ministry's jurisdiction.

The same close linkage with the civil bureaucracy is still more evident at the republic level, although the structure differs slightly from that at the center. Here, the formal "chief" of civil defense is normally the civilian chairman of the republic executive bureaucracy, but the real direction of civil defense

*General-Colonel A. T. Altunin, Deputy USSR Minister of Defense and Chief of Civil Defense USSR.*

—V. Savostyanov/TASS via Sovfoto.

[56] *Ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1972.

[57] *Cf. The Soviet Volunteers*, pp. 43-44.

[58] For a description of the civil defense system prior to these developments, see Leon Gouré, *op. cit.*



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activities is vested in a military "chief of staff" for civil defense—usually an officer of relatively senior rank, *e.g.*, a General-Colonel in the Ukraine.[59] The pattern is the same at the oblast, district, and city levels. In Moscow, for example, the chief of civil defense is V. F. Promyslov, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Moscow City Soviet (*Mossovet gorispolkom*), and General-Major S. A. Kuzovatkin is his chief of staff for civil defense.[60] Thus, there is an interlocking arrangement at every level from the all-union center down to the lower echelons of the state territorial administration.

Moreover, Altunin does not simply sit at the top of an apparatus interwined with the state bureaucracy; he also has special troops under his command. Civil defense units are normally of battalion or company size, but there have also been occasional references which suggested the existence of regiment-size units.[61] Civil defense exercises are frequent, and the troops also participate occasionally in relief operations at times of natural disaster—as, for example, in operations to control the enormous forest fires around Moscow in the extremely dry summer of 1972.[62] To provide command cadre for these units and for the civil defense staffs, there is a relatively new civil defense officer-training school offering a three-year course.[63] Taken together, the staff hierarchy and network, the specially trained officers, and the civil defense troops add up to something like a sixth branch of service—not as large as the other five (Ground Forces, Air Force, Air Defense, Navy, and Strategic Rocket Forces) but with an institutional status that is outwardly similar to that of the others in many respects.

Altunin's organization, however, is only the taproot. It is surrounded and fed by a dense growth of ancillary organs. Every factory, school, institute, hospital, and collective farm is required to have a civil defense organization. The "chief" is normally the head of the institution, but he, too, depends on a "chief of staff" to do the real work. The main difference between these organizations and the local soviet executive committee's civil defense structure is that there are seldom any uniformed military personnel. A bakery, a tire plant, or a steel mill normally has a civilian chief of staff for civil defense, who takes charge of organizing all workers into teams, training them in the use of civil defense equipment, and preparing personnel evacuation plans. He is also concerned with ensuring that new construction takes into account civil defense criteria such as adequate water and fuel supplies, blast resistance, and so on.[64]




*A reconnaissance patrol of the combined civil defense detachment of Moscow's Likachev Automobile Plant engaged in a CD drill in 1972. The signs they carry say "CONTAMINATED" (ZARAZHENO).*

**—From *Voyennyye znaniya* (Moscow), No. 4, 1973, p. 24.**

Some might view all this as tokenism or wishful thinking rather than as a genuinely effective civil defense system. But even though it might prove defective in the event of war, it cannot be dismissed as less than a serious effort. Literally thousands of civil defense exercises are held each year, with city districts quite commonly stopping all activity for training exercises that last a full day.[65] Factories, plants,

[59] *Krasnaya zvezda*, Jan. 15 and March 16, 1975.

[60] *Ibid.*, Jan. 15, 1975.

[61] See Altunin's reference to *chast'*, a somewhat imprecise term which normally is understood to mean "regiment," in *ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1972. Also see *ibid.*, March 17, 1973, for an editorial on civil defense troop training and pictures of such troops; and *ibid.*, Oct. 3, and Nov. 24, 1973, for other references.

[62] See *ibid.*, Feb. 7, 1973.

[63] *Ibid.*, March 7, 1973.

[64] N. P. Krechetnikov and N. P. Olivyanishnikov, *Grazhdanskaya oborona na mashinostroitel'nykh predpriyatiyakh* (Civil Defense in Machine-building Enterprises), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Mashinostroyeniye," 1972, po. 32 ff; and *Grazhdanskaya oborona* (Civil Defense), Moscow, "Vysshaya shkola," 1973, pp. 6-11.

[65] See *Krasnaya zvezda*, June 13 and July 15, 1972; July 8, 1973.



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schools, and other such institutions hold still more frequent exercises.[66] According to press reports, the executive committees of local and regional governments perennially keep civil defense on their agenda of problems for discussion.[67] Conferences on civil defense occur rather frequently as well, reflecting efforts to achieve interdepartmental coordination, especially among the various ministries concerned.[68]

The new civil defense system, unlike the old, puts more than a formal effort into the rural areas.[69] One reason for this is fairly obvious. Radioactive fallout makes agriculture far more vulnerable than in the past; yet the damage can be greatly reduced if the farm population is effectively trained in defensive measures and decontamination techniques. Perhaps more important, however, is the potential role of the rural villages in receiving and housing evacuees from urban areas. This takes highest priority in village exercises and frequently ties the villages near an urban center into joint city-village exercises.[70] It is only with the planning of defense against nuclear weapons that it has become necessary to prepare for large urban evacuations. Naturally, such planning must include utilization of the agrarian sector in a supportive role.

Public education is, of course, a major prerequisite for making the whole civil defense system viable, and it takes up the largest part of day-to-day program activity. Courses in civil defense are taught in the public schools in the second and fifth grades of the standard academic curriculum—that is, to eight- and eleven-year-old children.[71] Public lectures play a key role not only in mass education but in organizing residential blocks for phased evacuation. The economic ministries are required to carry most of the financial burden involved in efforts to make civil defense "a way of life,"[72] but they are frequently reluctant or slow to provide the funds needed to meet all the demands of the civil defense program.[73]

To sum up, this program amounts to a massive system of military education in peacetime. In wartime, it would play a key part in maintaining administrative control of the civil sector. The Ministry of Defense has been given the task of putting the core of the centralized structure together, but the costs in money, material, and labor are borne mostly by the civil sector—the economic ministries and state bureaucracy, production units, and the public schools. Administratively, the system creates a new military presence at all levels of the state bureaucracy, thus approaching Frunze's ideal of militarizing the population through the state apparatus.

## Conclusions

One can hardly explore the labyrinth of Soviet military training programs and structures without coming away with a sense of their pervasiveness and integration into all aspects of Soviet life. By the time a child is in the second grade, he receives his first formal instruction in survival in nuclear war. He learns not only that survival is possible but also how to go about saving himself personally. By his mid-teens, he confronts the "military supervisor" of his secondary school. About the same time, the local military commissariat is suggesting that he "volunteer" for one or more of the specialized military training courses offered by DOSAAF organizations. By age 18 or 19, he expects to be called to two years of active military service. If he matriculates at an institute of higher learning, he implicitly commits himself to becoming a reserve officer. If he wants to pursue any of a number of engineering specialties at the graduate level, he will learn that the best training in those areas—sometimes the only training—is found in military research facilities and in the graduate programs of military academies and schools. Even if he is a gifted musician and makes his way to the Moscow State Conservatory, he will not escape the militarization of Soviet education, for there he will find a military music department with generals as professors of directing and composition.[74] If he becomes an economist and finds employment in GOSPLAN, discovering a General-Colonel in the post of a deputy chief would hardly surprise him.[75]

[66] See *ibid.*, July 15, Aug. 5, Aug. 29, Sept. 7, and Nov. 15, 1972; May 16, Aug. 25, and Nov. 29, 1973; Feb. 8, 1974; and Feb. 8, 1975. Also *Sovetskiy patriot*, Aug. 30, 1972, and Feb. 14, 1973.

[67] See *Moskovskaya pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 17, 1973.

[68] See, *e.g.*, *Krasnaya zvezda*, July 19, 1972, and Jan. 17, 1975.

[69] See the chapter on agriculture in *Grazhdanskaya oborona*, *supra*, pp. 138-54. For an example of a rural civil defense exercise, see *Krasnaya zvezda*, Feb. 8, 1974.

[70] For examples of such joint city-village exercises, see *ibid.*, Aug. 5, 1972, and Feb. 8, 1974.

[71] *Sovetskiy patriot*, Aug. 16, 1972.

[72] *Krasnaya zvezda*, Feb. 13, 1975.

[73] For the candid remarks of the Chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers on many of the problems of program implementation but particularly of funding by ministries and other state agences, see *Sovetskaya Litva* (Vilnius), Oct. 4, 1972.

[74] See the obituary of General-Major I. V. Petrov in *Krasnaya zvezda*, June 6, 1975.

[75] For example, at the time of his death in July 1974, Engineer General-Colonel V. Ryabikov was serving as a first deputy chief of GOSPLAN. See *Krasnaya zvezda*, July 22, 1974.



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

*Students of the Novosibirsk Higher Military Political School scramble from a tank during November 1969 training exercises.*

**—TASS via Sovfoto.**

Throughout his adult life, the omnipresence of the military will strike him as normal, to be expected. He does not see the military as a thing apart but as something of which *he* is a part.

He will not find it strange—even though he probably will consider it onerous—to be importuned for contributions of money and time to the local DOSAAF programs long after he has lost interest in "military sports" such as shooting, parachuting, and tank-engine repair. Nor will he be outraged at finding himself on a civil defense decontamination team in the factory, farm, institute, or school where he is employed. He may resent the training sessions and may not put his heart into such forms of "continuing adult education" in the arts of modern warfare, but it probably would not even occur to him that Soviet society is abnormal in displaying so many aspects of a "garrison state."[76]

We have suggested at least two sources of this militarization of Soviet society. First, socialism, as a political ideology and as a guide to social and economic organization, correlates highly with war-like states. It would, of course, be wrong to say that socialism *per se* causes a polity to militarize. As Quincy Wright has observed, "socialism is more often developed from necessity than from theory, though in recent instances the latter has played a part."[77] The necessities can vary, but leaders inspired by various necessities frequently turn to the same ideological banner to justify militarizing programs. The

[76] We are mindful of the special meaning which H. D. Lasswell has given to the concept of a "garrison state" in his *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1935. The likelihood of war and the threatening character of the international environment would, in his view, incline political leaders to become increasingly dependent on their military chiefs, allowing the latter to exert influence on the leaders to turn their societies into military camps continually preparing for war. In this scheme, international factors are the primary causes of domestic political changes leading to the garrison state. The present author would argue, however, that domestic rather than international factors are a more important primary cause of the garrison condition in the Soviet Union.

[77] *Op. cit.*, p. 1165.



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reason is not far to seek. Socialism emphasizes the social or public interest over the interests of individuals. And that is precisely what a state and its army must do in war—sacrifice individuals and their private interests for the state's political objectives.

When the Bolsheviks took power, the very act was a declaration of war on society throughout the old regime's imperial territories. The ensuing internal war has waxed hot and cold throughout the nearly sixty years of Soviet history. Army General V. G. Kulikov, Chief of Staff of the Soviet armed forces, declared in 1973 that the Soviet military's "internal" role had virtually ended, giving way in the present stage of "developed socialism" to a growing "external" *role not simply to defend the Soviet Union* but also to secure the expanding territories of the socialist bloc.[78] Kulikov may be excessively optimistic about the internal front, but his notion of a regime at war at home and abroad is instructive and cogent.

The second major source of the militarization of Soviet society has been the military-political tradition of the Tsarist empire. Before the advent of the Bolsheviks, the old regime had already been at war internally. If urban industrial strikes were relatively new in Russia at the turn of the century, peasant disorders and armed opposition by ethnic minorities in in the borderlands were chronic. The empire ensured its own collapse when, in addition to internal struggles, it entered a vast foreign campaign on its European borders. The upshot was that the Bolshevik regime, arising amidst these unresolved and precarious military circumstances, both internal and external, had to accept as its birthright most of the tensions that had made militarization of the old state seem imperative to the imperial leadership.[79] Thus, the Tsarist military-political tradition was genetically transmitted to the Soviet regime.

One is forced to conclude, therefore, that the militarization of Soviet society is neither an aberration nor an unusual or extraordinary state of affairs. It is a traditional policy which is merely being currently expressed and justified in Marxist-Leninist *ideological terms. When it comes to the future, it is* important to recognize that the key problems that gave rise to the Tsarist military-political tradition in the first place and that were inherited along with that tradition by the Soviet regime—the peasant-agricultural problem, the nationality problem, and the foreign policy problem of a colonial, expansionist power—have remained largely unsolved despite the strong efforts of the Soviet leadership. If it cannot be said that the application of Marxist-Leninist ideology caused these problems, it can be argued cogently that it exacerbated them. Thus, both sources of the impetus to militarize persist today. We should not expect, therefore, that Soviet society will be spared the policies of militarization in the foreseeable future —unless there are significant changes either in the economic and social structure or in the ideology that shapes the leadership's thinking.

[78] *Krasnaya zvezda,* Feb. 23, 1973.

[79] On the Bolshevik military birthright, see Bertram Wolfe, "The Influence of Early Military Decisions Upon the National Structure of the Soviet Union," *American Slavic and East European Review* (New York), No. 9, 1950, pp. 169-79.



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# Defense Industrialists in the USSR

By Karl F. Spielmann

At this stage in the evolution of Soviet society, the defense industrialists of the USSR have considerable stakes in the decisions which that country's leaders have to make in two major areas. As managers of traditionally the most privileged segment of the Soviet economy, the defense industrialists cannot help but be concerned with the decisions confronting the leadership on how best to cope with the ills of the flagging civilian economy. As the armorers of the Soviet state, they also have an obviously large stake in the leadership's decisions on how best to build upon the Soviet Union's newly acquired status as a strategic equal of the United States.

The defense industrialists have reason to sense both opportunities and challenges in these not unrelated sets of decisions. New vigor for the economy as a whole would obviously be welcomed by them. However, as the regime casts about for economic cures, they are doubtless attentive to the potential threat of encroachments on their longstanding privileges. Similarly, the defense industrialists have reason to anticipate a rich and varied menu of defense programs from a regime appreciative of their recent achievements and tempted to exploit the USSR's new strategic status for foreign-policy gains. Yet, at this point in the arms "race," some of the dishes on this menu might not be too appealing. If the Soviet Union should have to place increasing emphasis on technologically adventurous weapons systems to keep pace with (or try to outpace) the United States, the defense industrialists could find themselves subject to disturbing pressures to modify tried and true organizational arrangements and practices in their sector.

It follows from the preceding statements that the defense industrialists are vitally concerned with decisions affecting the future course of the Soviet regime's current policy of détente toward the West. The regime's decisions regarding the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) and its effort to secure doses of Western technology to nurse the Soviet economy are most prominently involved. It is thus a matter of more than passing interest to Western policymakers trying to divine the nature and depth of the USSR's commitment to détente whether the defense industrialists are in a position to translate these concerns into an impact on policy and what this impact might be.

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## Soviet Military-Industrial Complexities

To suggest that the question of managerial power in the Soviet defense sector—*i.e.*, of the degree to which managers and administrators in this sector can or do influence national policy—may now have a particular relevance to pressing policy decisions affecting Soviet-US relations does not mean that one should have high hopes of satisfactorily resolving it. Over the years, the Soviet defense industrialists have received much less scholarly attention in the West than either their military customers or their managerial counterparts in the Soviet civilian economy. The reason for this lies in the extraordinary dearth of available information on the operations of the Soviet defense industries, which has caused Western scholars, by and large, to heed the counsels of prudence and adopt a policy of benign neglect toward



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the defense industrialists. Such an attitude, however, carries certain risks of its own. For one may then be tempted to make judgments about the defense industrialists on the basis of one of two alternative assumptions: either (1) that the attitudes and interests of the defense industrialists, as managers, coincide with those of Soviet industrial managers in general; or (2) that the defense industrialists, who are simultaneously members of the Soviet military establishment, fully share the interests and attitudes of the professional military. Neither of these assumptions, however, has been definitely established. As a consequence, the scholar faces a difficult choice: either he can go ahead and focus specifically on the defense industrialists as a particular group, in the face of admittedly incomplete evidence; or he can continue to make inferences about their attitudes and policy impact on the basis of the unproven assumptions just described. In the author's view, there are good grounds for choosing the former course.

For while the territory of the defense industrialists may be difficult to chart, it is not to be regarded as totally alien. Without succumbing to the illusion that methodological niceties can somehow make up for a lack of evidence, one can draw some useful guidance from other analytical settings in broaching the issue of managerial power in the Soviet defense sector. Since this article represents only a first step in trying to focus attention on the defense industrialists, it will not attempt a detailed discussion of the utility and disutility of applying concepts from related analyses. However, where particularly appropriate in the discussion, the apparent relevance of various approaches which have been utilized in other areas will be noted. The three principal sources that might be tapped to shed light on the defense industrialists' situation—provided that in doing so one does not lose sight of the peculiarities of these industrialists—are: (1) recent evaluations of US foreign-policy and weapons-system decision-making;[1] (2) studies of industrial decision-making in the Soviet civilian sector;[2] and (3) analyses of the Soviet defense research and development (R&D) process.[3]

## The World of the Defense Industrialists

The limited nature of the evidence available on the question of managerial power in the defense sector is readily apparent from a survey of the most significant published information on the defense industrialists' domain. As analysts who have grappled with the problem are painfully aware, it is difficult to calculate the magnitude of the overall annual Soviet defense budget,[4] much less arrive at a reliable estimate of the budget share for each of the Soviet defense-industrial ministries. It is generally agreed, however, that the defense-industrial ministries are privileged in respect of both the volume and quality of their share in certain key resources, such as R&D inputs (both manpower and equipment), and that, also in contrast to the civilian economy, they tend to utilize these resources more efficiently.[5] Finally, while there is very little direct information on enterprise-level operations in the defense-industrial bailiwick, one can at least tentatively derive some inferences about the attitudes, roles, and relations of personnel at this level from what is known about: (a) the R&D process and its relations to production; (b) enterprise-level activities of the military customer; and, most important, (c) the basic structure

[1] See, for example, Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," in Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter, Eds., *Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1973; James R. Kurth, "Aerospace Production Lines and American Defense Spending," in Steven Rosen, Ed., *Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex*, Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1973; and Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Sherer, *The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1962.

[2] The following excellent efforts deserve particular mention: Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969; David Granick, *Soviet Metal-Fabricating and Economic Development*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1967; Barry M. Richman, *Soviet Management with Significant American Comparisons*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1965; Joseph Berliner, *Factory and Manager in the USSR*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1957, and *The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1976; and Jeremy R. Azrael, *Managerial Power and Soviet Politics*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966.

[3] See, for example, Arthur Alexander, *R & D in Soviet Aviation*, Santa Monica, Calif., The Rand Corporation, 1970, and *Weapons Acquisition in the Soviet Union, the United States, and France*, Santa Monica, Calif., The Rand Corporation, 1973; also Nancy Nimitz, *The Structure of Soviet Outlays on R&D in 1960 and 1968*, Santa Monica, Calif., The Rand Corporation, 1974.

[4] See the useful discussion of this problem in Herbert Block, "Value and Burden of Soviet Defense," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1973, pp. 175-204.

[5] See, for example, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *Science Policy in the USSR*, Paris, 1969, p. 435. For a persuasive dissent from the general view that the defense sector received the lion's share of total Soviet R&D outlays in the 1960's, see Nimitz, *op. cit.* In seeking to explain the superior performance of the sector in contrast to the civilian economy, Nimitz emphasizes the efficiency factor.



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*Soviet defense industrialists (l): from left, S.A. Zverev, Minister of the Defense Industry; P.V. Dement'yev, Minister of the Aviation Industry; B. Ye. Butoma, Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry; and A. I. Shokin, Minister of the Electronics Industry. (Subsequent to going to press with this article, it was learned that Butoma died in July of this year and was replaced as Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry by M. Yegorov.)*

**—Sovfoto.**

and responsibilities of the defense-industrial ministries.

The most important defense industrialists are the heads of the individual defense-industrial ministries. There are currently eight defense-industrial ministries as well as at least four "quasi"-defense-industrial ministries (contributing to Soviet defense production) that have been identified. The ministries in the former category, together with their current ministers (in parentheses) and basic production responsibilities, are as follows:

Ministry of the Defense Industry (S. A. Zverev)—artillery, tanks, armored vehicles, small arms, fuses, primers, propellants, explosives, and possibly tactical guided missiles;

Ministry of the Aviation Industry (P. V. Dement'yev)—aircraft, aircraft parts, and probably aerodynamic missiles;

Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry (B. Ye. Butoma*)—naval vessels of all sorts;

Ministry of the Electronics Industry (A. I. Shokin)—electronic components and parts (subassemblies rather than finished electronic equipment);

Ministry of the Radio Industry (P. S. Pleshakov)—electronic systems, including radio and communications equipment, navigation aids, radars and computers;

Ministry of General Machine-building (S. A. Afanas'yev)—strategic ballistic missiles and space vehicles;

Ministry of Medium Machine-building (Ye. P. Slavskiy)—nuclear devices and warheads;

Ministry of Machine-building (V. V. Bakhirev)—possibly some portions of ballistic missiles and space vehicles or a portion of the Ministry of the Defense Industry's responsibilities.[6]

The category of "quasi"-defense-industrial ministries includes those of Tractor and Agricultural Machine-building; the Chemical Industry; the Automobile Industry; and Instrument-making, Automation and Control Systems.[7]

A notable feature of the defense-industrial sector is the durability of its administrators. All of the current defense-industrial ministers have spent long years in this field of work in various capacities, rising typically from enterprise-management posts to deputy minister and then minister. Moreover, most have

* After this article went to press, the author learned that Butoma had died on July 11, 1976. He was replaced by M. Yegorov, his principal deputy since 1958. Yegorov is neither a candidate nor a full member of the Central Committee.—Eds.

[6] Unless otherwise indicated, the description of these ministries and their ministers are drawn from: Andrew Sheren, "Structure and Organization of Defense-Related Industries," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the Soviet Union*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1970; Institute for the Study of the USSR, *Prominent Personalities in the USSR*, Metuchen, NJ, Scarecrow Press, 1968; Institute for the Study of the USSR, *Officials of the Soviet Union, 1917-1967*, Metuchen, NJ, Scarecrow Press, 1967; CIA Reference Aid, *Directory of Soviet Officials, Vol. 1: National Organizations*, Washington, DC, November 1973; and CIA Research Aid, *Evolution of the Central Administrative Structure of the USSR, 1917-June 1972*, Washington, DC, August 1972.

[7] See Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex: Does It Exist?" in Rosen, *op. cit.*, p. 117.



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long tenure in their ministerial posts. Apart from P. S. Pleshakov, who only assumed the post of Minister of the Radio Industry in 1974 upon the demise of V. D. Kalmykov, V. V. Bakhirev is the most "junior" minister, with 8 years of experience as head of the Ministry of Machine-building (*i.e.*, ever since its creation). S. A. Afanas'yev has been a minister for 11 years, and S. A. Zverev for 13 years. Among the "senior" ministers, P. V. Dement'yev has headed the Ministry of the Aviation Industry for 23 years; B. Ye Butoma* and Ye. P. Slavskiy have led their ministries for almost 19 years; and A. I. Shokin has headed the Ministry of the Electronics Industry since its founding 15 years ago. V. D. Kalmykov, had been Minister of the Radio Industry for over 20 years at the time of his death in 1974.

The basic lack of turnover in the ranks of the top defense industrialists probably attests at least in part to the Soviet political leadership's general confidence in their capabilities as administrators. Since several of them have weathered two successive leaderships, the top defense industrialists' grip on their posts may also testify to considerable political acumen on their parts—either in picking the winning side on key issues that have divided the leadership over the years or in wisely maintaining a low profile when it was politically expedient to do so. Except for P. S. Pleshakov, all of the current defense-industrial ministers are full members of the party Central Committee,[8] but none has gained entry to the Politburo. This contrasts with the situation in the early 1950's, for example, when defense-industry ministerial posts were occupied by Politburo members M. G. Pervukhin and M. Z. Saburov. (Since then, only D. F. Ustinov, whose unique role we shall consider presently, has risen from the ranks of top defense-industrial administrators to membership on the Politburo).

Not only has the durability in office of the top defense industrialists provided an important element of continuity in this vital sector; it has also apparently helped to sustain a network of personal relationships that may be significant in reinforcing a community of defense-industrial "interests." [9] These relationships are not limited to long-term personal contacts among the defense-industrial ministers themselves but also extend to the ministers' working relationships with the principal overseers of the sector. D. F. Ustinov, who was the party's chief watch-

* See editors' note above.

[8] Pleshakov only attained the rank of candidate member of the CC at the recent 25th CPSU Congress. [The new Minister of Shipbuilding has no Central Committee status at present—see editors' note above.]

[9] Graham Allison's analyses of US decision-making (see, *e.g.*, *loc. cit.*) suggest the importance of the personality factor in a bureaucratic setting. Emphasizing the significance of personal ties, personal bargaining skills, etc., Allison differentiates a bureaucratic-politics model of decision-making from the organizational-process model. Whereas the latter relies on organization charts and standard operating procedures of organizations to establish pertinent policy differences and pressures, the former is based on the premise that the personality factor is likely to modify such conclusions because people heading organizations may, for example, have stronger or weaker ties to particularly powerful individuals and have different bargaining skills. Given the long tenures of the Soviet defense-industrial ministers, it seems likely that the latter considerations would have an impact on managerial power in the Soviet defense sector.

*Soviet defense industrialists (II): from left, P. S. Pleshakov, Minister of the Radio Industry; S. A. Afanas'yev, Minister of General Machine-Building; Ye. P. Slavskiy, Minister of Medium Machine-building; and V. V. Bakhirev, Minister of Machine-building.*

—Sovfoto.



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dog over defense industry until his recent promotion to the post of Minister of Defense, and L. V. Smirnov, the Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission (*Voyenno - Promyshlennaya Kommissiya* — VPK),[10] both previously served as Minister of the Defense Industry and no doubt have had a longstanding personal acquaintance with the current defense-industrial ministers as well as with one another.

Notwithstanding the long tenure of the key defense-industrial administrators, there have been several organizational changes within the sector since it first attained separate existence almost 40 years ago.[11] While some of these changes no doubt have been reflections of broader organizational shake-ups in the Soviet bureaucratic structure,[12] some changes probably also have taken place to meet specific needs arising out of the exploitation of new areas of military technology. The creation in 1961 of the State Committee for Electronics Technology (which in 1965 became the Ministry of the Electronics Industry) probably falls into this category. The establishment of the Ministry of General Machine-building in 1965 presumably was also prompted by evolving military requirements. (It is curious, however, that creation of this separate ministry to administer missile R&D and production came only some five years after the Soviets saw fit, in late 1959, to create a separate service in the military to accommodate the ICBM—the Strategic Rocket Forces.) Since the establishment of the Ministry of General Machine-building, only one new ministry has been added—*i.e.*, the Ministry of Machine-building (in 1968).

In addition to these organizational accommodations to technological change, the defense sector in general has apparently benefited from other practices to keep the gap between R&D and production —which has been a source of particular concern in the civilian sector in recent years[13]—from yawning wide. Besides special supervisory efforts by the top leadership directed to this end, this seems to be basically a consequence of efforts by the individual ministries to attain and retain under their own authority the necessary R&D and production resources to turn out weapons systems; the clout given to individual designers in both the R&D and production processes; and the attention given to special experimental plants which construct weapons-systems prototypes.[14] It is noteworthy, however, that the defense-industrial ministries were apparently among the first to adopt the new system of economic accountability called for under the 1965 economic reform.[15] (Indeed, in 1964, S. A. Afanas'yev—soon to become Minister of General Machine-building—explicitly endorsed the need for economic reform based on the Liberman proposals.[16]) That the leadership saw fit to extend the reform to the defense sector suggests that the sector may not be altogether free of the ills

[10] Smirnov was identified in this post by Raymond Garthoff in "SALT and the Soviet Military," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1975, p. 29. The likely role of the Commission is discussed below.

[11] The early years of this evolution are described in Marshal M. V. Zakharov, "On the Eve of World War II; May 1938-September 1939," *Novaya i noveyshaya istoriya*, (Moscow), No. 5, October 1970.

[12] For an illuminating analysis of the defense industries' relations with the Soviet economy as a whole, and particularly of their reflection of the evolution of that economy over the years, see David Holloway, "Technology and Political Decision in Soviet Armaments Policy," *Journal of Peace Research* (Boston), No. 4, 1974, pp. 257-79.

[13] Of the many Western discussions of Soviet efforts to come to grips with the problem, the most comprehensive is Joseph Berliner's recent *The Innovation Decision . . .*, cited in fn. 2.

[14] See Alexander, *Weapons Acquisition . . .*, pp. 4-5. Other analyses have argued, explicitly or implicitly, that superior performance of the Soviet defense sector has been due in part to the use of modern management techniques—*e.g.*, Soviet versions of program evaluation and review techniques (PERT) and critical-path methods (CPM). Since, on the basis of Western experience, we know these techniques to be particularly suited to weapons efforts and since the Soviets show signs of trying to "transfer" such techniques to the civilian sector, it is tempting to assume that they have been widely and effectively used in the Soviet defense sector in the past. Available evidence would seem to warrant the conclusion that these techniques have at least been used selectively or on a trial basis in the defense industries. However, the extent of use and the degree to which it has positively affected performance remain very much open questions.

For discussion of the Soviet effort to transfer defense management practices to the civilian sector, see Robert W. Campbell, "Management Spillovers from the Soviet Space and Military Programmes," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), April 1972, and Paul Cocks, "Science Policy and Soviet Decision-Making: PPB Comes to the Kremlin," a paper prepared for the 1975 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

[15] David Holloway, *Technology, Management, and the Soviet Military Establishment*, Adelphi Paper No. 76, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971, p. 6. Holloway argues that the defense industries may have been encouraged by the profitability performance criterion (inherent in the reform) in a manner not originally intended by the reformers—*i.e.*, to try to resist innovation. While there is scant firm evidence to this effect, K. N. Rudnev, Minister of Instrument-Making, Automation, and Control Systems, recently gave a strong hint that the primary interest at least of the top defense industrialists in the new principles of economic accountability may be basically to preserve or enhance their prerogatives (*e.g.*, vis-à-vis the central economic authorities), with questions of production efficiency and innovation taking second place. As he put it, "Why aren't these principles being extended to other branches? Aren't our economic agencies being overly cautious here where the relevant concern is to increase the economic rights of the [branch] ministries?" See *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Dec. 10, 1975.

[16] See Sheren, *loc. cit.*, p. 130.



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besetting the civilian economy—which the reform in part was supposed to help remedy. If the presumed goals of the regime as evidenced on the civilian side are any guide, the intent would have been, among others, to improve production efficiency in the defense sector and in particular to encourage the defense managers to be more receptive to technological innovation.[17]

A final aspect of the defense-industrial setup that bears mention also illustrates that the dividing line between civilian and defense industries may not be as sharp as it at first appears. While it is impossible to arrive at any trustworthy calculation, the civilian production commitments of the defense-industrial ministries seem to be considerable. This is quite evident if one takes into account, for example, that the production of all civilian aircraft in the USSR falls under the Ministry of the Aviation Industry in the defense-industrial sector. Brezhnev himself told the 24th CPSU Congress in March 1971 that 42 percent of the defense-industrial ministries' efforts went into production for the civilian sector.[18] Soon thereafter, P. V. Dement'yev, Minister of Aviation Industry and, S. A. Zverev, Minister of Defense Industry, both published articles bolstering Brezhnev's claim.[19] The latter cited an impressive array of civilian products produced by defense-industrial plants —ranging from oil-drilling equipment to the Moskvich automobile.

## Defense Producers and the Military

The foregoing survey of various aspects of the Soviet defense-industrial establishment provides only a rough starting point for assessing managerial power in this sector. It is necessary to fit these elements into a more sharply-focused picture of the defense industrialists' relationship with their military customers as well as with the Soviet political leadership.

While the nature and impact of managerial power in the Soviet defense-industrial sector must ultimately hinge on the relationship between the defense industrialists and the political leadership, these matters cannot be properly evaluated without first taking a look at the relationship between the industrialists and their most important customers, the Soviet military. In broad terms, one might reasonably take for granted a basic commonality of interests between those who produce Soviet weapons systems and those who use them. To the extent it could be shown that such a commonality of interests exists *and* can be translated into pressure on the Soviet leadership to pursue defense (and foreign) policies which it would not otherwise adopt, one would have a classical example of the operation of a military-industrial complex in the Soviet setting. There are, however, significant nuances and distinctions in the Soviet case that may limit the validity of this military-industrial "model" in analyzing the policymaking process in the USSR.

First, the model oversimplifies matters for the reason that, notwithstanding the aggregative role which the Ministry of Defense may play for the military, in reality the defense-industrial/military relationship is one between a *collection* of producers on one side and a *collection* of customers on the other. The eight defense-industrial ministries turn out weapons systems for five different military services. Accordingly, the Ministry of General Machine-building, for example, can be expected in the main to have a greater interest in the fate of weapons systems for the Strategic Rocket Forces than in those desired, say, by the Ground Forces. Similarly, the Ministry of Shipbuilding would obviously have a greater stake in the Navy's programs than in the programs of the other services. Consequently, just as there may be categories of decisions which find the defense-industrialists as a whole and the military as a whole in agreement, so there may also be categories of decisions in which certain military services and certain defense-industrial ministries "ally" themselves against other services and defense-industrial ministries.

It is necessary to go beyond even these distinctions. While particular defense-industrial ministries may have service customers that are basically more important for them than other service customers, the range of production responsibilities of these ministries indicates that their ties with their principal customers are by no means exclusive. For example, the Ministry of the Radio Industry would doubtless have a high stake in supplying the radar systems which the Air Defense Forces (*Protivo-Vozdushnaya Oborona*—PVO) desire but it would also have an obvious stake in the production of radars for the Air Forces and Navy. Likewise, the Ministry of the

[17] Holloway, "Technology and Political Decision . . .," p. 268.

[18] Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter—FBIS), *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), No. 62, Supplement 17, March 31, 1971, p. 3.

[19] *Izvestiya*, May 22 and July 7, 1971, respectively.



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Aviation Industry would presumably have a major interest in production for the Air Forces, but it would also have a stake in meeting the needs of Naval Aviation and the PVO.

As a consequence of the breadth of the defense-industrial ministries' production responsibilities, identification of basic alliances between services and specific defense industries can on occasion prove difficult. To take a hypothetical case, the Long-Range Air Force (LRA) plumps for a new bomber which top officials in the Ministry of Defense (or in the Politburo) view as feasible only if plans for a new fighter-interceptor desired by the PVO are scrubbed. In this situation, can the Minister of the Aviation Industry, P. V. Dement'yev, be reliably identified as a backer of the LRA case? Or should he be regarded as a PVO ally?

In this context, it is also worth noting that the various armed services under the Ministry of Defense cannot do much shopping around to get their desired weapons systems produced. While it is undoubtedly true that on the whole the Ministry of Defense enjoys considerable market power as the only substantial customer for new weapons in the USSR,[20] the bargaining leverage of the defense-industrial ministries is hardly inconsequential. The PVO after all *has* to deal with the Ministry of the Radio Industry to get the radars it wants; the Air Forces *have* to deal with the Ministry of the Aviation Industry to secure aircraft, and so on. This sort of dependency does not, of course, justify the conclusion that these defense-industrial ministries would be likely to affront a major service customer. It does suggest, however, that even when a defense-industrial ministry does not have to choose between competing proposals of two different services as in the case described above, it may still be less committed to a new weapons system than the particular service which is promoting it.

In light of these considerations, it would appear to be among personnel operating *below* the ministerial level in the defense-industrial ministries that one is likely to find the greatest congruence of interests with those of service proponents of particular weapons systems.[21] Here the role and attitudes of weapons-system designers are probably of key importance in the Soviet military-industrial equation. Memoir material [22] and recent analyses based on that material indicate that on occasion weapons-system designers themselves have taken the initiative in proposing new weapons systems (sometimes seeking the backing of top political leaders) to the military customers. Such indications, plus the fact that extensive competition may occur among design shops before a choice of a weapons system for production is made,[23] would suggest that individual designers may have considerably higher stakes in particular weapons decisions than do the top defense industrialists. In a design competition for a new aircraft for the PVO, for example, what would be a loss to a designer would not be a comparable loss to his minister—since the winning design would be produced in the ministry in any event.[24]

Besides these incentive considerations, intensity of interest in decisions on particular weapons systems may also be affected by the quality of communications between service proponents of the systems concerned and the design shops in the defense-industrial ministries which would develop these systems. Memoir material indicates that these contacts may be highly developed and effective. Evidently, personnel with appropriate technical qualifications are assigned by the military services to monitor weapons efforts in the defense-industrial ministries.[25] One might infer from the technical expertise re-

[20] See, for example, Nimitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-45.

[21] This is not to assume that a particular service would necessarily have a monolithic weapons "interest." Indeed, differences among branches of a service may be on occasion quite virulent with respect to weapons-system priorities—such as between artillery and armor partisans in the Ground Forces; Frontal Aviation and LRA advocates in the Air Forces; and fighter-interceptor and SAM proponents in the PVO.

[22] See, for example, A. S. Yakovlev, *Tsel' zhizni: zapiski aviakonstruktora* (The Goal of Life: Notes of an Aircraft Designer), Moscow, Politizdat, 1966.

[23] According to Alexander, success or failure in such competition means state prizes and awards for the winner and, in extreme cases perhaps, dissolution of the design bureau headed by the loser. See *Weapons Acquisition* . . ., p. 10.

[24] As noted above, there is another kind of competition in which designers might also have more direct stakes than the head of their ministry, *e.g.*, in a decision whether to build a new bomber or a new fighter-interceptor. Such a "competition" would put design shops within the Ministry of the Aviation Industry (as well as the two services involved) at loggerheads. Which designer the minister would be likely to back is no more clear than which service interest he would promote. Similarly, to refine the analysis further, there could also be instances in which weapons-system choices involve branches of the same service and a single defense-industrial ministry. A choice between a new tank and a new artillery piece, for example, would find design shops within the Ministry of the Defense Industry at odds as well as artillery and armor partisans in the Ground Forces. Which system Minister Zverev would back would be an open question, but his commitment to one or the other option would seem likely to be less intense than that of any other of the above-named principals.

[25] See, for example, B. L. Vannikov, "From the Notes of the People's Commissar for Armaments," *Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 2, 1962, pp. 79-86, and Sheren, *loc. cit.*, p. 126.



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quired of these military monitors to perform competently, as well as from their basic responsibilities,[26] that they are likely to be quite specialized and, in consequence, to be associated with technical organizations located in particular services.[27] If this is the case, they would seem well suited to act as a channel for transmitting particular weapons-system ideas from their respective military services to individual designers, as well as conveying the designers' ideas to their service superiors.[28]

To what extent such opportunities for the development and communication of common weapons-system "interests" at the lower levels of the defense-industrial ministries and in the services affect managerial authority in the defense sector is difficult to say. It seems likely that the monitoring activities of the military personnel and the clout that has been ascribed to designers in the production process would, at the very least, heavily impinge on the authority of managers at the enterprise level.

At the upper levels of the managerial hierarchy—*i.e.*, among the defense-industrial ministers and deputy ministers—the situation may be much more complicated. These individuals may be in a position to block ideas for new weapons systems put forward by the most concerned individuals in their respective spheres, or alternatively to advance them further—*e.g.*, to a hearing by political and military decision-makers at the highest levels.[29] The receptivity of the defense-industrial ministers (and deputy ministers) to such new ideas is likely to depend in part on the sorts of distinctions between military and defense-industrial "interests" adduced earlier. In addition, much might depend on the top defense industrialists' view of the degree of technological adventurism involved in a proposed weapons system.

Without ascribing to military personnel and designers unbridled enthusiasm for forcing the pace of military technology, there are reasons for believing that they would be more inclined to promote technologically adventurous ideas than would the top defense industrialists. To be sure, analyses which have underscored the large role of designers in the Soviet weapons-acquisition process have stressed the basically conservative approach of the designers over the years—which has resulted in the relatively simple but reliable weapons systems said to have characterized much of the Soviet arsenal in the past.[30] However, even if we grant this to be an accurate description of the situation in Soviet weapons development in the past,[31] the designers may be less conservative today, even if not as inclined as military service personnel to see technologically adventurous weapons systems developed and produced. The element of competition is likely to continue to induce a relatively greater cautiousness on the part of designers, but in light of the considerable personal stake a designer may have in weapons "contracts" with a particular service, he may not be in the best position to fend off technologically adventurous proposals advanced by that service (especially if the service insists that keeping pace with US weapons programs requires that such proposals be carried out). It is also possible that an increase in the predisposition of the Soviet military services to accept technologically adventurous ideas might

[26] Sheren asserts that "a major function of the team [of military monitors] is to maintain quality control at each step in the production process and to insure that the product meets prescribed specifications." *Loc. cit.*

[27] The existence of such technical organizations has been noted, for example, in the case of the Air Forces and Ground Forces. See Raymond Garthoff, "Soviet Air Power: Organization and Staff Work," in Asher Lee, Ed., *The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces*, New York, Praeger, 1959, p. 181, and John Milsom, *Russian Tanks, 1900-1970*, Harrisburg, Pa., Stackpole, 1971, p. 80.

[28] The production responsibilities of the military monitors and the involvement of the designers in monitoring the production process (see Alexander, *Weapons Acquisition . . .*, p. 4) would at the least give military monitors and designers a basis for sustained contact.

[29] As will be noted below, there are a number of formal bodies that bring top military, defense-industrial, and political leaders together. Within the military domain *per se*, service backers of new weapons ideas would no doubt have to contend with ministry-level organs and personalities concerned with defense R&D and production. General N. V. Ogarkov, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General-Colonel N. N. Alekseyev of the Engineering-Technical Service, and General-Lieutenant K. A. Trusov (all of whom *have "represented" the Soviet military at SALT) are probably* among the key officials to be dealt with at this level. If top defense industrialists should try to block new programs proposed by designers, the "channel" from service backers of the programs to top Ministry of Defense officials such as these may afford the proponents a means to try to overcome such resistance. However, support at the top level of the Ministry of Defense for ideas that had won the backing of a particular service would not necessarily be automatic either. See Garthoff, "Salt and the Soviet Military," *loc. cit.*, pp. 28-29.

[30] See Alexander, *Weapons Acquisition . . .*, pp. 8-11.

[31] There is already some questioning of this image of past Soviet weapons programs and of the consequent burden they have represened for the Soviet economy. Since roughly the mid-1960's, this image may have been appropriate for much, but certainly not all, of the Soviet arsenal. As one analyst has written, "This presumption of relatively unsophisticated weaponry may no longer be justified. Recent analyses indicate that the major Soviet land armaments and tactical aircraft introduced since 1965 are substantially more complex than the weapons they have replaced. There are some cases in which the increased complexity and associated increase in capability entail lower dollar costs. But in most cases the unit-production costs for the present generation of Soviet land arms are substantially higher than for older equipment performing similar missions." See Andrew W. Marshall, "Estimating Soviet Defense Spending," *Survival* (London), March-April 1976, p. 77.



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tend to induce individual designers to push similar ideas of their own.

On the other hand, such ideas may well encounter their least enthusiastic reception among the top defense industrialists. This perspective does not necessarily reflect a conservatism resulting from old age and long tenure in the same posts. (Resort to actuarial tables to identify who stands where on Soviet policy matters is, in any event, a questionable analytical device.[32]) A far more important reason for the top defense industrialists' wary attitude is their concern that pushing the pace of military technology might lead to infringements on their individual domains and/or complication of their management responsibilities. They have before them a number of examples of organizational changes in the not too distant past which were certainly prompted in part by the need to keep pace with advancing military technology and which resulted in losses of resources by older ministries to newly-created ones. The Ministries of the Electronics Industry, General Machine-building, and Machine-building, which were established in the 1960's, were after all hardly created out of whole cloth.[33]

The top defense industrialists may also be uneasy that acceptance of technologically adventurous weapons systems may entangle them in new dependencies, even if they manage to avoid large-scale reorganizations. An increasing need to turn to the Academy of Sciences, for example, rather than to rely heavily on in-house R&D resources would seem to be a likely prospect.[34] A greater dependence on other defense-industrial ministries for subsystems and components for ever more complicated and advanced weapons systems is another possibility that might add to the individual management burdens of the top defense industrialists.[35] A final prospect that might also be less than welcome is the possible assumption by the political leadership of a greater and more direct role in managing operations in the defense-industrial sector. This role is already considerable, but the increased problems of coordination among the defense-industrial ministries and between them and outside institutions (such as the Academy of Sciences) that would result from commitment to a more technologically adventurous policy of weapons development could make the hand of the political leadership weigh even more heavily on the defense-industrial managers.[36]

None of this is to suggest, of course, that the top defense industrialists are predisposed to treat every indication of determined technological advance in weapons systems like the plague. Nor is it to suggest that they would necessarily have the power, even if they had the desire, to block those who wished to push the pace. After all, reorganizations have been successfully imposed on the defense-industrial sector in the past; and there are indications that, even in a simpler age, top weapons designers like A. S. Yakovlev and S. P. Korolëv were able to gain access to the top leadership to push through their ideas,[37] whatever the wishes of their immediate superiors. Rather it is to emphasize that, although the Soviet military and the defense industrialists are in many respects natural allies, it is also necessary to appreciate the elements of heterogeneity that enter into the relations between them—elements that could make for a less than solid military-industrial front as

[32] Moreover, some of the defense-industrial ministers are not that old—Afanas'yev, for example is only in his late 50's.

[33] It is possible that deputy ministers in existing ministries could have a different perspective on the matter. Judging from past practice, the creation of new ministries could increase their chances of attaining ministerial rank. Shokin, for example, was First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee of the Radio Industry before becoming Chairman of the new State Committee for Electronics Technology in 1961. (This body became the Ministry of the Electronics Industry, with Shokin as Minister, in 1965.) *Prominent Personalities in the USSR*, p. 569. Similarly Bakhirev was Deputy Minister of the Defense Industry before moving to head up the new Ministry of Machine-building in 1968. Sheren, *loc. cit.*, p. 131.

[34] The Academy would seem to be a natural source of new expertise. However, the extent of its past contribution to the defense effort is difficult to assess. It may be noted that Alexander's analyses (see fn. 3) stress reliance on in-house ministerial resources as a factor that has facilitated efficient weapons development and production. As a further corrective to the tempting assumption that the Academy's contribution in the past has been extensive, we have the observation that "in 1942, the . . . Academy was able to accept only 22 of the 175 research projects proposed to it by the People's Commissariat of Defense." See OECD, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

[35] Since some of the defense-industrial ministries appear to be mainly subsystems producers (*e.g.*, the Ministry of the Electronics Industry), there is clearly some interdependence in the production of particular weapons systems, even if the effort has apparently been to minimize it. Alexander has noted, for example, that "of the thousands of components going into aircraft, 90 to 95 percent are produced in the aviation ministry itself." *Weapons Acquisition . . .*, p. 2.

[36] This list of concerns is not meant to exhaust the factors that would affect the perspectives of the defense industrialists. These concerns may be reinforced (or, alternatively, mitigated to some extent) by pricing policies and other economic measures that might be adopted concurrently with an effort to push technologically adventurous weapons programs. For a discussion of the relevance of such economic incentive considerations to technological innovation in the defense sector, see Holloway, "Technology and Political Decision . . .," *loc. cit.*

[37] See Yakovlev, *op. cit.*, and L. Vladimirov, *The Russian Space Bluff*, New York, Dial Press, 1973, p. 56.



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particular policy decisions arise for the Soviet political leadership to consider.

As indicated earlier, the priority status which the Soviet leadership, as a whole, has accorded to the defense effort over the years has probably accounted for the relatively greater economic privileges the defense industrialists have enjoyed in comparison to their counterparts in the civilian sector. This status has also brought a heavy measure of direct involvement in, and close scrutiny of, weapons development and production efforts by the top political leadership. This applies not only to special crash defense (and space) programs that may have been undertaken from time to time,[38] but also to the "normal" operations of the defense-industrial sector. Let us therefore look at the relationship between this sector and its political overseers.

## Relations with the Political Leadership

Until Ustinov's recent promotion to the post of Minister of Defense, three key individuals were particularly well placed to oversee the defense-industrial sector on behalf of the top political decision-makers —Ustinov himself, L. V. Smirnov, and I. D. Serbin. They were in positions where they could both impose the top leadership's will on the defense-industrial ministers and their subordinates and also speak up on the ministers' behalf on crucial policy matters. Ustinov was clearly the most important of the three. With long years of managerial responsibility at various levels in the defense-industrial sector, he was the most highly placed—as a member of the Politburo and a party secretary. (He was a candidate member of the Politburo for over a decade prior to his acquisition of full membership at the 25th CPSU Congress in March 1976.) Smirnov, who presumably has had a long personal acquaintance with Ustinov (since they were both affiliated earlier with the Ministry of the Defense Industry), has been a full member of the Central Committee and a Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. His importance in the defense-industrial sphere, however, derives from his post as Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) — a body which, according to one description, "handles coordination between the Defense Ministry, ministries concerned with military production, and Academy of Sciences institutes engaged in military research and development." [39] Serbin, as head of the Defense Industry Department of the Central Committee, also can be presumed to have an important role in overseeing activities in the defense-industrial ministries and their subordinate elements.[40]

Relations between these defense-industry supervisors and the defense industrialists have likely been heavily conditioned by the nature of the working relationship among these three key individuals as well as by their ties to particular defense industrialists. It seems reasonable to grant that by and large the key defense-industry supervisors have probably had a satisfactory working relationship with one another over the years, and that this has helped to make the defense industrialists responsive to the top leadership and thereby contributed significantly to the sector's successful performance of its defense production tasks. Nevertheless, there were elements in this working relationship that may have made for some divisiveness in the ranks of the defense supervisors and for a less than tight and effective top-level supervision of Soviet weapons efforts.

The first thing to be noted in this regard is that although Ustinov was the party secretary charged

[38] See Vladimirov, *op. cit.*, (esp. pp. 54 and 67) for a description of top-level scrutiny of the early Soviet space efforts as well as the special priority accorded thereto.

[39] Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet Military," *loc. cit.*, p. 29. Garthoff gives further indications of the key roles of Ustinov and Smirnov, as well as their relative status, in his decription of the Supreme (or Higher) Defense Council. He writes that the Council is "the highest body dealing with military and defense matters . . . . Chaired by party General Secretary Brezhnev, this body includes Prime Minister Aleksey N. Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Nikolay V. Podgornyy, party Secretary Dmitriy F. Ustinov, and Minister of Defense Andrey A. Grechko. Others are called on to attend on occasion, including Defense Ministry and General Staff officers, Smirnov and other VPK members, Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko, and experts from the Academy of Sciences." *Ibid.*

[40] Jerry Hough identified a defense industry department in the Leningrad oblast party committee (*op. cit.*, p. 17). This suggests that lower-level party organizations probably have some role in defense production and that the Defense Industry Department of the Central Committee (the likely apex of such departments in the party hierarchy) probably has a considerable role. However, since the supervisory effort from the center is apparently particularly strong in the defense sector, one may question whether the lower-level party organizations have had the clout and utility in the defense sector ascribed to their role in the civilian sector. These civilian activities—*e.g.*, exercising a supervisory role over enterprises, effecting managerial appointments via *nomenklatura*, and expediting and procuring necessary materials for enterprises—have been well examined in John P. Hardt and Theodore Frankel, "The Industrial Managers," in H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 188-89.



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with the main responsibility for oversight of the defense industries, the Defense Industry Department of the Central Committee was formally headed by Serbin. If one bears in mind the immense management burdens which the very complexity of modern weapons systems imposes,[41] it would appear necessary for Ustinov—however knowledgeable and diligent—to have had a large staff at his disposal in order to perform his duties effectively. Unless he possessed a sizable personal staff of his own (for which we have no evidence), he would presumably have had to rely heavily on the staff resources of Serbin[42] (or possibly on any staff resources that might be attached to L. V. Smirnov's VPK). But even if Ustinov did have staff resources of his own and was not dependent on Serbin's Defense Industry Department of the Central Committee (or the VPK) for support,[43] the very presence of three key supervisors performing basically the same task—each with considerable status and substantial management resources at his individual disposal—may well have contained some potential for divisiveness, and hence for some impairment of management effectiveness. It is noteworthy in this regard that Serbin has held the post of Chief of the Defense Industry Department of the Central Committee for about 18 years.[44] Even if his relationship with Ustinov was basically cordial, it would be unlikely for his long-standing incumbency in this important post not to have tempted him from time to time to "act as his own man." Similarily, Smirnov probably had on the whole a satisfactory working relationship with Ustinov, but his status, too, would suggest that he may have acted as his own man from time to time and not simply seconded Ustinov's opinions.

One might hypothesize therefore that, to the extent that the top defense supervisors did not see eye to eye, the defense industrialists and their subordinates, whose R&D and production efforts these three were supposed to supervise, might have tried to play Smirnov, Ustinov, and Serbin off against one another to enhance their own autonomy. One might further hypothesize that the top Soviet political leadership as a whole would not necessarily have found this situation uncongenial. Having a rough form of checks and balances operating to keep the defense-industry supervisors "honest" would, for example, have helped to assure the Politburo membership of alternative sources of information on weapons programs which involved heavy costs and were difficult for even informed laymen to comprehend.

Ustinov's promotion to the post of Minister of Defense on April 29 (three days after the death of Marshal A. A. Grechko) raises intriguing questions about future supervision of the defense-industrial sector. In the first place, it is noteworthy that the political leadership saw fit—even before this promotion—to raise Ustinov to the rank of full Politburo member (at the 25th Party Congress). Since Ustinov had been a candidate member since 1965 and had been outranked by Marshal Grechko for the past three years (Grechko was made a full member of the Politburo in April 1973), Ustinov's accession to the status of full Politburo member held some interesting implications. It raised his status vis-à-vis the other defense supervisors and also vis-à-vis Marshal Grechko—with whom Ustinov may not always have been inclined to cooperate. This could be taken to suggest that while the political leadership may have countenanced some slack in supervision of the defense-industrial sector during the preceding several years, it was less predisposed to do so in the future. It is possible that some of the increased management burdens associated with the development and production of sophisticated

[41] Analyses of US weapons acquisition provide a useful corrective to the temptation to overstate the degree to which the Soviet defense supervisors are actually able to manage and coordinate Soviet weapons development and production efforts. The complexity of modern weapons systems and the attendant management burdens are particularly well described in Harvey M. Sapolsky, *The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1972.

[42] The likelihood of Ustinov's reliance on Serbin's staff is indicated in Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, *Soviet Decision-Making, Strategic Policy, and SALT*, prepared for the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ACDA/PAB-243, Washington, DC, December 1974.

[43] It cannot be precluded that Ustinov relied on a personal staff to perform his supervisory responsibilities. His position was different from that of party secretaries who simultaneously head CC departments and thus presumably have sizable department staffs at their immediate disposal (*e.g.*, P. B. Ponomarëv, V. I. Dolgikh, I. V. Kapitonov, K. U. Chernenko, and possibly K. F. Katushev). While we lack definitive information on Central Committee staffing arrangements, it would seem likely that persons in Ustinov's position would rely on personal staffs. There is evidence that General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev depends heavily on his personal staff. While Ustinov obviously was not in Brezhnev's league, the importance of his supervisory functions indicates that he would have needed a large personal staff if he did not rely on Serbin's or Smirnov's staff resources. On Katushev's situation and Brezhnev's personal secretariat, see Center for Strategic and International Studies, *op. cit.*, pp. 13 and 14-17, respectively.

[44] See *Prominent Personalities in the USSR*, p. 547. Serbin has also been a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee since 1961.



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

*Representatives of the top Communist Party leadership—the ultimate "bosses" of the defense-industrial sector—pictured at the May 10, 1976, ceremony naming General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev a Marshal of the Soviet Union. From the left: M. V. Zimyanin, K. F. Katushev, I. V. Kapitonov, K. U. Chernenko, K. T. Mazurov, M. P. Georgadze, A. A. Gromyko, Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov, V. I. Dolgikh, B. N. Ponomarëv, N. V. Podgornyy, M. S. Solomentsev, Brezhnev, M. A. Suslov, P. N. Demichev, V. V. Grishin, and A. Ya. Pelshe.*

**—V. Yegorov/TASS via Sovfoto.**

weapons systems were beginning to be felt and that this necessitated an effort to tighten top-level supervision.

Ustinov's further promotion to the post of Minister of Defense may also have been prompted—at least in part—by the political leadership's concern to improve the overall efficiency of the Soviet defense effort. There has not yet been time for a shakedown of the arrangements affecting supervision of the defense-industrial domain, and there are few clues as to the effects that Ustinov's promotion will have in this area. It is possible that Smirnov (or Serbin) will gradually accede to the sort of authority Ustinov was credited with over the last decade and more. However, even though Ustinov wears a new hat,[45] his shadow may continue to loom large over the supervision of defense production. And unless Smirnov (or Serbin) is willing to live compliantly in this shadow, some of the earlier-noted potential for divisiveness in the defense supervisory effort could well endure (or even increase), thus complicating rather than alleviating Soviet defense-management concerns.

Just as the key supervisors of the defense sector may on occasion have represented something less than a solid phalanx, so, too, the defense industrialists they supervise may stand divided as often as they stand united on major decisions affecting their sector. As already indicated, simply because of their different weapons development and production responsibilities, the top defense industrialists can be expected, from time to time, to have significant disagreements as to what weapons systems should be added to the Soviet arsenal. Which view might prevail in such situations would depend no doubt on a variety of factors—the opinions of Ministry of Defense officials regarding what systems deserve priority treatment, the views of top political leaders, etc. Informal ties between particular defense-industrial ministers and key political decision-makers would probably also be a factor. It would be only reasonable to expect that these ministers, who have had large and rich industrial fiefdoms to protect for many years, have not neglected to cultivate personal connections in the Politburo.

The existence of the Supreme Defense Council (which has only four Politburo members—Brezhnev, Premier A. N. Kosygin, Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman N. V. Podgornyy, and Ustinov—are regular members) probably helps to keep the scope and intensity of bargaining over weapons programs at the top political level within tolerable limits. An

[45] Incidentally, Ustinov is at present the only political leader who is simultaneously a government minister, a party secretary, and a Politburo member.



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organ like the VPK would also seem suited to serve as a mechanism for reaching some consensus on weapons programs before these matters come up for decision in the Politburo. At the same time, the VPK's likely role as the principal coordinating body for defense R&D and production probably makes it the locus of the toughest bargaining among the top defense industrialists. The VPK may thus bear particular witness to differences among the defense industrialists. On the other hand, it may also provide the defense industrialists with a forum for displaying their unity. Consequently, notwithstanding the utility of this organ to the top leadership for enforcing its will on the defense industrialists, the latter may regard the VPK as a political asset for themselves as well, insofar as it facilitates their efforts to press the collective case of the defense-industrial bailiwick as a whole.



*L. V. Smirnov, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission, during a 1968 visit to Rome.*

—Wide World.

The foregoing survey of the key personalities and organizational elements involved suggests that the relationship between the defense industrialists and the political leadership reflects a complex political reality that is difficult to categorize. There are aspects of this relationship which lend support to the notion that central direction prevails in this sphere of the Soviet polity, as in others, and that accordingly the policy impact of the defense industrialists—and even their administrative autonomy—may be severely circumscribed. The special attention given by the political leadership to supervision of defense production efforts, the limits on bargaining inherent in such organs as the Supreme Defense Council, the potential for disagreement among the top defense industrialists themselves, between them and the military, and between the top defense industrialists on the one hand and the designers (and possibly even their own deputy ministers) on the other—these are all features that can be cited in support of the political leadership's ability to impose its will on the defense industrialists.

On the other hand, as we have seen, there are other aspects of the relationship between the defense industrialists and the political leadership that can be emphasized to argue against the notion that the former are basically passive instruments of the regime. If there are divisions on the side of the defense industrialists which the regime can exploit, there may be pertinent divisions on the other side which the defense industrialist can exploit as well—whether among the defense supervisors, within the Supreme Defense Council, or in the Politburo itself. Moreover, the personal ties which the top defense industrialists during their long tenures have likely developed with particular members of the ruling elite would seem to be a substantial political asset for making their influence felt in policy decisions of concern to them. And finally, while divisiveness may occasionally diminish their bargaining power, the defense industrialists would seem to have the capability as well as the institutional mechanism, in the VPK, of closing their own ranks and winning support from their military customer (or customers).

Any firm judgment on which of these broad "models" is more accurate than the other requires a searching examination of political interaction between the Soviet defense industrialists and the political leadership over a variety of concrete issues for many years. Unfortunately, the evidence may be lacking to permit such an examination on even one issue. It seems prudent, therefore, to operate on the



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assumption that, so far as the Soviet defense industrialists are concerned, one-sided application of either "model" is more likely to distort than to capture political reality.

## Views on Détente

As should be clear from the preceding discussion, the nature of the evidence hardly permits one even to pretend to resolve the question of managerial power in the Soviet defense sector. Yet, if only because the Soviet defense industrialists can easily lose their identity in the kinds of analyses that are usually attempted on the USSR, it is necessary at least to bring the issue to the fore. Discussions of the role of managers in general in the Soviet Union, of the alignment of forces with respect to various Soviet domestic economic priorities and programs, of the impact of the Soviet military establishment on foreign and defense policies—these are all important areas of analysis in which the position of the defense industrialists is often likely to be simply subsumed but probably should not be.

Relying on the meager evidence available to probe the defense industrialists' situation—and having to be wary of indulging in methodological sleight of hand to compensate for the paucity of data—may be somewhat of an unsavory scholarly enterprise that yields few, if any, significant answers. However, more efforts along this line could serve to focus attention on some worthwhile questions to be taken into account in the kinds of analyses noted above. Raising such questions, moreover, may be particularly worthwhile at the present time, when Western policymakers are trying to assess the nature and durability of the Soviet leadership's commitment to détente with the West.

As suggested at the outset, the Soviet defense industrialists are likely to have important stakes in decisions affecting two key elements of the regime's détente policy—SALT and the effort to secure Western technology to help get the civilian economy out of the doldrums. Of course, having stakes in decisions and being able to shape these decisions are quite different things, and as indicated above, we are very far from any firm conclusions regarding the defense industrialists' influence on policy. It may be useful, however, to make a start by trying to see whether the defense industrialists do at least have particular interests of their own in decisions relating to these two policy areas as distinct from the interests of other groups.

*Strategic arms limitation.* In the case of SALT, the direct evidence concerning the roles and attitudes of the defense industrialists is, as might be expected, scanty. As Raymond Garthoff has pointed out, the only regular "representative" of the defense industrialists at the talks themselves was P. S. Pleshakov, first as a Deputy Minister and then as Minister of the Radio Industry. Garthoff also noted that L. V. Smirnov, Chairman of the VPK, "played an important direct part in the final negotiation of the Interim Agreement limiting strategic offensive arms." Another participant in the talks who, like Smirnov, was probably in a position both to articulate and to refute defense-industrialists' points of view was Academician A. N. Shchukin, whom Garthoff terms "a highly respected 'elder statesman' in military applications of science and technology." [46]

For present purposes, the fact that Pleshakov has been present at the talks is principally important as an indication that the defense industrialists have not had to depend on the Soviet military representatives (or Academy scientists or defense supervisors) to represent their particular "interests." Nevertheless, Pleshakov's status raises some intriguing questions about his effectiveness as a spokesman for these "interests." In the person of Pleshakov, the defense industrialists as a whole were represented through all of SALT I and part of SALT II *only* by a deputy minister of *only one* ministry.

It is possible, of course, that Pleshakov was selected basically on the grounds of his technical qualifications. Given the Ministry of the Radio Industry's purview (radars, computers, navigation aids, etc.), he may have been regarded as possessing a special expertise that was particularly crucial in the SALT deliberations on such items as ABM radars and MIRV technology. In this regard, he could well have served the interests of either the regime or the defense industrialists, or of both together.

If technical qualifications were not the main (or only) grounds for Pleshakov's selection, his particular status could equally well be cited to argue that he was selected because he was viewed as being as amenable to articulating the position(s) of the defense supervisors (on behalf of the top leadership) as he would be to giving voice to any conflicting opinions from the defense-industrial minister

[46] "SALT and the Soviet Military," *loc. cit.*, p. 29.



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level. As noted earlier, there are reasons for believing that defense-industrial deputy ministers might not see eye to eye with their ministers on certain key issues, particularly on developments which might make for further organizational changes. It would therefore not be surprising if the defense supervisors have on occasion quietly sought to circumvent the current ministers by establishing contacts with various deputy ministers. Nor would it be all that strange for deputy ministers, with a view to their own career advancement, to try to cultivate personal patrons among the defense-industry supervisors in particular or, more generally, in the upper reaches of the political and military hierarchies. Perhaps Pleshakov was the beneficiary of such processes in being selected for SALT in the first place and subsequently in gaining the post of minister upon Kalmykov's demise in 1974.

While Pleshakov's particular situation may support arguments that he was acting more as the creature of the regime than as the "representative" of the defense industrialists at SALT, one could also argue the contrary. Prior to the signing of the ABM agreement, some analysts held that powerful internal opposition would probably be mounted to block Soviet accession to a curb on ABM efforts.[47] However, as suggested by subsequent analyses,[48] it is possible that no substantial effort was really made by elements in the Soviet military and defense-industrial establishments to block such an agreement, since the Soviets had shown signs of being quite dissatisfied with the performance of their ABM system even before the talks began. Nevertheless, the PVO did stand to lose something by an ABM agreement, as did certain defense-industrial ministries—especially Pleshakov's ministry (with its responsibility for ABM radars). Conceivably, one of the prices which the ministry exacted from the regime in return for the ministry's support of an ABM curb may have been Pleshakov's presence at the bargaining table, where he could, at minimum, look out for the ministry's particular "interests" as agreements were being shaped.

On the whole, the question of Pleshakov's role at SALT serves well to indicate the difficulty of establishing the impact of the defense industrialists on particular Soviet defense or foreign policies. In the absence of more substantial information, one can argue with almost equal plausibility that Pleshakov represented the defense industrialists or that he did not. Similarly, Pleshakov's position does not permit one to discern easily where the "interests" of the defense industrialists converged with those of the military and where they diverged, or where a similar convergence or divergence might have operated between the defense industrialists and the top political decision-makers. This said, however, it is still important to bear in mind that, through the presence of Pleshakov, the defense industrialists would seem to have had at least a greater opportunity to inject their own particular viewpoints into the SALT bargaining process than if they had had to rely entirely on Smirnov, Shchukin, or the military "representatives" to do so.

With respect to any future SALT agreements, the impact of the defense industrialists is even more speculative. Nevertheless, some pertinent observations as to their particular stakes in such agreements can be ventured. In the first place, the defense industrialists may share with the military bureaucrats a concern for the general uncertainties of the strategic situation and thus, like the latter, should not automatically be cast in the role of opponents to further agreements which might, after all, serve to "make the future more predictable."[49] In addition, however, the defense industrialists have distinct cause to associate some specific unwelcome prospects with a strategic context that places a premium on pushing the pace of military technology. As discussed above, these prospects range from pressures for further reorganizations in the defense-industrial sector, which would likely mean some loss of resources from certain of the present ministries, to increased interdependencies among the ministries and between them and "outside" organizations like the Academy of Sciences. The latter eventuality would at the very least increase the management burdens of the defense industrialists and might also bring greater interference in their affairs by the top leadership's defense-industry supervisors.

*Technology transfer from the West.* As in the case of SALT, so in the case of the regime's policy of importing technology from the West, the defense in-

[47] See, for example, Graham Allison, *loc. cit.* This argument's apparent refutation by subsequent developments demonstrates the perils of transferring Western models of decision-making to Soviet soil.

[48] See Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet Military," *loc. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

[49] On the possible attitudes of the military, see William Odom, "Who Controls Whom in Moscow," *Foreign Policy* (New York), Summer 1975, p. 122.



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

*The Ministry of the Aviation Industry runs tests on a model of the TU-144 passenger plane in a wind tunnel at its Central Aerodynamics Institute in Moscow in 1971.*

**—S. Preobrazhenskiy/TASS via Sovfoto.**

dustrialists would seem to have a stake which is peculiar to them as a group. This stake is related to the issue of the defense sector's contribution to the civilian economy, first aired by General Secretary Brezhnev in 1971 at the 24th Party Congress. While Brezhnev at the time seemed to be praising this contribution (a view heartily endorsed, as we have seen, by Ministers Zverev and Dement'yev), his comments could also be construed as an exhortation for a greater contribution from the sector.[50] This issue could become increasingly sensitive for the defense industrialists in the future should other inputs—particularly Western capital and technology—not be available at adequate levels to assure the well-being of the civilian economy. Thus, although specific comments on technology-import questions from the defense industrialists are lacking, there is good reason to expect that they ardently welcome the regime's efforts to secure Western technology and capital. While they doubtless seek direct benefits from technology transfers to help meet their defense-production responsibilities, they may see their principal potential benefit to be primarily an indirect one. To the extent that these transfers hold promise of bolstering the civilian economy's health, the defense industrialists may hope that pressures to increase their own contribution to civilian production may be held in check.[51]

Whether this hope is a realistic one is, of course, another matter. The pressures for an increased contribution to civilian production might continue anyhow simply because the defense industries, owing to their *comparatively* greater capability to diminish the lag between R&D and production, seem better situated than civilian industries to make the infusion of Western technology pay off. Moreover,

[50] Brezhnev, *loc. cit.* His only remarks in a similar vein at the 25th Party Congress earlier this year were confined to the somewhat cryptic comment that "as always, great importance will be attached to producing mass consumer goods at heavy industry enterprises" (a comment which may have been viewed by the defense-industrial sector—a major component of Soviet heavy industry—as a call for continued or increased contributions to the civilian sector). See FBIS, *op. cit.*, Feb. 25, 1976, "Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress," Vol. 1, p. 42.

[51] It should perhaps be noted that there is nothing in this situation to suggest a threat to the traditional privileged status of the defense-industrial sector, but merely that the defense industrialists may be called on to produce more in order to justify these privileges.



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certain defense industries would probably still have a crucial role to play because of their particular responsibilties—*e.g.,* the Ministry of the Radio Industry in the computer field. Even so, from the defense industrialists' viewpoint, such a situation would probably be preferable to one in which the pressures for a larger defense-industrial contribution to the civilian sector would be even greater—as they might well be if Western technology inputs were unavailable to help the civilian economy directly or to assist the defense-industrial ministries in meeting their civilian producton responsibilities.

In any event, the considerations just described suggest that the defense industrialists' perspectives on technology imports may be distinct from those of their managerial counterparts in the civilian economy. It has been argued that "if the trade policy, aimed at bringing an influx of new Western technology into the Soviet economy, threatens any group, it is the economic managers. That influx of innovations promises uncertainty, organizational change, and fewer jobs in the overstaffed ministries." [52] For its part, the Soviet leadership has probably come to believe that what economic changes may be required to make the infusion of Western technology pay off in real benefits to the overall economy will prove less disruptive than other measures (*e.g.,* economic reforms) which might be necessary without this infusion.[53] Out of their particular concern to avoid potential future pressures to increase their own contribution to the civilian sector, the defense industrialists may be more receptive to this view than are their civilian brethren.

## Implications

Thus, the particular stakes of the defense industrialists in the regime's decisions on two key elements of Soviet détente policy toward the West—SALT and the effort to secure Western technology—would seem to be not only considerable but also distinguishable in broad terms from those of other concerned parties in the USSR. The defense industrialists, as already pointed out, may be more wary than their military customers about forcing the pace of military technology. At the same time, they may be less wary than their civilian counterparts about an influx of Western technology into the economy. But having noted these distinctions, one should be mindful that these perspectives may not be the only ones that the defense industrialists would bring to specific SALT or technology-import decisions. Moreover, it cannot be easily established that these perspectives have been translated into an impact on policy in the past or will be in the future.

Even if one falls short of making a case that the defense industrialists have been able to exert a direct impact on Soviet defense and foreign policy decisions, their particular perspectives still hold important implications for the future of détente. One of the reasons why so much interest has been generated in recent years in the Soviet defense decision-making environment is a desire to divine the forces that have prompted certain Soviet defense policies and weapons decisions. In particular, nagging questions have arisen about the strategic arms relationship between the USSR and the United States. Do American weapons programs prompt the Soviets to react with new or larger programs of their own? Or, to take one alternative hypothesis, does much of the stimulation for Soviet weapons efforts come rather from internal forces (bureaucratic interests and the like), so that American action or inaction in weapons programs may have little reciprocal effect?

Clearly, if such questions are to be satisfactorily answered, it is important to know what the stakes of the defense industrialists, as one of the interested parties, may be in Soviet weapons programs and, more broadly, in defense and foreign policies, and whether the decision-making environment permits them to influence the relevant decisions. As suggested in the foregoing discussion, the available information permits one to go part way in probing these questions—at least to the point of demonstrating the need for some fresh assessments of what we in the West mean when we speak of the Soviet "military" and the Soviet "managers." Even assuming the introduction of such conceptual refinements, however, some might still question whether it is worth the candle to expend much effort in probing the Soviet defense decision-making environment in view of the difficulty of amassing the concrete information required for assessing the relative influence of any of the principal actors.

[52] Odom, *loc. cit.*

[53] Some Western analysts have argued that inputs of Western technology will, in any event, probably have only a marginal impact unless the Soviet leadership is willing to contemplate some serious structural changes in the economy. See, for example, Berliner, *The Innovation Decision . . .*, pp. 513-18, and Nimitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-61.



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The look we have taken at one set of actors involved—the defense industrialists—suggests that the enterprise may still be worthwhile. Greater understanding of the operations of the Soviet defense sector is germane not only to the analytical effort to determine whether its denizens can directly influence the decisions affecting the future of détente between the US and the USSR but to another, larger effort as well. One does not have to establish the guiding hand of the defense industrialists in various policies to appreciate that organizational practices and arrangements affecting these industrialists have considerable relevance to the related effort to analyze the nature and extent of the overall Soviet defense burden and its relation to the policy of détente. Several implications for the détente relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union would seem to flow, for example, from changes in Soviet defense-management efficiency attendant upon a determined Soviet effort to force the pace of military technology.

Even assuming that the defense industrialists acquiesce in this effort rather than try to impede it, it would seem difficult for the Soviets to maintain past standards of management efficiency in the defense sector. To be sure, as Western analysts have begun to argue of late,[54] these standards—and the overall efficiency of the Soviet defense effort—have probably not been as high as they were once presumed to be. But, even correcting for possible overstatements in this regard, if our description of the organizational implications of a Soviet policy of determined technological advance in the military sphere is reasonably accurate, a drop in management efficiency would still seem to be in the cards. Given the prospect of increased organizational interdependencies, added problems of coordination, and the like, it is certainly difficult to see how the Soviets could have the best of two worlds: to continue to enjoy the relatively light management burdens imposed by the simple, reliable weapons systems that are said to have constituted much of the Soviet arsenal in the past, and to simultaneously engage in producing systems that are far from unsophisticated.[55]

If the Soviets cannot have it both ways, the upshot could be a burgeoning of sophisticated weapons programs at a cost which would considerably increase the overall defense burden on the Soviet economy. In the SALT arena, the emphasis on technologically adventurous systems might make specific agreements harder to reach, simply because of the inherent difficulty of coping with qualitative (as opposed to quantitative) "arms racing." By the same token, a drop in efficiency in producing such weapons could well increase the economic pressures on the Soviets to seek further agreements. Outside the SALT context, the added defense burden would seem likely to strengthen Soviet incentives to secure Western technology.

In sum, even if the question of the defense industrialists' influence on decision-making is set aside, an increased comprehension of the workings of their sector could help to illumine some of the complexities—both opportunities and dangers—which make a détente relationship with the USSR something other than a simple either-or proposition for the West.

Just as the particular perspectives of the defense industrialists deserve to be kept in mind in analyzing issues of pressing concern to Western policymakers, so, too, the peculiar characteristics of the defense industrialists are germane to the more leisurely pursuit of speculating on the future of the Soviet polity. For those who entertain the possibility of an eventual managerial revolution in the USSR, a look at the defense industrialists would seem to cast additional doubt on that prospect. The managers may be a much more heterogeneous group than they are usually considered to be. Moreover, the defense industrialists—the managers with perhaps the most political assets, in terms of powerful allies and institutional means to express their concerted views—may well view any substantial change in the Soviet polity as more of a bane than a boon to their position and privileges.

[54] See, for example, Marshall, *loc. cit.*

[55] Incidentally, whatever the use of modern management techniques in the past in the defense sector, the Soviets would probably be tempted to turn increasingly to systems-analysis approaches and the like as a way of trying to deal with defense management problems associated with the development, production, and procurement of weaponry of greater and greater sophistication.



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# Books

# The Artist's Fight for Freedom

**By Josef Skvorecky**

MICHAEL JON STOIL: *Cinema Beyond the Danube: The Camera and Politics*. Metuchen, NJ, The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1974.
MARCO CARYNNYK, Ed. and Tr.: *Alexander Dovzhenko: The Poet as Filmmaker*. Cambridge, Mass., and London, The MIT Press, 1973.
ANTONIN J. LIEHM: *Closely Watched Films: The Czechoslovak Experience*. White Plains, NY, International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., 1974.
ANTONIN J. LIEHM: *The Milos Forman Stories*. White Plains, NY, International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., 1975.

THE FOUR VOLUMES under review are, on the surface, works of scholarship on the cinema (at least three of them so qualify).* Interest in them could be expected to be limited to film buffs and specialists. But that is not the case at all. Underlying the authors' treatment of the problems of the craft, a universal drama unfolds: the drama of the artist's fight for freedom.

The least satisfying of the quartet of books is Mr. Stoil's, so let us dispose of it first off. It opens with presumptuous statements by the author about other specialists who, in writing on the cinema in Eastern Europe, sometimes sound as if they "have never seen an East European film"; who often commit "errors in judgment" when analyzing "the artistic aspects of film at the expense of its social significance"; and who "commit gross errors," as for instance when "one 'scholar' insisted that the major Soviet director of the 1920's was Einstein rather than Eisenstein" (p. ix).

This is an ironic preface to a work that is itself, to a large degree, a collection of errors of both fact and judgment. If misuse of names is a gross error, then Mr. Stoil is a grossly erring man. However, I am prepared to ignore misspellings of names that are obviously too exotic for a non-Slavic eye (though I wonder how my own reputation would fare if I were to write about Hitchcocque or Hataway). Much more disturbing are Stoil's numerous factual blunders and strange ideological interpretations of even such familiar films as *Closely Watched Trains*. Inaccuracies abound. To quote just a few from this rich collection: the return of Jiri Trnka "to filmmaking in Russian-occupied Czechoslovakia is" indeed "not likely" (p. 153), since he died almost five years before Stoil's book was published. Karel Stekly did not "retire from active filmmaking" (p. 132) but made a bad name for himself with a viciously unfair satire on the Dubcek era called *The Hippopotamus*, produced in 1974. Mac Fric was hardly a "veteran" director when he made *Janosik* in 1936 (he was only 34 at the time), and he never "specialized in producing" Robin-Hood-type dramas but rather became best known for his skillful conversational comedies. Certainly he did not "continue to produce similar works until the present day," since he unfortunately had a fatal heart attack during the Warsaw Pact invasion in 1968.

As for ideological interpretations, Stoil's comments on *Closely Watched Trains* afford an example. This film tells the story of a young man in Nazi-occupied Bohemia whose main problem is how to lose his virginity rather than how to fight the Germans. The desired loss comes at the very moment when opportunity arises for him to do a bit of sabotage. Elated, he does his heroic deed, and dies. With characteristic rectitude, Stoil chastises Western reviewers for their treatment of Milos Hrma's heroic death: "Some critics add that this ending is a challenge to the ac-

* Certain diacritical marks have been omitted from names and foreign words in the present article because they are not available in type.—Eds.



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cepted stereotypes of the resistance, but these critics are too often the same ones who are blind to the deeper significance of the film as social commentary on Modern Czechoslovakia" (p. 145). The reviewer can bear personal witness to the fact that the *character* of the sex-obsessed adolescent Hrma *in connection* with his stereotypically heroic death was indeed intended by Bohumil Hrabal—the author of the novel on which the movie is based—as a "challenge to the accepted stereotypes," namely, the sexless superman of the partisan mythology. Hrabal told me that in so many words when we talked about his novel, then in progress, some time during the early 1960's, as he was comparing this aspect of his new work to my own demythologizing wartime novel, *The Cowards.* However, the director of the film version, Jiri Menzel, feared that a tragic ending to the antipathetic story would come as a disagreeable anticlimax, and he actually shot an alternate dénouement in which Hrma, unharmed by the explosion, was thrown into a blossoming cherry tree. A discussion followed the screening of the rough-cut print in the Barrandov studios among Hrabal, Milos Forman, myself, and several other people involved in the New Wave,[1] after which Menzel dropped the cherry tree, kept the heroic death, and thus did not distort Hrabal's original ideological intention.

But, as far as I'm aware, this is the *only* ideological "commentary on Modern Czechoslovakia" in the film. Mr. Stoil maintains that the movie, which ridicules petty wartime traitors, is mostly a metaphor for Communist Czechoslovakia: "Menzel transforms the Marxist propagandist into the Quisling Zednicek" (p. 145). If anything is overinterpretation, this is. The comical turncoat who pitifully tries to convince himself that the Nazi military disasters are actually triumphal victories is a character historically much too concrete and specific to carry a metaphorical meaning—at least for Czech audiences. He could stand for a Marxist propagandist only in the mind of someone who has not had any personal experience of both Nazism and Stalinism in Central Europe.

THE KEY WORDS here are "personal experience," which is exactly what makes the three remaining books under review valuable. Unlike Stoil's *Cinema Beyond the Danube,* Marco Carynnyk's translation of—and introduction to—the diaries of the noted Ukrainian poet and filmmaker, Alexander Dovchenko, and the two volumes by Antonin Liehm on Czechoslovak cinema directors are solid works of film scholarship based on useful—perhaps even indispensable—first-hand experience. All three volumes are multifaceted and contain a richness of facts and ideas which it is impossible to do justice to in a review. One feature, however, stands out and, curiously enough, may be what makes these reports meaningful to people who only know Hollywood. I refer to the ordeal that all the directors who are mentioned or featured in the three works had to go through in their daily dealings with the men who

[1] The term "New Wave" is usually applied to the Prague Film Academy graduates who made their first films at the beginning of the 1960's—Milos Forman, Jan Nemec, Vera Chytilova, Evald Schorm, Ivan Passer, etc. However, they were never a movement with a more or less defined program, in the way that the surrealists, for example, were. What united them was a common opposition to the stultifying official dogmas of socialist realism (which they simply ignored) and to the establishment which tried to suppress many of their films. Artistically, they cover a wide range—from the highly formalistic Chytilova, to the poetically absurdist Nemec, to the ironically realistic Forman.

## Reviewers in This Issue

JOSEPH SKVORECKY—currently Professor of English and Film at the University of Toronto (Toronto); a Czech writer whose novel *The Cowards,* banned after publication in Czechoslovakia in 1958, marked the beginning of the move away from socialist realism in Czechoslovakia; author of many novels, including *The End of the Nylon Age,* 1967, *Miss Silver's Past,* 1969, *The Tank Corps,* 1972, and *The Miracle Game,* 1974; scriptwriter for Milos Forman's banned *The Band Won,* for Jiri Menzel's *Crime in a Girl's School* and *Crime in a Night Club,* and for Evald Schorm's *End of a Priest.*

DAVID W. PAUL—Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington (Seattle); author of a forthcoming book on the political culture of Czechoslovakia and of various articles on East European politics.

IVAN VOLGYES—Professor of Political Science and Director of the Graduate Program on Rural Transformation, University of Nebraska (Lincoln); author of *The Hungarian Soviet Republic,* 1970, coauthor of *Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland: The Breadbasket and the Battleground,* 1970, and editor of *Revolution in Hungary, 1918-1919,* 1971, *Comparative Political Socialization: Eastern Europe,* 1975, and *Environmental Deterioration in the USSR and in Eastern Europe,* 1975.

HENRY KRISCH—Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Connecticut (Storrs); author of *German Politics Under Soviet Occupation,* 1974, and various articles on the two Germanies.



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paid for their art. In this respect, the books testify to the fact that the basic problem facing an art heavily dependent on expensive technology is essentially (but not quite) the same in widely disparate economic and political systems. The Czechs have a proverb for it, dating back to the days of feudalism: "Whose bread you eat, his song you must sing."

The history of cinema, both in the West and in the East, is often a history of wrecked intentions, shelved scripts, and unfinished or unreleased films. Directors everywhere need a Maecenas, but those among them who are worth their salt stubbornly refuse to sing the songs that make Maecenas happy. Some Western intellectuals are, therefore, only too ready to claim that an artist is subject to the same lack of freedom, whether he works in the West or in the East. But some of those in a position to compare feel differently. In the words of Czech director Ivan Passer:

*It isn't exactly the same lack of freedom as some people say. The nature of the limitations . . . is not irrelevant nor is their source or their significance . . . one could even die in a situation of political restriction not just an artistic death but also a physical one.* (Quoted in *Closely Watched Films* —hereafter *CWF*—p. 388)

Anyone, I think, who is not biased beyond hope must agree. There is after all, a comprehensible difference between the power of—say—a Louis B. Mayer and that of a Josef V. Stalin. Just compare the tribulations of Francis Scott Fitzgerald and Isaac Babel as scriptwriters. There is a similarity, but not a sameness.

## Czechoslovak Film Figures:

STANISLAV BARABAS—a Slovak director, known in the West only for his TV adaptation of a novelette by Dostoevsky, *The Gentle Creature*. He works in West Germany, mostly for TV.

VACLAV BINOVEC—one of the founders of the Czechoslovak cinema. He well illustrates the words of Ivan Passer about every fascism starting out as a leftist or radical movement. Among Binovec's first films were social dramas of considerable social criticism. Under the Nazis, he became a prominent collaborator and was banned from film work after World War II.

ZBYNEK BRYNYCH—a director known in the West for his *And the Fifth Horseman Is Fear*, heavily influenced by Radok's *Distant Journey*.

VERA CHYTILOVA—a director best known in the West for *Daisies*. Since 1968, when she made *We Eat the Roots of the Trees of Paradise*, she has not been allowed to direct any other film, a sorry state of affairs about which she complained to Czechoslovakia's Communist president Gustav Husak in a recent open letter.

MILOS FORMAN—the most influential director of the New Wave. Essentially a realist, he was violently attacked by establishment critics because his realism was not "socialist" but simply true to reality. His first feature, *The Band Won*, was banned by President Antonin Novotny in 1961 before shooting actually started. His first finished film was *Competition*, and this was followed by *Black Peter*, *Loves of a Blonde*, and *The Firemen's Ball*. After the Soviet invasion in 1968, Forman left Czechoslovakia and has now made two films in the US, *Taking Off* and *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest*—the latter of which earned him an Oscar in 1976. He has also contributed one section to *Decathlon*, the film about the Munich Olympiad.

MARTIN (MAC) FRIC—one of the founders of the Czechoslovak cinema, best known for his comedies, which, however, never reached the US. He died of a heart attack during the Soviet invasion of 1968.

LADISLAV HELGE—unknown in the West, but important as a predecessor of the New Wave and the creator of politically-engaged films such as *Great Solitude* or *Shame*. Banned from all film work, he now works as a postal clerk.

VOJTECH JASNY—one of the men who prepared the way for the New Wave. He is known in the West for *Cassandra Cat* and *All My Good Countrymen*. His most recent film is *Opinions of a Clown*, based on the Heinrich Böll novel and made in West Germany, where Jasny now lives.

PAVEL JURACEK—known in the West as director of the Kafkaesque *Josef Kilian* and as scriptwriter of *End of August in the Hotel Ozone*. He has been banned from all work since the invasion.

KAREL KACHYNA—the director of all Prochazka's scripts. He has miraculously survived the post-invasion period and is the only former fellow traveler of the New Wave busy making new features. Significantly, perhaps symbolically, his first post-1968 feature was titled *Jumping Puddles Again*.

JAN KADAR—Oscar Award winner for *Shop on Main Street*. His latest success is the Canadian film, *Lies My Father Told Me*. He lives in exile in the US.



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Liehm's books demonstrate the similarities in a number of caustic anecdotes, evocative of a von Stroheim or other recalcitrants. Here for example, is Vera Chytilova on her Western experience:

*Another producer invited us for a most expensive lunch at the most expensive restaurant on the most expensive street. There I found out that if I accepted his offer, I would be completely free: the only thing he wanted was that I shoot a film of something by Karel Capek and cast one famous actor in it, and, finally, that his wife write the music for the film. She was present, and there and then she launched into a song that she had already composed for the film. I understood two words in it: "Karlovy Vary, Karlovy Vary." In short, it was just too much freedom for me to handle.* (*CWF*, pp. 245-46)

But for the most part the interviewed filmmakers treat the question, "Which is more confining: money or ideology?" (as posed by Liehm), directly and with deadly seriousness. Their verdict—a convincing one, I feel, since they know *both* Hollywood and Prague—falls against totalitarian ideology. Milos Forman puts it most succinctly, and his words also answer the often-expressed question about how in the name of heaven it was possible for so many flowers to blossom so suddenly on the Stalinist desert of Barrandov:

*As soon as it happens that in a system of nationalized film, which has placed art over money, artistic considerations cease to be controlled in the name of a single ideology, you have the most ideal the most humanistic setup that*

## Some Biographic Notes

ESTER KRUMBACHOVA—probably the most important screen writer of the New Wave, who provided Nemec, Chytilova, Vavra, and others with excellent scripts (*Daisies*, *Report on the Party*, *Martyrs of Love*, etc.) She has been banned from film work since 1968.

ANTONIN MASA—best known in the US as the screenwriter of *Courage for Every Day*. Before 1968, Masa also made several excellent movies on political themes. Since the invasion, he has been permitted to make only one film, about motorcycle racing.

JIRI MENZEL—director of the Oscar-winning *Closely Watched Trains*, of the lyrical *Capricious Summer*, and of two crime comedies, *Crime in a Girls' School* and *Crime in a Night Club*. After 1968, he recanted, and he was then allowed to make two socialist-realist films. In a recent opinion poll, he has cautiously raised his voice against the disastrous quality of contemporary films in post-invasion Czechoslovakia.

JAN NEMEC—best known for *Report on the Party and the Guests* and *Martyrs of Love*. He was one of the best directors of the New Wave and its *enfant terrible*. He now lives in West Germany.

IVAN PASSER—a director whose best-known film is *Intimate Lighting*, which received the New York Critics Award in 1969. He now works in the US, where he has so far made three films: *Born to Win*, *Law and Disorder*, and *Love and Passion*.

*JAN PROCHAZKA*—the most prolific scriptwriter of the 1960's, who used his influence with President Antonin Novotny to help his colleagues in the studios when they got in trouble. He was best known for scripts for *Carriage to Vienna* and *Night of the Bride*. He died shortly after the invasion, having been banned from all work as one of the leading "counterrevolutionaries."

ALFRED RADOK—the leading genius of the modern Czech stage, the creator of *Magic Lantern* for EXPO 1958 in Brussels, and the mentor of such directors as Milos Forman and Ivan Passer. Radok made only a few films, owing to constant squabbles with the party apparat. But one of them, *The Distant Journey*, released only some 15 years after it was made in 1949, is one of the best films ever made in Czechoslovakia. He died in exile in 1976.

EVALD SCHORM—the "philosopher" of the New Wave, who directed—among other films—*Courage for Every Day* and *End of a Priest*, both shown in the West. From 1968 through 1975, he directed only opera and stage plays. In the current year, he has been permitted to shoot a short documentary.

OTAKAR VAVRA—the founder of cinema as art in Czechoslovakia. His *The Guild of the Maids of Kutna Hora* won the Venice Festival award in 1938, but he is largely unknown in the West.

FRANTISEK VLACIL—a filmmaker whose greatest success to date is *Marketa Lazarova*, a vast picture about a gang of medieval robbers. Since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, he has been allowed to shoot only a few children's films.

JIRI WEISS—a director of the older generation, best known in the West for *Ninety in the Shade*, a Czech-British coproduction. He lives in exile in New York.



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*filmmakers can dream of. Whenever nationalized film has not achieved such decontrol, it is worse than the commercial system, because in the latter you at least aren't under the eagle-eye of ideological censorship, although it does tend to come up with some producers there, too. Anyway, there is always the chance that you will find some fool who will let you have the money you need.* (*CWF*, p. 234)

This conclusion is reiterated—not surprisingly—by many other Czech directors. What may be surprising to some Western leftists is that it is also the conclusion of one of their own number—Lindsay Anderson. Here he speaks to Liehm:

*I really . . . think that the conditions under which films were made in your country had every chance of becoming the best in the world. In many ways they already were. But at the same time, I kept feeling that it could all be destroyed overnight, by a single gesture, and that what would remain wouldn't leave even a limited possibility, not even a hope. Here [*i.e., in the West*], for the most part, conditions are incomparably worse than the ones to which you have become accustomed. But no matter what happens, no matter how badly one fails, there will always be a chance, or at least a hope. That is the main difference.* (*CWF*, p. 413)

These words spoken by a Westerner in 1970 are, in my opinion, an exact and unfortunately prophetic diagnosis of what has evolved in Czechoslovakia.

IT IS INTERESTING that Anderson's closing emphasis is on "hope," a word that is so symptomatic of Eastern thinking. Alexander Dovzhenko was one who clung to hope, but not much of it remained to him by the time he died—of heart failure, at the age of 62, in 1956. His diaries, finely translated and pieced together by Mr. Carynnyk from differing and heavily edited Soviet sources (the only sources we have) make illuminating reading, in more ways than one. I wonder what must have been in all those passages omitted by the Soviet editors, if, in what is left of the original diaries, there is so much hatred for the "reliable comrades" in the Soviet film bureaucracy and party apparatus. The sweetest term the gentle Dovzhenko has for them is "flunkies," but there is a great variety of others: "mercenaries," "party hacks," "wretches," "brutes for whom 'issuing orders means cursing,' " "cut-throats," "know-nothings," "heartless men of ambition who seem to be 'thought up by a malicious satirist,' " "lackeys," "boors 'whose compliments sound like condemnations,' " "idiots," "dog-turds." As I look back on this inventory it seems to me there are no more synonyms left. But no—there is one which occurs most often on the poet's pages. This word is "pigs," which coincidentally is the present-day American slang word for "policeman." Mr. Stoil could have his metaphor here, this time a defensible one.

Dovzhenko's sufferings, both human in general and artistic in particular, opened his eyes to much that was officially hushed up during his lifetime.[2] The following is a synopsis of an unfinished story jotted down in his diary in 1942:

*Describe the tribunal. It was made by unknown carpenters from some special wood. They must have put a spell on it, no one could speak the truth. Brave men would get up on it to speak, but some force would skew their tongues every time, and they would leave the tribunal in consternation. As soon as they had stepped down, everything would be the same again. No doubt about it, that tribunal was bewitched. It made everyone speak in the same way. Some people were changed beyond recognition when they stood on the bewitched spot. Hence the shorthand recordings of their speeches had to be corrected. They resembled real speeches as much as a log resembles a living tree.* (p. 59)

Lucky for Dovzhenko that they did not find his manuscript that year. And there is much more. "He died an innocent man, but at the given stage or sector of time the execution was correct" (p. 92).

[2] Alexander Dovzhenko (1894-1956) was the most famous Ukrainian director and, along with Sergei Eisenstein and Vsevolod Pudovkin, one of the three greatest directors of the Soviet era of the Russian cinema. Usually regarded as an Old Bolshevik, he in fact seems to have fought against the revolution—at least for a time—but later embraced it wholeheartedly. From the very early days, his career was marked by conflicts with the Soviet establishment. His classic *Earth* (1930) was attacked by the Kremlin's "folk poet" Dem'yan Bednyy as "counterrevolutionary," and his next film, *Ivan* (1932), was denounced as "fascist and pantheistic" and guilty of "biologism and Spinozism"—whatever that may be. In any case, the film was quickly removed from circulation. *Schors* (1939) was badly marred by Stalin's personal intervention, which resulted in the hero's resembling the Generalissimo more than the historical partisan leader, Schors. The wartime documentary, *Ukraine in Flames*, was attacked for "nationalism" and suppressed by the Commissar of Internal Affairs, L. P. Beriya; Dovzhenko himself was forbidden ever to return to his native Ukraine or to the Kiev studios. His next film, *Chronicle of Flaming Years*, was banned by Stalin before it had gotten beyond script form. Dovzhenko's only postwar film, *Michurin* (1947), is hardly recognizable as the work of the man who made *Earth*, *Arsenal*, and *Aerograd*, three of the few masterpieces of early Soviet cinema.



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In 1943, this was hardly an innocent political irony, especially when topped off by another heretical wisecrack: "G. [after hearing the statement about the correct execution] laughed his dialectical laughter." Beria, the "evil monster" (entry of 1945), appears often, and Stalin, the ominous "protector" of the "erring nationalist" Dovzhenko, is almost omnipresent. In an entry of 1945 he is apostrophized in the following way:

*My dear comrade Stalin. . . . I forgive you. For I am a part of the nation. I am still greater than you. Being very small, I forgive you your pettiness and evil, for you too are imperfect, no matter how ardently people may pray to you.* (pp. 113-14)

Solzhenitsyn was sent to the camps for much less.

And yet this man, deprived of any love for the people who were —and still are, as many of us know from personal experience— the rulers of Soviet film industry (and who, after all, are merely a species of the genus that is the ruler of the Soviet state), this knowledgeable intellectual retained an embarrassingly naive faith in mythologies and mythological saints. He never faltered in his admiration for the "great Lysenko," he faithfully revered Lenin,[3] he saw the "new Soviet Man" in every laborer who happened not to be drunk during a Dovzhenko epiphany, and in every sexy lass, for like all aging lyrical poets, he seems to have been abnormally susceptible to young feminine charms. While he had no illusions about Soviet postwar military justice in the Ukraine (somewhat like Hemingway in *A Farewell to Arms,* he viewed its administrators as "ignorant . . . young fellows"— p. 79[4]), and while he was more than aware of the near-genocidal banning of thousands upon thousands of Ukrainians and POW's to Siberia, he was still capable not only of raving about communism but of identifying it with "love, compassion and brotherhood" (p. 190). In fact, he was a religionist of sorts who had no trouble reconciling in his mind the reality of the Church with its ideal image. In his opinions of Stalin and the Cardinals of red bureaucracy, there is something of John Hus; but he was no Luther—he was rather an intellectual St. Francis of Assissi of Marxism.

When it came to art, however, there was no trace of idealistic *naiveté.* True, he occasionally mentions socialist realism, and, in his sketches for films (mostly never realized), he uses some of its clichés—like pretty female shock-workers seducing enthusiastic tractorists. But innocent as he probably was of any Western scholarly criticism of socialist realist concepts, he wrote in his diary (on October 15, 1954) the most accurate analysis of the disease:

*Because I was an artist I thought in images. . . . A multitude of colorless petty people gradually and methodically convinced me that I am "mistaken" . . . . I submitted to them with great reluctance. They hated me . . . . In the end I gave in . . . . I began to think in ideas, assignments, and plans. I knew with documented accuracy where my* Eugeni Onegin, *my* Taras Bulba, *and my* King Lear *were to come in the plan. I have many ideas. They're all beautiful and noble, and they live in my mind. . . . Only the images have deserted me. My beloved native images have turned away from me. . . .* (p. 245)

This is a dirge, a lament for a talent murdered by nonartistic intruders; one day before Dovzhenko's death the lament turns into a cry of hatred, and socialist realism becomes simply the "realism of petty reptiles" (p. 270). I believe that this death-bed definition can hardly be refuted even by whole divisions of Soviet-bloc literary theoreticians, wining, dining, and congressing over the mystery of 20th-century art's stillborn child.

TO THE younger Czechoslovak directors, less religious and more rational, socialist realism has never been a problem: it has been viewed simply as a whip used by flunkies on creatures who displeased Maecenas. In Liehm's interviews, the term hardly appears at all, and when it does, then only in the confessions of some of the oldsters. But even they woke up after the shock therapy of the 1950's. As Jiri Weiss recounts:

*I realized that a director, no matter how good his intentions, cannot and must not serve directly political aims. It is all very beautiful to want to become a weapon, a spokesman, for great ideas; but in the end a person simply becomes a megaphone of someone who declares himself the sole spokesman.* (*CWF*, p. 66)

[3] Though his attitude toward Lenin is, in places, comically ambivalent, as in this dream of 1956: ". . . had a strange dream: Lenin was kissing and embracing me . . . . Evidently I will be in trouble" (p. 264). I almost feel tempted to a Stoilian interpretation: Lenin as Judas.

[4] Hemingway wrote: "They were all young men and . . . had the beautiful detachment and devotion to stern justice of men dealing in death without being in any danger of it."



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This, to some ears, may sound like a heretical antisocialist sentiment, but it is only a realization of the old truism that an artist is a singer, not a loudspeaker. Among the many themes that run through Liehm's books, one of the strangest is the stubbornness with which some Western leftists cling to the loudspeaker function and to the pinkwashing methods of parlor academicism, refusing to listen to the voices of experience. The flunkies make Dovzhenko, an ardent Communist, into an enemy of the people because he portrayed the wartime Ukraine as he saw it, not as the propagandists thought he ought to see it (again Hemingway comes to mind, although as far as I know Dovzhenko never read Hemingway); the Czech directors, most of whom were convinced socialists—some even party members—and a few, nonpolitical humanists, were often accused by Western Marxists of similar sins and for similar reasons. When Frantisek Vlacil's *The White Dove*, a polished work of subtle but essentially establishment peace-propaganda, was selected for showing at the Venice Festival in 1960, the selection "was one of the arguments used by the Italian left wing" in their "attack against the festival and its management." The Italian comrades argued that "the management gave preference to a "nonpolitical fantasy" over Jiri Weiss's Nazi-occupation drama, *Romeo, Juliet and the Darkness* (which, ironically, was at that time under fire in Czechoslovakia as "Zionist propaganda"). "It put our delegation in an odd light," says Vlacil. "The right-wing press stood behind the film, whereas the left-wing press—although it didn't condemn *The White Dove* outright—still. . . ." (*CWF*, p. 173)

And so it goes on, this dispute between the Innocents Abroad in a Socialist Wonderland and the inhabitants of Socialist Reality. In France, Vera Chytilova's almost exemplary socialist, back-to-honest-work fable, *The Ceiling*, faces arguments like: "They shouldn't make that kind of film. It undermines people's faith in socialism. If that is the way it really is, then none of it is worth it all" (p. 241). *Hotel for Strangers*, by Antonin Masa, one of the most politically-minded directors and scriptwriters of the New Wave (*Courage for Every Day; Wandering; Looking Back*), is attacked in the typical terminology of Dovzhenko's dogturds for a "lack of commitment, for escapism" (p. 259). And this is the Western experience of Pavel Juracek (*Josef Kilian*):

*I spent some time in France. Progressive people there did a great deal for our film at a time when it seemed that people at home would destroy it completely. We traveled to the movie theatres, particularly in the rural areas; and there they sat, Communists and non-Communists, all dressed up, hoping that they would finally get a look at socialism and at people who came from socialism. It was pretty embarrassing most of the time. They were very disappointed; they were angry with us. I felt I ought to help them, somehow; but then I said to myself, No, then they'd find out how things really are—they'd see that their naive ideas are simply headed back into the fifties.* (*CWF*, p. 317)

One can hardly wonder that such confrontations of *Dichtung und Warheit* produce provocative reactions. Liehm poses a question: "There is the popular claim of Western left-wing or radical critics that the best Czechoslovak films are essentially bourgeois." Ivan Passer answers, heatedly:

*That, in my opinion, is another example of Western snobbism. . . . What is the epitome of petty bourgeois morality? The extreme that you naturally will find at the bottom, at the very beginning: fascism. And I would be tremendously interested in which is closer to fascism—one of [Jean-Luc] Godard's recent films, or Czech films. . . . Every fascism starts out looking leftist, or at least very radical. Ultraradical.* (*CWF*, pp. 382-83)

Anyone who has taken the trouble to study fascist art—or was forced to study it as an *Untertan* of the Nazi Reich—knows how accurate these strong words are. But who, among the Western intellectuals of leftist leanings, *has* taken that trouble or *was forced* to take it? No, it is obviously fruitless to quarrel with Innocents in Wonderland. "They don't even have a vocabulary for some things yet," sighs Passer, and Forman sums it up: "I don't argue about certain things anymore. I know that a person who hasn't seen some things and some contents from close up, for himself, simply cannot comprehend them" (p. 229).

Most of what I have quoted so far sounds like pronouncements of people who, in the true Hussite tradition, have found the truth and are prepared to defend it or, if defense becomes impossible, to let themselves be silenced and persecuted rather than recant. Some did indeed defend it and, rather than recant, ended up in exile (Forman, Passer, Kadar, Weiss, Radok, Jasny, Barabas, Nemec) or as unemployed former filmmakers or laborers (Helge, Chytilova, Krumbachova, Juracek,



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Schorm). This, we hear, is the bitter tragedy, rooted in the fact that film, the most expensive art, by its very nature generates a much greater amount of conformism and downright toadyism than arts whose practitioners need only a pen and a piece of paper to produce finished works.

Joseph Goebbels, among other things the cinema mogul of the Third Reich, seems to have known his film people. In an important speech taken down in shorthand and quoted by filmmaker Veit Harlan (*The Jew Suss*) in his autobiography, Goebbels reacted to the complaints of some scientists who felt insulted by the disparity between their incomes and those of the film people:

*What a misery! These heroes of the spirit deserved at least the same rewards which I was lavishing on the gang of film people whose boss I am and whom I provided with medals and honors, with money and with all possible kinds of facilities. . . . You should see these ladies and gentlemen, should we not be here one day. They all have eaten our bread—they even forced themselves to our table . . . but then, I am perfectly sure about this, they would be the first to force themselves on the new masters and to maintain they had always been good anti-fascists. And as for the money and the honors, well, they were "forced" to accept them.*[5]

This observation of the late Propaganda Minister has stuck in my mind, so it is with mixed feelings that I read in the interview with Mac Fric (under the Nazis he changed his once fashionable, English-sounding nickname to the neutral Martin and later retained the change under the Communists) how he would like to make a film about Lidice, the village which was annihilated (with all men over the age of 15 shot) at the time when this same Fric was directing movies for the Nazi-controlled, state-owned UFA company in Berlin. "Lidice should be my memorial," says he. Well, let bygones be bygones. I do not criticize him for what he once did or what he later said; my maxim has become never to criticize people for behavior in situations I have not been in, for who knows how I would have behaved. But Fric is symptomatic of something which occurs not infrequently among the masters of the expensive illusion. Jiri Weiss recollects a traumatic experience he had shortly after Munich:

*A Czech director by the name of Binovec called a halt to all shooting when I came on his set. He announced that he wasn't going to shoot a foot of film as long as "that Jew" stayed on the set. I'll never forget the immobile faces of the workers, the staff, the actors . . . not a single one of them stood up for me with so much as a word. When I returned to Czechoslovakia after the war, I worked with the same cameraman who had been working with Binovec that day. He never mentioned it. And deep in my heart, I had to smile. I was wiser by then, after all; and I was slower in passing judgment.* (*CWF*, p. 59)

This, to me, is the wisdom of experience.

Yet, it is bitter. So much in Liehm's *Closely Watched Films* reminds me of the scene described in Lillian Hellman's *Scoundrel Times* in which Clifford Odets first boasts of his intention to show the "bastards" on the Committee on Un-American Activities "the face of a radical man," and then, vis-à-vis the Committee, breaks down and apologizes for his beliefs. The bitter fact is that Jiri Menzel, who not so long ago refused to sit on a film jury with the Soviet delegate, has apologized for his Dovzhenkian "mistakes" and now embellishes socialist realist fairy tales with his considerable craftsmanship. God knows, I do not hold it against him—for I went into exile precisely to avoid the possibility of being broken and the resulting necessity of doing things I would hate to do. But one cannot help feeling sad. Sad for scriptwriter-producer Jan Prochazka, the "arch-counterrevolutionary," who was watched over by the secret police in his hospital bed when he was dying of cancer because the comrades "wanted to make sure he wasn't pretending" (p. 142), and whose partner of many, many films, director Karel Kachyna, has forced himself successfully on the new masters of Barrandov, seemingly without much of a sense of loyalty to the memory of his dead and disgraced friend. In 1968, Zbynek Brynych (*And the Fifth Horseman Is Fear*) made the following pronouncements to Liehm: "I have made a program [*i.e.*, principle] of having my say about" the "era of extreme injustice" in which I "am still living. . . . I probably won't be changing programs. . . . I shall always work with national subject matters" (p. 106). It is something of a bitter commentary on these vows that the same Brynych in 1972 made a film about the French Foreign Legion which was shot on a desert in the Soviet Union, and in 1975 engaged in concocting a movie soap opera that white-

[5] Veit Harlan, *Im Schatten meiner Filme* (In the Shadow of My Films), Gütersloh, Sigbert Mohn Verlag, 1966, pp. 6-7.



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washes the notorious Communist-establishment prison guards in Czechoslovakia. And what about Vavra, the dean of Czech directors, who told Liehm:

*I am sorry that over the years I have found myself in situations in which I was not doing my job well: I, too, fell victim to prevailing currents, pressures and depressions, and it was all the worse for me because I recognized them better than others who were less experienced.* (*CWF*, p. 32)

Shortly after this cautious self-analysis, Vavra left for the Soviet Union to make *Sokolovo*, an amalgam of excellent battle scenes (which he obviously savored) and of crudely toadyish political scenes (which he, I suspect, directorally sabotaged—they look like very bad thimble-theatre, perhaps Vavra's subtle revenge for the recurrence of the "pressures and depressions").

THIS, TO ME, is the deepest tragedy of art in the Soviet orbit; not that people are exiled or silenced —because then they retain at least their human integrity—but that they are broken into submission which, since so many of the victims are my friends, I hesitate to call by the label Vojtech Jasny uses: "I just can't take part in the prostitution that everyone will have to submit to" (*CWF*, p. 132). The bitterness is only slightly alleviated by the fact that not all have submitted, as yet, and by the cathartic effect of the evidence that some clearly saw what was coming. Juracek, for instance said to Liehm in occupied Prague in 1969: "Do you know what we are going to be, no matter how much we try to look like martyrs today? Quislings. . . ." (p. 314)

There is, of course, always hope. For some it is very real, as for Milos Forman, the Oscar winner for *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest*, which crowned his old determination to answer the Stalinist detractors of the New Wave not with declarations and manifests but with a triumph in the West. He had told me about this decision in New York in 1969, during the first counteroffensive of the flunkies. In 1976, after it had become clear that *One Flew . . .* would be a success, he asked me happily: "'Isn't it really a *Czech* film?"

For most of the others, however, the hope is very dim, lost in a distant future when very likely we won't be alive any more. The epitaph for the Czechoslovak New Wave was written by Vladislav Vancura (quoted in *Closely Watched Films* by Jan Schmidt), a prewar Communist writer and filmmaker who was "physically liquidated" by the Nazis and who posthumously provided the New Wave with two of its best productions, Menzel's *Capricious Summer* and Vlacil's *Marketa Lazarova:*

*Honesty goes to the dogs, and various figments are lauded to the heavens. To the devil with it all! It appears that Truth has lost its shoes and limps lamely away, following Lie, of which the folksaying has it that a Lie is short-legged. No need to worry about Lie: she won't get lost.* (*CWF*, p. 330)

All I can hope is that Vancura was mistaken. But was he? John Hus, in contrast to him, believed that "Truth prevails." They both died martyrs' deaths.



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# New Light on East European Societies

**By David W. Paul**

BOGDAN MIECZKOWSKI: *Personal and Social Consumption in Eastern Europe: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany.* New York, Praeger, 1975.
IVAN VOLGYES, Ed.: *Political Socialization in Eastern Europe: A Comparative Framework.* New York, Praeger, 1975.
ALEXANDER MATEJKO: *Social Change and Stratification in Eastern Europe: An Interpretive Analysis of Poland and Her Neighbors.* New York, Praeger, 1974.

IT IS difficult to say exactly when the "behavioral revolution" in Communist studies began, but it is clear that we are now well into it.[1] Empirical studies of Communist societies have by no means caused the demise of traditional area studies, as some predicted they might, but the new approaches have clearly proven their viability in a field of knowledge which until relatively recently was limited by the predominant assumptions and methodologies. Thanks to studies using these new approaches, we have now begun to assemble a much clearer picture than we had previously of the social forces at work under the surface of several East European societies. These forces had been largely obscured in the image of totalitarianism so prevalent in the Western scholarship of the "pre-behavioral" era. Now, the new studies have drawn our attention to the importance of social structure and of patterns of differentiation and mobility in socialist society—not only as subjects highly interesting in themselves but also as possible bases for explaining the successes and failures of Communist regimes.

One critical factor in the development of the new studies has been the availability of data generated from several sources previously nonexistent or unreliable. These include official statistics, not yet perfectly accurate or dependably comparable from one country to another but nonetheless far more useful than the statistics available two decades ago; data gathered by participants in scholarly exchange programs and projects carried out by cross-national research teams; and the increasingly more sophisticated studies by East European social scientists themselves.[2]

Still, it must be admitted that generating "hard" data about the socialist world is often a frustrating task. The Western social scientist finds himself obliged to work with materials that are frequently incomplete, second- and third-hand, or only peripherally related to the subject under study.[3] The methodologies developed for use in open societies must be adapted to the imperfections in the available data. Particular care must be taken to avoid confusing facts and assumptions. Conclusions must be stated with considerable modesty befitting the "softness" of the data, and predictions can be made only with the greatest of caution.

The three books under review

[1] For a discussion of behavioralism and its application to Communist studies, see the editor's introductory essay in Roger E. Kanet, Ed., *The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies*, New York, The Free Press, 1971, pp. 1 ff.

[2] Despite the still uncertain position—and even occasional suppression—of the social sciences, an impressive amount of information has emerged from several East European countries, especially Poland. Foremost in this respect has been the work of sociologists. See John S. Shippee, "Empirical Sociology in the Eastern European Communist Party-States," in Jan F. Triska, Ed., *Communist Party-States: Comparative and International Studies*, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1969, pp. 282-336; Eduard Urbanek, "Sociology in Czechoslovakia," *Social Research* (New York), Spring 1970, pp. 129-46; C. G. A. Bryant, "Sociology and Socialism in Poland—A View from the West," *ibid.*, Spring 1972, pp. 102-33; J. Rezler, "The Rebirth of Sociology in Hungary," *East European Quarterly* (Boulder, Col.), June 1974, pp. 223-29; and the special section, "Sociology in Eastern Europe," in *Acta Sociologica* (Copenhagen), No. 1, 1973, pp. 23-82.

[3] The problems involving data have been discussed by many authors. See, *inter alia*, Paul R. Shoup, "Comparing Communist Nations: Prospects for an Empirical Approach," in Kanet, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-47.



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demonstrate some of the virtues as well as some of the limitations of the empirical trend. All three belong, in one sense or another, to the behavioral genre. All are designed around reasonably systematic models of scientific inquiry, and all are based on types of data which were not readily available to the scholars of the "pre-behavioral" era. Each contributes in its own way to our understanding of the social dynamics at work in the countries under study.

OF THE THREE, Mieczkowski's *Personal and Social Consumption in Eastern Europe* is the most modest in its purpose. The author assumes that consumption, as he puts it, "constitutes an ultimate desirable goal" and therefore must be accorded as much attention as production in any attempt to measure the effectiveness of economic systems. He postulates a direct relationship between levels of consumption and labor productivity, arguing that recent policies in three of the countries covered—Poland, East Germany, and Hungary—have succeeded in raising labor productivity through the incentive of more consumer goods for the worker. In fact, Mieczkowski argues that the necessarily higher investments in the consumer-goods sector in these countries in the past few years have come at no apparent cost to production in the capital sector.

The author takes special care to note the impact upon consumption of planning policies, investment, foreign trade, and income distribution. Thus, not only has he provided us with a useful compendium of aggregate consumption statistics, but he has also set his analysis of consumption within the broader picture of economic development.

Mieczkowski is aware of several difficulties. He notes numerous discrepancies in the available data and has sought to check these by means of his own careful computations. He demonstrates the formulas by which he does this, warning us that many of his statistics are "only approximations." He has devoted much more attention to Poland than to any of the other three countries, and the data that he presents are not always cross-nationally comparable. Moreover, he does not adequately discuss the distribution patterns of consumption within the individual countries. Only in the Polish case does he show a breakdown of consumption by social groups, and here his statistics divide the population into only two strata: blue-collar and white-collar workers. These are all rather minor shortcomings, however, in a work that provides an illuminating picture of consumption in East-Central Europe based on an impressive number of statistical sources.

THE VOLUME edited by Ivan Volgyes is the most problematic of the three books, for it deals rather sketchily with a subject of great complexity. The book was an outgrowth of a panel discussion at the 1972 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. It brings together individual country studies by Otto Ulc (Czechoslovakia), Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr. (the German Democratic Republic—GDR), Ivan Volgyes (Hungary), Joseph R. Fiszman (Poland), and Trond Gilberg (Romania), all of whom seek to develop themes and test hypotheses set forth in Volgyes' introductory essay.

The editor's conceptual framework is a useful statement of the central problem of political socialization in socialist countries. Volgyes has drawn his basic terminology from Western scholars such as Hyman, Dawson, and Prewitt, but he points out the special nature of socialization in the context of the Communist regimes' purposeful efforts to develop a new "socialist man." There is little originality in his survey of the agencies of socialization, but the distinction between informal structures (family, peer groups, churches), formal structures (party, mass organizations, schools, the military), and media instruments is well drawn.

The contributors, for the most part, adhere reasonably well to the conceptual framework proposed by Volgyes. In this respect, the volume succeeds where many collective projects fail: the individual papers treat the same general problems, thus providing a well-balanced, if implicit, basis for cross-national comparison. (Fiszman's chapter is the lone exception. It is by no means devoid of interesting and original propositions, but the author has unfortunately ignored Volgyes's outline and eschewed a direct discussion of the formal and informal structures.)

Most of the contributors acknowledge the tentativeness of their judgments regarding the individual regimes' effectiveness in carrying out their goals of socialization. Gilberg cautiously assesses the Romanian effort as "a modified success at best." Interestingly, the conclusion reached by Hanhardt suggests that the GDR has achieved the greatest relative progress toward creating a socialist mentality among its citizenry. Ulc's conclusions, forcefully (if unempirically) argued, suggest that Czechoslovakia has been the least successful—not surprisingly so, given the bitter disillusionment



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of the populace with the policies of the eight years since the Prague Spring.

As the volume's subtitle indicates, the authors present their contributions as only a preliminary framework for examining political socialization in Eastern Europe. Gilberg suggests several tasks for future researchers: studies of the family as socializing agent, ethnic minorities and their place in the socialization process, and mass response to the symbols purveyed by the elites. One can hope, as Gilberg does, that future research possibilities will enable scholars to pursue studies of these problems in depth, but under the current political circumstances the outlook is not encouraging.

Indeed, much groundwork is necessary before we can even go significantly beyond the rough outline presented in the Volgyes volume. Specific aspects of value-formation and mass political behavior have not been explored in detail. We are therefore lacking a solid base of empirical data focused on the role and impact of individual agencies such as the school, youth organizations, and the family. Such works as Fiszman's *Revolution and Tradition in People's Poland* and Susan Woodward's thesis on education for self-management in Croatian secondary schools are a good start.[4] However, the subject of family socialization patterns—a critical matter about which we know almost nothing—is indispensable to any serious analysis of value-formation. The contributors to the Volgyes volume realize the importance of the family but are unable to make any substantial judgments on the family's role in political socialization.[5]

FALLING somewhere between Mieczkowski's modesty successful study and the as yet visionary schema of the Volgyes volume is Alexander Matejko's *Social Change and Stratification in Eastern Europe.* Despite the promise of the title, most of the book deals exclusively with Poland; only the first two chapters present much information about other East European societies. One must, therefore, question the validity of the numerous propositions offered as generalizations relevant to all of Eastern Europe.

In the case of Poland, Matejko's data are indeed persuasive.[6] His tables show educational patterns, consumption expenditures, causes of worker dissatisfaction, and leisure-time activities according to social groupings, and they provide many other significant statistical tidbits. Elsewhere, one interesting qualitative argument not often heard in the West is that there exists a great deal of resentment and distrust on the part of most Polish blue-collar workers toward the intelligentsia—a distrust particularly centered around the latter's control of culture, entertainment, and the mass media. According to Matejko, blue-collar workers do not share the "highbrow" tastes of the intelligentsia and long for their own forms of mass entertainment.

This book, too, is not without its problems. Some of Matejko's data are now more than ten years old, yet he presents them as evidence of current patterns. In addition, the author is not always clear in his usage of several key terms that occur throughout the book. For example, he refers to blue-collar workers as a "class" separate from white-collar workers and (presumably) other groups, but he neither clarifies his definition of class nor offers an explicit outline of class divisions (as opposed to strata within any given class).

These difficulties aside, *Social Change and Stratification* is a work of considerable subtlety, well deserving of scholarly attention. It follows in what seems to be a very promising pattern of social-science literature dealing with Eastern Europe, namely, studies based on much empirical work done in the East but written and published within the political sanctuary of the West.

IN CONCLUSION, it must be said that despite the obvious progress that has been made in behavioral studies of Communist societies, there will probably always be a gap between the state of research in this field and that in fields related to more open societies. It is a distant vision, for example, to imagine that the future will produce a study of political socialization in Eastern Europe comparable to the work of scholars such as Hess and Torney in their study of

[4] Joseph R. Fiszman, *Revolution and Tradition in People's Poland; Education and Socialization,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1972; Susan Lampland Woodward, "Training for Self-Management Patterns of Authority in Yugoslav Secondary Schools," unpublished PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 1974.

[5] Volgyes hypothesizes that the effect of family values on the political outlook of children, paramount in the earliest years of the child's development, begins to diminish as the child is exposed to influences outside the family, eventually succumbing to outside influences as the child grows to maturity. This interesting proposition would require years of research to be proven, and the many possible ramifications present a titillating research challenge. However, the likelihood of actually carrying out such a project—especially on a cross-national scale, and by Western social scientists—seems remote.

[6] Much of Matejko's data is drawn from the author's own first-hand research carried out during his sociological career in Poland between 1956 and 1968.



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the socialization process in the United States.[7] The data with which we must work are relatively scarce and inconsistent. Our access to most socialist societies is still severely limited in spite of the development of scholarly exchange programs. Politically sensitive topics can be studied only with great difficulty—and usually from within the confines of Western libraries. We are still working out the appropriate methodologies to deal with these constraints. Given all these problems, we must be satisfied with the prospect of fragmentary knowledge based partly on intuition, as well as with the inevitability of conclusions that are subject to periodic adjustment in the face of new evidence. This is of course true to some extent of social science in general, but in the field of Communist studies these constraints place a special premium on analytical modesty.

[7] Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children*, Chicago, Aldine, 1967.

# Hungary's Rural Transformation

## By Ivan Volgyes

LEWIS A. FISCHER and PHILIP E. UREN: *The New Hungarian Agriculture*. Montreal and London, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973.
JENÖ F. BANGÓ: *Das neue ungarische Dorf* (The New Hungarian Village). Bern, Verlag SOI, 1974.

IN 1973, a former Hungarian citizen who is now a professor at an American university returned to his native Hungary for his first visit since 1956. The professor was no naive youngster when he left Hungary; indeed, he had been one of the leaders of the Hungarian Peasant Party in the immediate postwar years and, among other qualifications, could list his graduation from the horrors of Mátyás Rákosi's jails. The professor spent several weeks in Hungary, during which he made several trips around the country, including a visit to his native village. After returning to the United States, he observed that his visits to the Hungarian countryside had forced him to conclude that the Hungarian authorities since 1956 seemed to have accomplished most of what he and other leaders of the Peasant Party had envisioned for the rural villages, the one obvious exception being the government's failure to create the type of political system they had anticipated.

Such reactions are not at all unusual, for many observers of the Hungarian scene return to the West with exciting descriptions of the rural transformation that has taken place in Hungary since the end of World War II. Indeed, this dramatic alteration of the entire agrarian setting of the countryside must rank as one of the outstanding accomplishments of the Communist regime in Hungary, even though it has not, as we shall see, been without its problems.

Competent Hungarian social scientists have analyzed and depicted this process of transformation in great volume and considerable detail. It is no wonder that the authors of the works reviewed here have been able to peruse only a small percentage of that literature and have chosen to concentrate on specific aspects of this broad topic. Before examining their particular contributions, however, it may be useful first to sketch in with a broad brush the dimensions of Hungary's rural transformation.

There have been five basic stages in this process. The first, lasting from 1945 through 1949, involved a major land reform, in which nearly one million landless peasants were given land by the government and those with very small plots had their acreage ex-



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panded to five cadastral holds (about seven acres). The redistribution of land was followed by a full-fledged collectivization drive in which private landholding was abolished, peasants were forced into collective farms, the surplus rural labor was driven into the cities, and the recalcitrants were herded into concentration camps. In this period Hungarian agriculture sank to hitherto unimaginable depths until conditions were moderated somewhat by the more lenient rural policies introduced in 1954 by Imre Nagy. The events of 1956 ushered in a third stage, lasting until roughly the end of the decade, during which the majority of the collectives were permitted to dissolve, others continued to exist in name only, and only a very few, mostly poor collective farms, actually continued to operate as units. The fourth stage of agrarian transformation—beginning in 1959 and lasting through 1967—was characterized by a comprehensive recollectivization which encompassed almost all the arable land. Although the methods of collectivization were far more gentle than those used in the early 1950's, the end result was the same—a collectivized agricultural sector capable of producing average yields no better and no worse than those of the collectives in the other socialist states.

A fifth and crucial stage of development in the life of the Hungarian countryside was ushered in with the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism on January 1, 1968. By allowing greater freedom of decision-making, by encouraging greater specialization, by forcibly merging nonproductive collectives with successful ones, by increasing the attention paid to the use of household plots, and by allowing the collective farms to engage in some industrial activity—in short, by offering financial rewards to the peasantry—the Hungarian government finally began to play a positive role in the transformation of the rural community.

SEVEN YEARS after the introduction of the reforms, one can begin to measure some of the results. On the positive side, there are a number of genuine accomplishments.

In the first place, the collective farms—or at least that third of the total which are characterized as "good farms"—now produce immense quantities of food, with yields that for the first time exceed those on private and household plots. This production brings substantial direct benefits to the collective farmers in addition to affording the collectives new investment possibilities. In 1974, the average income paid collective farmers for their work in collective fields was 2,602 forints (roughly US $130) per month versus 2,660 forints for the total socialist sector and 2,706 forints for wages of industrial workers. This means that by devoting even minimal additional effort to working his household plot, the average farmer can attain an income considerably higher than the average wage in industry. On the "good farms" the monthly average income seems to be above 3,500 forints.[1] In addition, a number of collective farms have been quite successful in investing their earnings in ancillary production of industrial and agricultural items for domestic and even foreign sales.

Secondly, a government policy of encouraging work on household plots[2] has reaped benefits not only for the farmers but for the society at large. Some 190,000 plots produce more than 40 percent of the country's vegetables, 25 percent of the pigs, and 15 percent of the cattle. For eggs the figure would range around 40-45 percent, although it could easily rise to 60 percent if one included all the eggs consumed directly by the farmers.[3] Through the sale of these products in the cities, the farmers augment their incomes, while the urban population also benefits by enjoying abundant supplies of fresh produce and meat.

As a result of these developments, the villages are prospering, with nearly half of them enjoying wealth unprecedented in the years of Communist rule.[4] Disposable income per rural family has grown some 70 percent in the decade since 1965.[5] This increased personal wealth has created a new upper class within the villages and has resulted in the

[1] *Statistical Pocket Book of Hungary, 1975*, Budapest, Statistical Publishing House, 1975, p. 148.

[2] The Hungarian government has expressed serious concern since 1970 over the loss of the private farmer population. Starting in 1974, it took steps to assist them by means of significant tax concessions, help in purchasing small-scale farm machinery, and other local measures, which, however, were often inadequately planned and uncoordinated.

[3] *Népszava* (Budapest), March 14, 1975, and *Szövetkezet* (Budapest), July 9, 1975.

[4] György Enyedi, "The Distribution [Regionalization] of the Agricultural Area in Hungary," *Földrajzi értesitö* (Budapest), No. 1, 1975, pp. 42-44.

[5] Derived from data in Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, *A Lakosság jövedelme és fogyasztása* (The Income and Consumption of the Population), Budapest, Statisztikai Kiadó, 1965, 1968, and 1974; and consumer price indexes published in the *Statistical Pocket Book of Hungary* for the years 1965-75. The basis of calculations is percentage growth of income of peasant households with both single and dual incomes, corrected for stated changes in the consumer price index.



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physical improvement of the villages themselves. More than 20,000 new houses have been built since 1965, many of modern A-frame or split-level designs contrasting sharply with traditional styles. They sport television antennas and display the newest furniture, and in the place of stalls, most now possess garages to accommodate nearly 20,000 new imported Zhiguli automobiles.[6] Weddings once again are lavish, with dowries frequently including a newly-built house and even an automobile.

Along with all these benefits, however, the rural transformation has also created problems that appear to be direct consequences of the very process of modernization. In the first place, the difference between the poorer and the richer agrarian areas has become increasingly evident, especially to those who live in the poorer regions and have not yet "made it." Such areas as the Orség, in southwestern Hungary, have remained backward and underdeveloped compared to the neighboring regions of Transdanubia, and their populations are disgruntled at the lack of government attention and the prospect of further neglect and decay.

A second problem is the aging of the population of the collective farms in general and of the poorer collective farms in particular. According to official sources, about 80 percent of collective-farm members are above 40 years of age.[7] The cities and towns have attracted the most intelligent, youthful, and industrious members of the collective farms. Nearly one million workers, mostly male, commute to work in the cities, frequently leaving their families for two weeks, a month, or even three months at a stretch to live in dormitories on the industrial outskirts of the cities. Meanwhile, their families remain in the traditional small village attempting to tend the household plot as well as work on the collective farms.

Finally, as a result of the increasing wealth of many villages, the overall aging of the agrarian population, and the changing values of the young people remaining in the countryside, there is a steady stream of sales of household plots to the collective farms. Especially the young—who desire five-day workweeks and vacations and other amenities unknown to their parents—no longer care to work on the household plots after eight to ten hours of hard work on the collective fields. Consequently, with a high percentage of the country's supply of livestock, milk, eggs, and meat products dependent on the household plots, the government has been forced to take ideologically unpalatable steps to induce the peasantry to continue working for personal profit on the private plots.

IN EXAMINING this process of rural transformation, Lewis A. Fischer and Philip Uren discuss effects of the New Economic Mechanism on Hungarian agriculture in general, but they concentrate particularly on the agriculture of a single county (Somogy) in western Hungary. Both authors —one from McGill University, the other from Carleton University— are specialists on East European agriculture uniquely qualified to attack this complex topic, but their book is disappointing even though it provides a good sampling of useful information. The problem is that the authors jump back and forth in both time and place, leaving the uninitiated reader confused rather than giving him a structured overview. While providing such trivial details as the number of sows at the Nagy Berek Collective Farm (721 to be exact), they fail to present data on such important indicators as the proportions of female and male workers on the collective farms, the number of commuters, or the number of total workers employed in agriculture.

There are also some contradictory figures. For example, on page 59 the authors mention 140,000 families on privately-owned farms in Hungary (farms "which avoided collectivization for a variety of reasons, particularly the inaccessibility of their land"). Yet, according to the official statistical yearbook, only 56,000 people in all of Hungary still had privately-owned farms in 1970.[8] (The authors themselves seem to recognize this on p. 84 when they state that 50,000 people work on private farms.) Again, they suggest on p. 116 that 45 percent of the agrarian labor force in Somogy county is over 40 years of age, whereas on p. 84 one finds the statement that more than 83 percent of the members of collective farms in that county are above 40 years of age. Such inconsistencies can hardly be laid at the door of the editors.

Despite these shortcomings, the authors do make some cogent comments on the transformation

[6] J. Györi, "New Style of Living in the Village," *Népszabadsag* (Budapest), Jan. 17, 1970. The cumulative total of Zhigulis imported reached the 100,000 mark in 1975; of these approximately 20,000 had been bought for use by the peasantry.

[7] Report by Benedek Toth in *ibid.*, April 6, 1976, as cited in *Radio Free Europe Research: Hungary* (Munich) May 11, 1976.

[8] Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, *Magyar statisztikai zsebkönyv, 1971* (Hungarian Statistical Yearbook, 1971), Budapest, Statisztikai Kiadó, 1971, p. 143.



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of Hungarian agriculture under the Communists, and their analysis is balanced and free of subjective criticisms of the social system. While generally recognizing the successes achieved, they are not blind to inherent problems, such as the unpromising prospects for the household and private plots, concerning which they state:

*Young men prefer to have a regular wage, to watch television in the evening, to visit a nearby town, and to buy processed foods. For these social reasons the days of the private plots seem to be numbered, although their life expectancy varies greatly from region to region. Impressive as the figures for private production may be, it is hard to envisage the system lasting in an increasingly capital-intensive, urbanized society. Their contribution is reminiscent of "digging for Britain," which may be well [sic] in an emergency but can hardly represent the wave of the future.* (p. 59)

The most important portion of the Fischer-Uren volume is the final chapter, where the authors present the following conclusions concerning Hungary's rural transformation:

*In attempting to assess the changes which the government is impressing on the Hungarian rural landscape, there are many factors to be considered. There is, first of all, the physical landscape itself, which irrespective of the policies or theories of the authorities, defines the basic character of the Hungarian countryside. Secondly, the Hungarian agricultural administrator has been confronted by a legacy from the past which has tended to limit the options open to him while, at the same time, obstructing some of the more promising solutions. Thirdly, much of the development which has taken place in the last twenty years has reflected the general trends in agriculture throughout the world. Fourthly, the influence of the Soviet Union and her model has been a substantial and often an inhibiting factor. . . . And finally, much that has taken place has been simply Hungarian and has reflected the Magyar character rather than any subtle combination of these other influences.* (pp. 111-12)

What does this all mean? At first glance one may be tempted to conclude from such an argument that the transformation of the villages in Hungary took place largely in spite of the efforts of the government. After all, the topography of the country and the climate defied the regime's attempt in the 1950's to make Hungary into a large cotton-producing country, just as much as the lack of mineral resources prevented the rulers from turning the country into a second Silesia. Furthermore, it could be argued that modern methods of farm management had been utilized in Hungary a long time before the war and that the regime's belated agrarian reforms merely recognized the native ability of the Hungarian peasantry and the innate shrewdness of the best peasant managers. Similarly, one could argue that the abandonment of the Soviet model was caused by a realization among the peasantry that an unproductive collective farm meant lower levels of personal income. And certainly the persistence of the stubborn Hungarian "national character" could be regarded as having been a major factor in Hungary's refusal to buckle under to an "alien order" that sought to impose an extreme collectivist behavior pattern.

Such arguments, however well-stated, would miss one essential point. For it *was*, after all, the agrarian policy of János Kádár, party First Secretary since 1956, that allowed these changes to occur. It was this policy that recognized the necessity of combining individual initiative with collective ownership, individual enrichment with collective wealth. Likewise, it was certainly this policy which slowly weeded out most of the unsuccessful collective farm chairmen and replaced them with better-trained managers without regard for their origins or party affiliation. It was again this policy that succeeded in convincing the peasantry of the necessity to adopt the attitude summed up in the Hungarian proverb of "*Ez van, ezt kel szeretni*" (This is what there is; this is therefore what you must love). The party's message that socialist ownership was there to stay filtered through to—and was finally internalized by—the peasantry, convincing it to accept the party's policies as offering the best possible solution to the problem of rural development. And finally, it was Kádár's policy that succeeded in molding a cautious national framework acceptable to the peasantry—a framework that emphasized national goals and values instead of Soviet goals and Communist values. Although continuing to pay lip service to the Soviet model and Communist goals, since 1968 the party has, with a wink in its eye, been telling the peasantry in effect: "*Enrichissez vous, enrichissez la Patrie.*"

UNLIKE Fischer and Uren, who are interested primarily in Hungarian agriculture, Jenö Bangó examines the changes in the Hungarian vil-



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lage from the perspective of a sociologist, emphasizing the social and political aspects of the transformation. In so doing, he devotes much of his book to discussions of sociological classifications and a review of the enormous sociological and developmental literature on such matters. To some extent, this tends to obscure or overshadow his most interesting insights into the concrete milieu of the new Hungarian village and the mentality of the inhabitants. Bangó identifies a new type of villager, a new type of peasant, possessing a mixed outlook which is no longer "peasant" but cannot yet be classified as totally "urban." The new house that this villager builds is characteristic of his new life-style and reflects his first major break with tradition; it is only large enough for a small family of perhaps two or three members and has insufficient space for future generations (p. 25). Bangó's delineation of the growing gap between the upper classes of the village and other rural elements and his analysis of the educational qualifications of the upper-class village communities is particularly good—the best such work to appear to date in a Western language. At the same time, he is careful to qualify his findings and candidly acknowledges the extremely grave difficulties that face Western analysts who attempt to study such problems as the question of double incomes in the rural family (p. 29).

Looking to the future, Bangó lists the following problems that are likely to continue to plague Hungarian rural society:

(1) the flight of the young, intelligent, and industrious from the land;

(2) the problems of rural-urban commuters;

(3) conflict between the attitudes of the new agrarian intellectuals and traditional rural outlooks;

(4) the increasing tendency to combine industrial and agrarian production functions; and

(5) possible tension between various new professional groups (agronomists, production managers of secondary industrial undertakings, collective farm bureaucrats) working with the farms and the traditional power structure of the villages.

EACH OF THESE two volumes examines different aspects of a major phenomenon—the transformation of the Hungarian village and peasantry from isolated communities and individuals into parts of an integrated national community. The process of integration has not been easy; nor will it be easy in the years to come. The image of the "stinking peasant," the uneducated, unintelligent dolt incapable of adopting modern attitudes, is slow to fade, even though advances in communications systems, most notably television, have helped modern attitudes make their way into the minds of the peasantry. Yet the plight of the commuters and the poor peasantry, the incredible problems of rural isolation perpetuated by inadequate and neglected road networks, and the hardships created as a result of rural consolidation have not yet been overcome. Nor is there any guarantee that the authoritarian and sometimes corrupt practices of collective-farm chairmen [9] have been completely eradicated. Regardless of these negative aspects and unresolved problems, however, the fact remains that the transformation of rural life in Hungary has been a remarkable and lasting accomplishment of the regime. The two volumes reviewed here serve as important reminders of that reality.

[9] The seriousness of the problem in earlier days is evidenced by the fact that in the four years preceding the beginning of the New Economic Mechanism nearly 10 percent of collective farm chairmen were sentenced by the courts for various crimes. One had even been reported to have gambled away his farm's property in a card game! See Dr. Imre Tar, "Concerning the Situation of Collective-Farm Chairmen," *Társadalmi szemle* (Budapest), February 1969, p. 21.



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# The Waning of the "German Question"

**By Henry Krisch**

WALTER HOFER, Ed.: *Europa und die Einheit Deutschlands: Eine Bilanz nach 100 Jahren* (Europe and the Unity of Germany: A Hundred-Year Balance Sheet). Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970.
FRANCOIS BONDY: *So sehen sie Deutschland* (So You See Germany). 2nd ed., Stuttgart, Seewald Verlag, 1970.
LASZLO GÖRGEY: *Bonn's Eastern Policy, 1964-1971*. Hamden, Conn., Shoe String Press/Archon, 1972.
HEINRICH END: *Zweimal deutsche Aussenpolitik: Internationale Dimensionen innerdeutschen Konflikts 1949-1972* (Dual German Foreign Policy: International Dimensions of Intra-German Conflict), Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1973.
DETTMAR CRAMER: *Deutschland nach dem Grundvertrag* (Germany after the Fundamental Treaty). Bonn, Verlag Bonn Aktuell, 1973.
DIETER MAHNCKE: *Berlin im geteilten Deutschland* (Berlin in Divided Germany). München, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1973.
ERNST R. ZIVIER: *Der Rechtsstatus des Landes Berlin: Eine Untersuchung nach dem Viermächteabkommen vom 3. September 1971* (The Legal Status of Berlin: An Inquiry into the Four-Power Agreement of September 3, 1971). Berlin, Berlin Verlag/Arno Spitz, 1973.
CLAUS ARNDT: *Die Verträge von Moskau und Warschau* (The Moscow and Warsaw Treaties). Bonn, Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1973.

HAS THE German question become obsolete? In a world distracted by resource and energy constraints, African and Middle East crises, and the uncertain stability of the détente between the superpowers, does anyone still care about German unity and destiny, about Berlin and its Wall, about the legacies of Otto von Bismarck, of Adolph Hitler, of Konrad Adenauer, of Willy Brandt? Presumably the Germans themselves care about these matters, although recent studies of German national consciousness such as that by Gebhardt Schweigler suggest that even they tend to see their affairs in a different light than heretofore.[1] But Germany and Berlin as the leading sources of European and world tensions seem to belong to a bygone age.

It is perhaps this shift in perspective that gives the books under review here a certain historical cast. In their varied ways, these works explore important questions, and since Berlin and Germany have not been entirely removed from political agendas, East or West, they provide useful background information and interpretive perspective. Yet the outcome of Bonn's *Ostpolitik* (and Moscow's *Westpolitik)* has been such that the questions with which they deal seem largely those of a previous age of world politics—although many of the events discussed took place less than half a decade ago.

In retrospect, the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Brandt can be seen as symbolic of the closing of an era when the infamous "German quarrels" disturbed mankind. Increasingly, a book on German affairs today, to be considered relevant, would have to investigate social policy and societal management in the two modernized German states, or the respective roles of the two states in their respective blocs, or perhaps (as a lingering echo) the relationship of national identity to political and social institutions.

IF "thinking about Germany in the night" no longer robs us of much sleep, how different it was in the hundred years preceding 1970. For the first three quarters of that time, Europe (and increasingly the

[1] Gebhard Schweigler, *National Consciousness in a Divided Germany*, Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1975.



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world) wondered what Germany would do, and how best to cope with the almost demonic energies released by the simultaneous achievements of Bismarck, the statesman, and Alfred Krupp, the arms manufacturer. Since 1945, past German power has affected the calculations of both policy-makers and populations, but the "German problem" has essentially been one of what to do about Germany as an object of policy, with the main actors—the United States and the Soviet Union—calculating how best to serve their own interests by means of appropriate German policies.

This brings us to the first of the books under review, Walther Hofer's symposium of reactions to the Bismarckian unification of Germany and its consequences. Despite the high quality of some of the contributions to this volume (Richard Lowenthal's excellent survey of the post-1945 Soviet-American confrontation over Germany will be of particular interest to readers of the present journal), the book as a whole is editorially and conceptually incoherent. Not all the papers cover the whole century since 1871, and in his introduction and conclusion Hofer cannot make up his mind on the central issue raised in his book: Could Europe and the world have "absorbed" the military-economic bloc a unified, dynamic Germany represented? Hofer and some of his coauthors point to the 1870's and again the 1920's as periods in which Germany might have found a peaceful place in Europe. But the first was a period of unusual German restraint, and the second was one of special German weakness. The problem of potential German hegemony remained constant and "unsolved" —unsolved, that is, in the sense that whereas previous threats to the European balance of power had been dealt with through wars, war was becomingly increasingly impracticable as an instrument of policy, given modern technology. Or rather, the "German wars" of the late 19th and 20th centuries (unlike those connected with, say, Louis XIV of France) were more than Germany and Europe could bear. They led to a situation in which the historically brief episode of Germany unity was ended and Europe as a whole was subjected to overwhelming peripheral (Soviet-American) influences.

While the victorious powers of the anti-Hitler coalition may not have intended German partition (albeit all of the Big Three toyed with schemes for one, two, or many Germanies), they did not propose to maintain German unity at the expense of objectives of more importance (to them)—of which the chief and overriding one was the denial of German resources to a potential foe. This bears emphasis: the issue central to German concerns after 1945 became a dead issue primarily because the German question as a whole was being dealt with by non-Germans.

Such a disregard of German interests is a striking feature of the rather superficial set of essays edited by François Bondy, in which a variety of politicians, professors, and journalists "respond" to the phenomenon of Germany. In the two most interesting contributions to the volume, Alfred Grosser provides an estimate of German responsibilities and opportunities written with the finesse of a leading scholar in the field, and Mando Aravantinou explores the conditions and attitudes of Greek migrant workers in Germany. However, all the chapters bear striking witness to the extent to which reactions to Germany are devoid of any sense of fear or awe. Perhaps this is because, to repeat a remark Grosser cites, "partition is the solution to the German question."

WE COME NOW to the subject of postwar intra-German politics.[2] The Germans' German policy in this period has gone through three broad stages. During the first period — say, until 1948 — Germans exercised whatever initiatives they were allowed to by the occupying powers. In almost every case, they did so on the assumption that German unity would be maintained—as, after all, the unity of Germany's chief allies, Italy and Japan, and of Austria, then subjected to a similar four-power occupation, was maintained. Moreover, all the Allied documents—including the Potsdam Declaration—spoke (to the German audience, among others) in terms of a united Germany.

For roughly two decades thereafter, Germans acted on the premise that the division of their country was maintained by force of the occupiers. While both East and West German leaders proclaimed the validity of their "model" for Germany and the desirability of its acceptance, the Bonn government, especially under Adenauer, was far more pleased than was the Communist

[2] The interested reader faces an overwhelming variety of studies on this general topic. A beginning may be made with Frederick Hartmann, *Germany Between East and West: The Reunification Problem*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1965; Wolfram Hanrieder, *The Stable Crisis*, New York, Harper and Row, 1970; Lawrence Whetten, *Germany's Ostpolitik*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1971; Peter Merkl, *German Foreign Policies, West and East*, Santa Barbara, American Bibliographic Center-Clio Press, 1974.



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regime in East Germany to accept German partition, and it acted accordingly. Adenauer legitimized democratic political forms in West Germany, presided over its economic growth, and, above all, secured its acceptance by the like-structured West European/North Atlantic communities. This was a substantial accomplishment, especially when the alternative of German unification seemed blocked by Soviet policy.

Beginning in the mid-1960's, however—under the pressure created by the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961—West German policymakers increasingly came to realize that their static and defensive policy, symbolized by the Hallstein Doctrine,[3] left them without an adequate response to the growing consolidation of the Communist regime in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). While it was not (yet) possible to approach East Berlin directly to arrange a *modus vivendi,* West German overtures to Eastern Europe multiplied from 1966 on, particularly under the Grand Coalition of 1966-69.[4] These overtures achieved one great success—recognition of the Bonn government by Romania in 1967.

Meanwhile, East German policy was based on two fundamental related premises: the precariousness of the GDR regime's legitimacy and the regime's inability to oppose Soviet policy to any substantial degree. Thus, during the decade ending in 1969, East Berlin followed—all tactical shifts aside—two basic policy lines: (1) it sought general and especially West German recognition; and (2) it strove not to be outbid by Bonn in the all-German competition. End, Mahncke, and Cramer all show clearly that the GDR's initiatives for German unification were predicated on Bonn's negative and static response. But, as these authors further demonstrate, when the GDR was confronted with Bonn's rising ardor for contacts with other East European states and its policies of "small steps" and "change through close contacts," the East Berlin regime recognized the potential perils of promiscuity and chose a prophylactic response—the notorious policy of *Abgrenzung.*[5]

The West German overtures toward the East, especially toward Eastern Europe at the expense of the GDR (in the era of "bridge-building"), met with Soviet opposition. Partly at GDR importuning, Moscow reacted initially by helping create the "Northern Triangle" in 1967-68 in order to insure that at least Poland and Czechoslovakia did not follow Bucharest's example. Then, in August 1968, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia and blocked domestic changes there that might have upset this edifice.

Moscow's response to Bonn's *Ostpolitik* forced West Germany to deal directly and primarily with the Soviet Union. Now, however, Bonn found the Brezhnev leadership ready to reach far-reaching accommodations on the German question. The result was the complex of agreements concluded in 1970-73. These included the Federal Republic's treaties with the USSR and Poland, the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin, and the Fundamental Treaty between the GDR and the Federal Republic.

Today, the two Germanies have all but normal diplomatic relations, both are UN members, and the GDR enjoys widespread recognition by the world's states. The GDR has normalized its position at the price of sharp demarcation from the Federal Republic; the Federal Republic has normalized its German stance by settling for a long-term policy of small improvements for the German population in East and West; there has been a normalization of the status of Berlin through a great-power agreement to maintain the existing rather ambiguous conditions of the city's existence; and there has been a normalization of the situation of Germany as a whole through acceptance of its partition, with varying degrees of relief, by most of the world—including most Germans, to judge by public opinion surveys.

THE BOOKS by Görgey, End, Cramer, Mahncke, Zivier, and Arndt all deal, in different ways, with this declining phase of the German problem. Laszlo Görgey surveys the evolution of Bonn's more flexible policy from the departure of Adenauer to the end of 1970. He clearly recognizes that Bonn needed to overcome its immobilism, although he seems to find it difficult to believe that any West German leaders might in principle favor an accommodation with the Eastern bloc.

Like many critics of Bonn's *Ostpolitik*, Görgey in effect

[3] According to this doctrine, the Federal Republic of Germany would break diplomatic relations (as it did with Yugoslavia in 1957) with any state that recognized the German Democratic Republic.

[4] The cabinet of the "Grand Coalition" of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) had Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (CDU) as Chancellor and Willy Brandt (SPD) as Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister. The Free Democratic Party provided the sole parliamentary opposition.

[5] *Abgrenzung* is, essentially, a policy aimed at severing and denying the existence of any common ties or "special" relations between East and West Germany.



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charges that the Brandt government failed to deliver on the goals of the Adenauer era—*i.e.*, to produce rapid and massive political changes in the GDR—without noticing that the Adenauer policy itself produced no movement at all toward these goals. Thus, he characterizes (p. 162) the 1970 Brandt-Stoph meetings at Erfurt and Kassell as showing that "the two systems are irreconcilable" (who claimed otherwise?), and that "obstacles to a minimum intra-German understanding remain insurmountable." The changes in West Berlin and West German access to the East, alone, make such views sound a bit strange. Unfortunately for Görgey, taking what William Zimmerman has called an "essentialist" view of Soviet policy [6] always leaves one vulnerable to surprise developments. Only a few months after he declared (p. 172) that the Soviet Union "will never pressure Pankow to make concessions . . . modifying [its] intransigence . . . toward Bonn," Soviet pressure secured the removal of Walter Ulbricht as a step to ensure ratification of the Federal Republic's treaties with the USSR and Poland and ultimately the conclusion of the Berlin agreement. As long as one thinks, with Görgey, that the Soviet Union cannot be interested in cooperation or cannot become involved in a network of cooperation because it cannot be shown *not* to be a threat to Western Europe, one will decry all détente policies—which he does in this book.

Many of the same events are covered in the late Heinrich End's interesting study of relations between East and West Germany from 1949 to 1972. End's book consists of two somewhat disjointed parts. The first part is an insightful narrative of the intra-German competition for international recognition and standing. Prior to 1972 each German state, committed to German unity in principle, tried to invoke international systemic forces to overcome the fact of domestic division. As End shows, the more powerful competitor in this contest, West Germany, was bound to lose. Being the leading German state, it was perpetually on the defensive, seeking to prevent recognition of the GDR by third parties. Consequently, the price of the success of its Hallstein-era policy was the at least potential enmity of third states—a potentiality which increasingly became a reality in the Third World. The GDR, on the other hand, simply had to claim equal status. With its every success—and in the mid-1960's its successes came more and more quickly, especially in the Arab world — the hopelessness of Bonn's position and the emptiness of its policy were underscored.

In the second part of his book, however, End attempts to use intra-German relations as a case study of international relations decision-making, and here he is not very successful. The brief discussion of GDR decision-making "circles," for example, does not explain nearly as much as Anita Mallinckrodt's full-scale study.[7] End usefully contrasts three relationships—confrontation, indifference, and cooperation—and evaluates each from the perspective of crisis-management capability. His own prescription for long-term, stable, and peaceful relations he labels "cooperative non-interference" — roughly, Bonn's policy under Brandt and Helmut Schmidt.

Where do the German states stand in relation to each other now? Dettmar Cramer, surveying the situation in Germany as of the summer of 1973, provides a perceptive analysis of the domestic factors influencing both government and opposition in the Federal Republic, and his account of East Berlin's unsuccessful attempts to use the breakthrough of *Ostpolitik* to establish its freedom from four-power control (characteristic especially of the late Ulbricht period) also affords stimulating reading. Cramer makes it clear that while the "German question" may have been put on ice, the domestic situation of each of the German states is now more in flux than ever—hence, of course, the GDR's frantic *Abgrenzung*. He also shows that the GDR lacked any carefully-thought-out, long-term German policy. Each new step in Bonn's *Ostpolitik* involved the GDR leaders in complications with the Soviet Union, as well as with the populace of their own country. Cramer ingeniously relates the GDR regime's fondness for public-opinion polling to its need for a sense of the possible in German affairs. He likewise demonstrates the GDR's abandonment of even verbal commitment to eventual political unification (pp. 60-65) and is very good on East German attempts to deny the continued existence of four-power rights, especially in Berlin (pp. 47-50.)

Reflecting the mood of the summer of 1973, Cramer is rather optimistic about the long-term

[6] In a paper presented to the 1972 meeting of the American Political Science Association in Washington, DC, and entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct: A Reconsideration," p. 6.

[7] Anita Dashbach-Mallinckrodt, *Wer macht die Aussenpolitik der DDR?* (Who Makes the Foreign Policy of the GDR?), Düsseldorf, Droste Verlag, 1972.



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impact of *Ostpolitik* on intra-German relations. One may criticize him on this score, for he pays insufficient attention to the basic Soviet interest in preserving tensions between the two Germanies. Not only has Moscow persisted in evincing a substantially less than enthusiastic attitude toward the Bonn government—attested to by such things as the difficulties that have halted plans to supply West Berlin's electric power from a West German-built nuclear power plant in Kaliningrad—but the USSR has a fundamental stake in seeing that intra-German relations do not become so warm as to deny it a role as arbiter of German affairs (shades of the 1830's!). Görgey is quite right in stressing this point. Moreover, as several authors in the Hofer and Bondy collections note, the USSR would not be the only state upset at overly close Bonn-East Berlin relations.

Of all the aspects of the German question, the most politicized both within Germany and in the world at large is the problem of Berlin. As Richard Merritt pointed out recently,[8] we still lack a definitive work on the 1958-62 Berlin crisis—and, one must add, on many other facets of this tangled tale as well. Fortunately, we now possess (in German at least) a first-class survey of the situation in and around Berlin. Dieter Mahncke's book provides historical background, chronological detail, the international and intra-German settings, and important documents on the Berlin problem. Particularly worthwhile is his discussion (pp. 104-16) of the conflict between Soviet and East German interests. Mahncke reminds us that for the GDR leaders Berlin is a central issue, especially for their self-perception (hence their interminable refrain that "Berlin is the capital of the GDR"), while for the Soviet leaders it is a marginal one, useful in large part precisely as an opportunity to assert their four-power responsibilities—*i.e.*, to reduce the independence of the GDR.

Mahncke provides a very useful detailed examination of social, economic, demographic, and psychological factors influencing the future viability of Berlin. While he recognizes that, after 1971 as before, the vitality of West Berlin rests on the "engagement of the Western powers and the practical help of the Federal Republic" (p. 263), he correctly and adamantly declares that the government and society of West Berlin must themselves elaborate sound and attractive plans for the development of Berlin. Mahncke reviews many of these proposals, properly discarding those that are unrealistic, politically motivated, or economically silly. He also offers an interesting suggestion for a Bonn-Berlin standing group to monitor compliance with the 1971 agreement and to work on general Berlin planning.

More than many other questions, the German and Berlin questions have become entangled in juridical complications. Two of the works under review provide some relief for the fatigued Berlin-watcher. Ernst Zivier's narrowly legal study of the interpretation of the 1971 Four Power agreement is useful to refer to when analyzing the latest Soviet note on the subject, but it is of little broader interest to political analysts. Claus Arndt performs a similar service within a somewhat broader context for the 1970 Moscow and Warsaw treaties. Arndt, as spokesman on these questions for the Social Democrat-Free Democrat coalition in the Bundestag, puts a good face on all controversial legal questions. In his 1972 statement to the Bonn legislature, he declared that in the absence of a peace treaty it was perfectly proper for the West German authorities to declare their own lack of jurisdiction over the territories beyond the Oder and Neisse. These lands were "forever lost to Germany," but not "as a consequence of these treaties" (p. 216).

LOOKING BACK at the events discussed in these books in the light of subsequent developments, it seems clear that all those prognosticators who anticipated substantial improvements in access to Berlin and the GDR from West Germany as well as some degree of intra-German cooperation and a substantial degree of normalization in Bonn-East European relations were correct. But those more pessimistic observers who warned that neither the Soviet Union nor the GDR viewed the results of *Ostpolitik* as a final resolution of the German problem were also correct. The disruption of traffic from West Germany to Berlin and the ensuing exchange of notes and messages to the UN by the four powers in the spring of 1975, the difficulties over the establishment of West German environmental and antitrust offices in West Berlin, the controversy over West Berlin's sports representation—these things were, to be sure, fairly mild stuff compared to the political-military confrontations of the past. Still, the revival of extreme—one might almost say

[8] Richard L. Merritt, "The Berlin Wall: What Was It All About?" *American Journal of Political Science* (Detroit), February 1973, pp. 189-95.



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silly—Soviet claims on Berlin was not a move likely to induce tranquility in Bonn and West Berlin.[9] We do not know, of course, how much effect internal Soviet factional politics may have had on Moscow's and East Berlin's recent behavior with respect to German affairs, although past experience indicates that they probably had considerable impact.

[9] The sequence of Soviet claims and their documentary refutation may best be followed in Joachim Nawrocki's account in *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), June 27, 1975, p. 6. See also Hans Heinrich Mahnke, "On the Status of Berlin," *Deutschland Archiv* (Köln), August 1975, pp. 835-42.

At any rate, the Berlin issue, as Joachim Nawrocki has remarked, has not been "solved"—rather, a deal has been made to regulate existing circumstances.[10] And since the "existing circumstances" are ambiguous and indeed involve a measure of stated disagreement as to facts, Berlin remains a potential trouble spot and a convenient place for Moscow to signal turns in Soviet policy.[11]

Nevertheless, the web of normality foreseen by the architects

[10] *Ibid.*, July 1975, pp. 704-07.

of the Bonn *Ostpolitik* — that lengthy state of *Nebeneinander* (coexistence) that may in a fairly far-off future lead to *Miteinander* (merger)—has begun to envelop the two Germanies, including even Berlin, and to slowly relegate the German question to the past.

[11] The ambiguity of the situation, however, renders it difficult to interpret just exactly what Soviet intentions might be in specific instances. To see just how far interpretations of the same sequence of events can differ, one need look only at the discussion by Joachim Nawrocki and Dettmar Cramer of the 1975 Soviet note to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim in the "Forum" section of *ibid.*, pp. 704-10.



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# Notes & Views
# Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, *Problems of Communism*, US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20547.

## SOVIET REPRESSION, PAST AND PRESENT

TO THE EDITORS: All students of Soviet politics are in Jerry Hough's debt for his writings on the subject. We have come to expect from him a high level of analysis based on meticulous collection of data organized in fresh and original ways. His latest contribution to *Problems of Communism*, "The Brezhnev Era: The Man and the System" (March-April, 1976), fully lives up to expectations. But a few of his interpretations seem so at odds with generally accepted views (or at least with my personal reading of the situation) that they ought to be challenged in order to give Mr. Hough a chance to elaborate.

Hough says (p. 8) that "the Brezhnev period has *not* been a period of growing repression of individual freedom," which point he supplements (p. 9) by adding that "dissenters have been treated with considerably more gingerliness than they were in the Khrushchev era." Unless Hough is using "individual freedom" and "dissenters" in some highly idiosyncratic way, I can't see that the statements are reasonable at all. Although Khrushchev's actions may have sprung from his own tactical motivations, he allowed Solzhenitsyn to be published and permitted *Novyi mir* and other journals a degree of literary room for maneuver that hasn't been approached since. Although these and other examples from the Khrushchev era don't exactly amount to freedom of speech (Hough's context for the point about treatment of dissenters), they come much closer than what has followed. Khrushchev's actions ushered in two periods of post-Stalin thaw (1956-57 and 1961-62) that have no parallel since his ouster. The frankness and relative honesty of discussions of shortcomings during these periods and the proposals in open publications for *political* reform (as opposed to proposals for mere *policy* changes, which are more characteristic of the present period) are not to be found during the Brezhnev era.

We know considerably less about dissenters during the Khrushchev period than during the Brezhnev period. Certainly there were fewer during the former. It seems likely that the dissent movement grew in large part out of disappointment over the unrealized promise of the Khrushchev thaws. A major manifestation of this disappointment was *samizdat* and the protests associated with it. There was relatively little *samizdat* under Khrushchev. Most people agree that the protest movement received its real impetus from the repression of the purveyors of *samizdat* (or *tamizdat*) during the post-Khrushchev period. The Siniavskiy-Daniel trial in February 1966 is a particular watershed in this respect. In other words, the kind of repression of dissenters that has occurred during the post-Khrushchev era had no analogue when Khrushchev was in power.

Finally, the level of repression is probably judged best not by us on the outside but by those who experience it. My impression from discussions with Soviet friends during visits to Russia after 1964 is that in general the atmosphere has been more repressive than under Khrushchev. Further talks with numerous recent Soviet émigrés only support this point. Acknowledging all of his faults, many émigrés comment on how people could breathe a bit easier and talk a bit more freely under Khrushchev (a number of comments to this effect may be found in Irina Kirk, Ed., *Profiles in Russian Resistance*, New York, Quadrangle, 1975).

Part of Professor Hough's judgment about the differences between the Khrushchev and Brezhnev regimes is based on the data he has gathered on political participation. Hough's interest in participation will be familiar to those who have read certain of his earlier writings, one of which he cites here. Participation, for Hough, has two aspects: "the broadening of participation in policy debates" and "an increase in the scale of participation in different types of groups and in voluntary work for governmental and other political institutions" (p. 10). On the first mode of participation he states that "debates are fuller and more wide-ranging" under Brezhnev and that the top of the political hierarchy in recent years "has done much less to override the judgments of the relevant specialists (and power centers) in the various policy areas." These are extremely broad state-



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ments, and Hough offers only a few examples to support them. It would be my guess that the generalization could not be sustained over very many fields. It certainly isn't true, in my opinion, in the field of law, the subject that I follow most closely. But this is really somewhat beside the point, because, as I shall argue below, these developments, even if they are as Hough has stated them, have little to do with "freedom of speech" and "repression of individual freedom," the yardsticks by which Hough in these passages set out to measure the Brezhnev regime.

On the second mode of participation, Hough cites published Soviet figures which show sizable increases over the last two decades in the number of party and Komsomol members, local soviet deputies, trade union members, *druzhinniki*, and members of other "voluntary" organizations. Hough calls this "political participation," but I find it hard to take this assertion seriously. Does it really make any sense to call Komsomol or trade union membership either "voluntary" or "political participation"? The very structure and ground rules by which these organizations (and some of the others cited by Hough) operate serve to deny the possibility of meaningful participation.

Approaching participation from another direction, Professor Walter Connor in these pages recently came to different (and in my mind, more persuasive) conclusions on the subject ("Generations and Politics in the USSR," September-October 1975). Connor argues that one of the main characteristics of current Soviet political culture is the apoliticality of the population. The educational system, communications media, and other extra-familial socialization instruments, including the various collectives to which an individual may belong, serve to depoliticize the populace. They "assure the public that there *are* no more major domestic political issues" (p. 23). In other words, most of the organizations that Hough cites to demonstrate increased political participation don't engage in participation at all; at most they engage in a charade of participation. Most Soviet citizens understand this role and, because of their essential apoliticality, don't find it strange. "To them," according to Connor, "politics, insofar as its existence is perceived, is the business of the leaders, not of the common folk" (p. 23). Connor goes on to talk specifically about *genuine* political participation. Not surprisingly, he finds that (aside from what goes on in certain areas of party and governmental activity) the only participation worthy of the name that exists among members of the general populace is that practiced by the dissidents. In the eyes of the Soviet authorities, this is their "heresy," which is "rooted not so much in opposition as in laying claim to participation. To be a dissident is to enter politics without a license, to participate without official sponsorship. It is to attempt (as do the writings of the Solzhenitsyns, Medvedevs, and Sakharovs) to *restore* 'politics' as a weighing of alternatives. This is the major crime of the dissenters; their break with the apoliticality of the mass political culture" (p. 24).

In sum, then, Hough cites figures showing the membership growth of certain organizations, but the participation he ascribes to these organizations is in large part sham participation at best. He argues that consultation among specialists is broader and more meaningful. But even if this is true, such consultation is carried out within strictly circumscribed rules of the game; and on a number of very important issues, not even the façade of such consultation is maintained. Finally, as suggested earlier, it is quite misleading to connect either of these developments with "freedom of speech" or "individual freedom." Political participation, as defined by Hough, could easily coexist with increasing restrictions on these Soviet constitutional guarantees. That, in fact, is closer to what has been happening in recent years, in my opinion, than the picture Hough describes.

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PROFESSOR HOUGH REPLIES: There seem to be several points of disagreement between Professor Barry and myself. The first involves trends in the Soviet Union over the last dozen years. Judgments about trends are, of course, based on judgments about both the beginning and the end of the period, and in this case the disagreement may be primarily about the former. I think Professor Barry has a far too rosy picture of the "good old days" under Khrushchev. It is absolutely clear that dissenters were ruthlessly suppressed under Khrushchev (see, for example, Chapter 1 in Pavel Litvinov's *The Trial of the Four)* and extremely unclear that the possibility of proposing political reform was so great.

The evidence on the Brezhnev era is voluminous, and since I have laid out much of it both in the *Problems of Communism* article and in "Political Participation in the Soviet Union" (*Soviet Studies,* January 1976), it seems inappropriate to do so again. I will only say that the vast majority of my research over the last eight years has centered on the question of participation in the Soviet Union and the West (indeed, one-quarter to one-third of my teaching has been on the subject), and while in an abstract way I will always admit that I can be wrong, I really have no personal doubts whatsoever that, on balance, the freedom to participate and the extent of meaningful participation are greater in 1976 in the Soviet Union than they were in 1964. So far as the dissenters are concerned, clearly they have gotten away with more *samizdat* and especially with more transmission of documents to Western journalists — and for a longer period of time—than they would have under Khrushchev.

A second difference between us may be a methodological one. As I have argued in the political participation article and especially in "The Soviet Experience and the Measurement of Power" (*Journal of Politics,* August 1975), I think we give far too little attention to these matters. Even aside from more esoteric methodological points, it seems to me that we



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need to become much more rigorous in our assessment of émigré and dissenter evidence.

The Harvard Refugee Project back in the days of the so-called "cold war" scholarship was extremely cautious in the type of questions it asked and the conclusions it drew. Now that we are dealing with an emigration that is *far* less random (indeed, one that comes in large part from a minority whose view must be shaped by the existence of anti-semitism), we are no longer exercising as much care. Perhaps my skepticism has become too great because of my four years of experience at the University of Toronto listening to the New Left American émigrés as they told Canadian listeners about the true nature of the American system, but surely the question of collaborative and documentary evidence is one that a scholar must continually raise. The need for it is particularly great when any group — émigré or otherwise, Soviet or otherwise — begins talking nostalgically about the good old days when they were young. And this is especially true when we recall that good old Khrushchev was initiating the execution of people (primarily with Jewish names) for economic crimes, suppressing *Dr. Zhivago*, instituting exile of "parasites" by public meeting, and so forth.

The third major point of disagreement between Professor Barry and myself concerns the definition of "political participation." To say that the only political participation worthy of the name is that practiced by the dissidents is to use a definition of participation that is often found in Soviet studies, but that is highly idiosyncratic in the literature on political participation in general. Gabriel Almond considers even awareness of the existence of the national government a form of participation, while David Easton would say that a person who tells a friend that the government should do something about inflation is not only engaged in the input of a demand into the political system, but is serving as a gatekeeper.[1] American studies of membership in politically-relevant groups invariably include church groups, sports clubs, fraternity organizations, the PTA's, adult work in the Boy Scouts, and so forth. Precinct party work —often not all that different from Soviet propaganda and agitation — is considered a sign of a very high level of political activity. I find it wholly wrong to call the United States a participatory society on the basis of such phenomena and then to say that in the Soviet case only frontal attacks on the fundamentals of society constitute political participation.

Undoubtedly the American political system features types of political participation that are not found in the Soviet Union or are found there in very truncated form. But to say that the absence of *some types* of participation means the absence of participation in general is to throw the baby out with the bath water. Even if one wants to discount such activities as trade union and Komsomol membership, involvement in various Komsomol and trade union committees and commissions is far from involuntary, and there is much evidence to suggest that an individual can make an impact through it. The thought that the involvement of over 4 million deputies and non-deputies in work of the committees of the local soviets (which may meet a half-dozen times a year) has no meaning is as difficult for me to accept as the claim that the Soviet population is completely apolitical when 21-22 percent of all men between the ages of 30 and 60 are members of the Communist Party.

To neglect the participation that obviously goes on in the Soviet Union and to concentrate only on the limitations is to destroy the possibility of any meaningful comparisons between the Soviet Union and the West, for we have shifted our definition. Moreover, we have foreclosed the examination of a question of crucial theoretical importance: Of the various types of political participation that exist in the West, which do in fact have an impact upon the distribution of power and the nature of policy outcomes? As I tried to demonstrate in "The Soviet Experience and the Measurement of Power," the answers which we instinctively accept rest on little more than ideological faith.

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[1] See Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1966; and David Easton, *Systems Analysis of Political Life*, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1965.

## CORRECTION

In the article, "The Brezhnev Era: An Economy at Middle Age," by Gregory Grossman (*Problems of Communism*, March-April 1976), there was an omission in the sentence beginning on page 28, column 2, line 24. The sentence should read (with the previously omitted words in italics): "It means that, after allowance for depreciation, the real annual additions to *the increment of* the total fixed capital stock may now be, in relation to the capital stock itself, only (very roughly) half as large as they were in the past . . . ."

## MORE ON "GESTAPU"

TO THE EDITORS: I am indebted to your journal for making me aware of the availability of the CIA research study of the 1965 coup attempt in Indonesia (letter from Guy J. Pauker, May-June 1976 issue, p. 88). A reading of this study evokes one or two observations which may be of interest to your readers.

Americans accustomed for so many years to eyewitness coverage of Southeast Asia may have difficulty remembering that such a momentous event as the Indonesian coup attempt occurred in the virtual absence of foreign press coverage. Reporters in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong, and elsewhere were hard put to make sense out of the radio broadcasts of Untung's decree and decisions, and there was the usual amount of seat-of-the-



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pants analysis which substitutes in those circumstances for hard facts. In this instance, the temptation to affirm that the PKI stood to gain mightily was almost universally succumbed to.

The latter-day Sukarno's Indonesia was not hospitable to foreign journalists, and I was lucky enough to be one of the first of these to be granted a visa in October 1965. Our small group—Americans for the most part, but also including Japanese and Indians—set about immediately to investigate and report the events of the preceding days. The CIA study now declassified constitutes a striking testimonial to the superiority of this method over exegesis from afar cloaked in scholastic terminology.

I think I am in a position to state correctly that we were able to reconstruct (1) in some detail the sequence of events on Oct. 1; (2) the main movements of the principal figures on Oct. 1; (3) the fact of infiltration of army units by the PKI prior to Oct. 1; and (4) the ambiguity of Sukarno's position as revealed by accounts of his statements to associates on and following Oct. 1.

But the CIA study fills two large gaps in the knowledge we acquired in 1965. The masterly detailing of how the coup itself was plotted by the PKI's Special Bureau fills one such gap; obviously, we had no inkling of the goings-on in the Aerial Survey Office, for instance. Secondly, the fact that Sukarno learned of Nasution's escape before the plotters did, had we known it then, would have made our picture very much clearer.

With respect to Sukarno's role in encouraging the coup, however, we are hardly better off today than we were in 1965. The circumstantial evidence we collected then, plus a good deal more cited in the CIA study (and distinctly labeled as circumstantial), implicates him in a way that suggests he was more than sympathetic to the coup plotters' purposes. But the hard evidence, if it exists, has not been produced.

Sukarno is reported to have said following Oct. 1 that the Indonesian revolution had been set back to 1957. This statement is entirely consistent with his view of the history of the revolution as a wave-like motion, which he was enunciating in 1965. In an article published in 1966, I concluded: "The fault lay in not taking Sukarno at his word, and in failing to recognize that at the pinnacle of its success the PKI exhibited a strange indecisiveness that betrayed its lack of independence." ("The Attempted Coup in Indonesia," *The China Quarterly* [London], January-March 1966, p. 168.)

Who, on rereading Sukarno's numerous, explicit statements in the days preceding Oct. 1, can doubt that he saw himself leading the revolution into a radically new phase, that of the Indonesian People's Republic? That he saw himself doing this to save Indonesia from the forces of reaction in the person of the Council of Generals? For a leader who cultivated even the secrecy surrounding the state of his health in order to foment the plotting against the alleged Council by the party which had largely invented that Council, for someone who was prepared all along, apparently, to sacrifice the PKI to its enemies in the event the tide turned, there can be only one description: the supreme political manipulator of the 20th century, overshadowing Hitler and Stalin.

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